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Preface
It has been my desire to carry out this study of my
six year son and hie companions impersonally, and

und~r

the conditions laid down I think that this is possible.
Th·e one effect of the relationship of mother and son in
the observations as carried on, it seems to me, comes ·from
the very naturalness of the attitude which the child has
with me, the observer.

Therefore, he feels no restraint

whatever and because of that the panorama of his thoughts
unfolds easily and in an entirely unhampered fashion.

In

the test periods I have tried to create a happy friendly
relationship with each one of the group.

I sat in their

play and school groups part of every day for a month and
became an accepted onlooker before attempting any individual work.

However, I realize fully that the happy years

of companionship I have had with David can never be
approached with any of them.
This study of the members of this group of twelve is
offered simply as an accompaniment to the fuller study of
David, and not as an exhaustive scientific study in any
sense.
In a letter from M. Bovet, a director of the Institut

J.J. Rousseau, Geneva, Switzerland, and a co-worker with

v
M. Piaget, we have the information that experiments based
on Piaget's findings have been carried on in Germany by
several, among them Professor Katz and his wife, and in
Cambridge, Engla.nd,

by

Mrs. Isaacs; also that M. Piaget

is preparing a general review and discussion of some
papers which have appeared in different countries in
regard to his theories.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
It must be made clear in the very beginning that the
basis for this thesis is the two volumes by Dr. Jean Piaget,
· Institut J. J. Rousseau, Geneva, Switzerland, The Language
and Thought of the Child and Judgment and Reasoning in the
Child; hence the very small bibliography, the material used
being observations and experimental tests based on these
volumes,l
Much has been written heretofore on the vocabulary and
phonetics of child language, piling up statistics on the
number of words various children have acquired at different
ages and on the sentence structure (number of adjectives,
adverbs, ·C onjunctions, etc.) used at different ages. 2 In
the division of the year book referred to, on studies in
language development, one hundred forty-three books are
listed and various others referred to in the discussion of
the problems.

1

Throughout this thesis these volumes will be referred to
as L.T. and J,R.

2 Of. The
.
Twenty-eighth, Year-Book of the National s ociety
for Study of Education--Preschool and Parental
Education: Studies in Language Development, 495-568.

a
Ohild thought back of its language has

~uzzled

psy-

chologists since child study has been a matter of interest.l
It remained for Dr. Piaget in his keen,

logio~ c.,manner

to

pull aside the curtain of mere vocabulary and analyze the
thoughts of childhood; a for in.s tance, the reasons why they
use so few conjunctions and why they use certain ones more
frequently than others, what they mean by the ones they
use, etc., and what all this is evidence of in child thought.
In true scientific spirit he gives the results of his
careful and tireless research, opens up the field to fellowworkers and invites others to further study, offering his
own findings as guide-posts, not as final ends.

As a result

of his studies he puts child thought in just as distinct a
class as •primitive• thought or the •autistic• thought of
the pscyhoanalyst.

To this class he gives the name •ego-

centric• (for reasons given later) and places it midway
between autistic and social thought.
The distinguishing feature of this world of child
thought is ego-centrism (intellectual, not ethical, and by
no means to be thought of as secretive), the child's self
being bound up with his every concept and bij of reasoning.
However, the child is entirely unconscious of this situation.
1

of. E. Olaparede: Preface, ix., to L.T.

2of. E. Olaparede: Preface, ~i., to L.T.

Only by socioalizing processes is a change wrought in the
child's mind and he comes finally to develop·pure reasoning.
For in so far as he is thinking only fo~
himself, the child has no need to be aware of the
mechanism of hie reasoning. Hie attention is
wholly turned toward the external world, towards
action, in no way directed toward thought as a medium interposed between the world and himself. In
so far, on the other hand, as the child seeks to
adapt himself to others, he creates between himself
and them a new order of reality, a new place of
thought, where speech and argument will henceforth
hold their sway, and upon which operations and
relations which till then have been the work of
action alone will now be handled by imagination and
words. The child will therefore have to become conscious to the same extent of these operations and
relations which till then remained unconscious
because they were sufficient for the purposes of
action.l
In other words, the process of learning an
operation on the verbal plane will reproduce the
same incidents as had arisen when this operation
was being learned on t i1 e plane of action •••• This
shifting from action to thought can be observed
at every turn.2
These two processes are condensed into the "law of
conscious realization• and the "law of shifting."

Of

the first, Piaget says,
This law seems to us fundamental for esta~
lishing relations between the functional
factors of childish thought,particularly between ego•centrism and the absence of social
needs, and the atructural features which define
childish logic.3

1

.!L4i·' 213.

2

J.R., 214.

3-·· .
·' J.R!·· , 213.

4

Until the socializing process has had i ·ts way the child
is incapable of reasoning as an adult reasons, on logical
grouqds; ego-centrism of child thought being accompanied by

(1) proneness to

j~taposition

(placing of concepts side

by side on equal basis, without relationship), (2) syncretism, or thinking in confused wholes, and intellectual
realism---he sees only what he knows and connects everything
1

with his own mental schema, so he connects everything with
everything else and justifies it at any price.
,..

This all

l~ad.s to ( 3) ';·recausal.i ty, an ignorance of the distinction
between the physical and the psychical, therefore a tendency to regard ·the world as endowed with both these qualities
at the same time.
;ticUlfl.l" to

(4)

Transduction--he reasons from par-

particul~ ,..not

by synthesis.

He builds no

hierarchies of relationships, therefore he forgets what he
has previously said when he has adopted a new particular.
So he contradicts himself and he cannot retrace the steps
of his own reasoning until, by contact of his own ideas
with and adjustments to those of other people, his thought
becomes socialized and he learns to see relationships

in

hierarchies and thus to build up synthetic wholes, to
separate his reasoning processes from hie point of view,
to

ret~ace

hie steps of reasoning, in short, to reaaon

abstractly.
Such, in a very condensed form, is the field for

5

investigation into the realm of child thought built up on
the basis of its ego-centrism.
Piaget 1 s two vg_lumes, !he Language and Thought of
the Ohild and Jud~ent and Reasoninf in the Child
constitute a firs psychological ou line. of the
Dogie of Childhood.~
Piaget concludes that there are four stages of modality of child thought: (1) From birth to 2-3 years--reality

is simply and solely what is desired: (2) From 2-3 to 7-8
years--heterogeneous but equal realities, world of play and
world of observation; jumps quickly from one to the other;
(3) From 7-8 to 11-12 years--beginning of hierarchical
arrangement; (4) From 11-12 years on to complete hierarchical arrangement, that is, formal thought and logical
assumption.
Now the age with which I wish to deal particularly is
the six-year-old child.

This should be of special interest

because Piaget devotes much time in The Language and Thought
of the Child to his findings with this age of Swiss-French

children, taking two at the Institut J.J. Rousseau for long
periods of observations.
My observations include the study of my son, David,
age 5:10-6:2, individually at home and together with his
play-group and school-group (low first grade, Woodrow
Wilson School, Stockton, California).

In this school group

1 oomment in the ·Twenty-eiihth Yea,r;-Book of the NationBJ.
.
·society for Study of ducation~Preschool 8Jld Parental
Education; Studies in Language Development, 565.

"

,, 0..

.

only those ·took part in the general

conversa~ion

I
or we1e .

members of the smaller groups during the observation periods
are considered.

E~erimenta~

tests were carried on with a

special group of twelve children from the larger group.
These e;periments began three months before the mental tests
were given, the genera.l observations extended over four months
including vacation.

The children at home are designated

throughout by initial, those at school by number.
Before setting forth theee observations, one criticism
of Piaget•s method is offered.

As far as can be discerned

he bases his entire study according to the chronological age
of the child.

Because of the wide variation in the mental

age of children of the same chronological age, it would
seem a very important oversight.

Surely all children do

not reach the same stage of thought and language development at the same chronological age of 2-3, .7-B, 11-12 years,
or even at these mental ages, for the I.Q. ' of the child
has a greater influence than the mental age in determining
his rate of development.

There seems to be an indication

that those of a high I.Q. are developing more rapidly in
these distinctions than children of the same
but lower I.Q.
our

observ~tioa

menta~

age

However, in group average, the group under
(as will be shown) corresponds to the aver-

age mental age rather than to the chronological.
1urther .research is needed since Piaget has opened
up the field and has himself neglected to emphasize anything

7

but chronological age.

Even if he is

establ~shing

norms

they should be more closely allied to those by which mental ages and I.Q.Ja are secured.

These allow much more

for individual differences in their establishment.
In view of these facts we have obtained through a
group test1 the mental age and I.Q. of the groups observed.
It should be understood therefore that these are only
indicative and not to be taken as being as reliable as
individual tests, since they do not bring out so thoroughly
fine points in individual development.
The following table gives the chronological and
mental ages of the school group observed, and arranges the
children in the order of their I.Q.•s.

The numbers starred

are those in the smaller group of twelve described in the
following chapter.

M.A. O.A.

M.A. O.A.

.....
8 ·0

l4.A.

O.A.

7:9

•No. 19

6:10

6:9

No. 11

7:9:. 7:2

*No. 20

6:7

6:6

6:7

No. 12

7:2

6:7

No. 21

6:8

6:7

7:7

6:2

No. 13

7:3

6:9

No. 22

7:6

7:5

*No.

5 8:0

6:8

No. 14

7:1

6:7

No. 23

7:0

7:1

•No.

6

7:11 6:8

•No. 15

7:6

7:1

No. 24

6:11

7:5

•No.

7

7:8

6:8

No. 16

7:11 7:6

No. 25

6:4

6:10

*No.

8

7:11 7:0

No. 17

6:6

No. 26

7:7

8:5

··wo.

9

6:11 6:1

*No.

1

8:1

6:2

•No. 10

*No.

2

8:3

6:5

*No.

3

8:3

•No.

4

1

6:2

No. 18 7:3 7:1
No. 27 7:7
8:8
Average for group of 12• ••• 7:8 ••• 6:8

Detroit Primary Tests.

Some explanation regarding this table is necessary.
All children who ever made any remarks in the group are listed,
but some of them, shy by nature, made so few that individually
they make no perceptible difference in the group findings.
The

~otive

for including them is to show the relative pos-

ition in the larger group of those who did the most talking.
This is to be said, however, that no one in the first twentytwo out of the twenty-seven is below the I•Q. of the lowest in the smaller group of twelve.

The only one below that

mark who made enough remarks to consider at all is No. 27,
who · talked frequently.
In the free conversation period at school the group
of twelve made 71% of all spontaneous remarks and when the
children in the play period at school broke up into smaller
groups I always chose for observation the particular one
~ontaining

the largest number of the twelve children in the

e;perimental group, hence 90% of the

spon~aneous

conversa-

tion is here carried on by these twelve.
In home play it was impossible to obtain the mental
ages of all the ten children who ever played in these periods.
However, the one,

s.,

who played most constantly with D.,

and who, with him, made 73% of all the remarks in home play,
had M.A. 7:3; O.A. 5:4, by the same tests which were given to
the other children at school.

The four children who did

90% of the talking in home play had average M.A. 7:9, C.A.
6:4.

The other 10% of remarks were divided between six

children so did not affect the findings to any great extent

.9

in comparison to these four in 90% of remarks.

This was as

accurate a statement as could be obtained under the circumstances.

CHAPTER II
Methods and Purposes of Observations
In this study the observations of the child or children
have been divided into six groups.
has been one-half hour in length.

Each observation period
The method in the first

four groups has been to take down verbatim, under all the
conditions .of the various groups, the spontaneous language
of the child.

No artificial conditions were produced, for

these would have nullified the purpose of the observations.
In all the groups a study has been made of remarks of an
ego-centric character and of socialized remarks.
(1)

At ·the family meal the purpose was to determine

the extent to which the child entered into the general conversation and adapted his own remarks to it, and to study
and analyze his questions and his use of conjunctions.
(a)

--

During the half-hour of conversation with the

writer the method was to let the conversation be directed
by the child's inclinations entirely and develop naturally
along these lines.

It is also important to note that the

child chose the activity to be engaged in, whether games,
puzzles, story-telling, or just a quiet talk, usually at
bed-time.

His remarks were answered when he e;pected an

answer but no attempt was made to direct the conversation.
Here also his questions and use of conjunctions were studied

ll

and analyzed.
(3)

In the play-groups at home and at school, the

purpose as before was to study their questions and· use of
conjunctions and to determine the stages of conversation
represented.
(4)

During the free conversation period at school the

child%en were perfectly free to express themselves.

They

usually told of some experience or showed something they had
made or possessed.

~ae

rest of the group listened, asked

questions, criticized or offered suggestions if they felt
inclined.

They simply drew their chairs into a circle;

someone had something he was anxious to tell the group about,
and once begun the conversation took its own natural course.
Here again their questions, their use of conjunctions, their
proneness to juxtap9sition, and their stages of conversation
were studied.
(5)

In a special group of twelve (the ones starred in

the list given in the previous chapter) experimental tests
were given.

Here the procedure in the other groups of

following the natural drift of their spontaneous conversation was laid aside, and they were set definite tests to
determine (1) their use of the conjunctions 'because',
'although', and 'therefore'; (2) their ability to pick
out absurdities in sentences given and tell their reason
for thinking them absurd; (3) their ability to handle
'brother (or sister)' and 'right and left 1 situations

12

relatively; (4) their ability to cope with

t~e

syllogism;

(5) their definitions of words designated by Piaget, in-

volving relative ideas, as 'half', 'part•, 'brother•,
'family', etc.: (6) their idea of 'life', and of 'strength',
taking P1aget 1 s lists and asking of each thing, "Is it alive,"
and "Why?" (or

1

Why nott•), •Is it strong?" and "Why? 1

(or •Why ·nott"); (6
(6)

Experiments were tried with the same twelve

children by twos to test in story-telling their ability to
understand each other and to reproduce stories and

e~lan

ations.
Such was the procedure followed to obtain the material
for analysis, always based on the methods followed by Piaget
in his study.

The one point of difference, however, always

to be kept in mind is that in our conclusions emphasis is
laid on the mental age together with the chronological,{or
according to I.Q.), whereas Piaget 1 s seem ·to take into consideration only the chronological age.
e~tended

These observations

over a period of four months (including school

vacations).

The material obtained from these observations

consists of the following number of remarks:
With .

Without

answers

answers

Of all children in groups:
In school play •••••••••••••. 694 .••••••••••• 651
In home play ••••••••• ~ ••.•.•• 743 •••••••••••• 691

-
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In free conversation

(sc~ool)

744 ••....••• 636

In all play g.roups •.•••••...• l437 ••••••••• l342
In all groups •••••••.•••••••• 2181 ••.•••••• 1978
Of D., the individual child studied:
At bed-time ••••..•........••• l031 ••••••.•• 982
At meal-time ••••••••.......•• 613 ••••••••• 540
At home (with adults, next older brother being
12:8-13) •••••.•...•••.•• 1644 •••••••• 1522
In home play •••••••.•......•• 413 •••..•••

392

In school play •••••.....•.••• 152 •••...••

143

In free conversation (school)

87........

74

In children's groups ••.•.•••• 652 ••....••

609

With family and with children

2296 •••••••• 2131

Total number of all children' s remarks in children • s groups and of
the individual child in other groups.
3825 •••••... 3500
These figures have been given both with and without answers since Piaget

e~cludes

all answers to adults

or to each other from children's spontaneous language
but in certain studies he includes them in the material
for analysis.

CHAPTER III

Functions of Language
Perhaps it is to be regretted that these observations
might not have been carried on under precisely the same
conditions as Piaget's for the sake of an

e~ct

comparison,

but he invites the extension of observations and the variety of material brings out interesting point_s of difference in some respects and likenesses in others.
In the first place we accept as proven his hypothesis
of the large part played by ego-cen trio language in the
child up to

7~8

years (but we mean mentally) when observed

steadily throughout the day, because of the effects of egocentrism which we still find in these children, even though
our observations show that it is on the wane in this particular group and child.
The conditions which were chosen under which we were
to observe were in every case social conditions, whereas
Piaget•s observers followed his subjects about all day at
school and studied them, both alone and in groups.

For

instance, he speaks of one boy who every now and then indulges in fantasies which isolate him for several hours
and during which he soliloquizes for several hours. 1 Our
findings should be considered with these facts in mind.
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However, we shall set forth his types of language and
our examples of each type.

He divides language into two

tY,pes, ego-centric and socialized.

Ego-centric language is

then divided into three categories and socialized into five.
He describes these eight categories as follows (the abbreviations in parentheses after the names are those used
· later in this study in giving examples):
Ego-centric:
(1) Repetition (Repit) •••• of words and
syllables ••• for the pleasure of talking, with
no thought of talking to anyone, nor even at
times of saying words that will make sense •••
(2) Monologue (M): The child talks to ·
himself as though he were thinking aloud. He
does not address anyone.
(3) Collective Monologue (O.M.): The
contradiction contained in the phrase recalls
the paradox of those conversations between
children •• ~where an outsider is always associated with the action or thought of the moment,
but is expected neither to attend nor to understand. The point of view of the other person
is never taken into account; his presence serves
only as a stimulus.
Socialized:
(4) Adapted Information (A.I.): Here the
child really exchanges his thoughts with others,
either by telling his hearer something that will
interest him and influence his actions, or by
an actual interchange of ideas by argument or even
by collaboration in ~ursuit of a common aim ••••
(5) Criticism ~0): This group includes all
remarks made about the work or behaviour of others
but having the same character as adapted information; in other words, remarks specified in relation to a given audience. Eut these are more
affective than intellectual, !.e., they assert
the superiority of the self and depreciate others.
One might be tempted in view of this to plac.e this
group among the ego-centric categories. But
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'ego-centric' is to be taken in an intellectual
not in an ethical sense, and there can be no
doubt that in the cases under consideration one
child acts upon another in a way that may give rise
to agruments, quarrels, and emulation, whereas
the ·utterances of the collective monologue are
without any effect upon the person addressed.
The shades of distinction, moreover, between
adapted information and criticism are often extremely subtle and can only be established by' the
context.
.
{6) Commands, Requests, Threats (O.,R.,T.):
In all of these there is definite interaction
between one child and another.
(7) Questions (Q.): Most questions asked
by children among themselves call for an answer
and can therefore be classed as socialized speech,
with certain reservations ••••
(8) Answers (Ana.): Bf these are meant
answers to real questions lwith interrogation
mark) and to commands. They are not to be compared to those answers given in the course of conversation (categ.4) to remarks which are not
questions but belong to 'information•.
These, then are the eight fundamental categories of speech. It goes without saying that
this classification, like any other, is open to
the charge of artificiality. What is more important, however, is that it should stand the
test of practical application, t.e.,that any
reader who has made himself familiar with our
criteria. should place the same phrases more or
less in the same categories.l
We have quoted in full Piaget 1 s criteria for the
eight functions of language, since they are the neo.e ssary
basis for the understanding of the classification of our
observations.

Of his methods, Olaparede says,

His only aim in collecting,recording and
cataloguing all these different types of behavior is to see the assembled materials in a
clearer light, to facilitate the task of com•
paring and affiliating them one to another. Our
author has a special talent for letting the
material speak for itself, or rather for hearing
it speak for itself. What strikes me first in
this book of his is the natural way in which the
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general ideas have been suggested by the facts;
the latter have not been forced to fit Teadymade hypotheses.l
Every remark taken down in our study has been classified according to the criteria of Piaget, with the one
following exception.
Because of the social nature of the conditions under
which our observations were taken and the fact that Piaget
says that either collaboration in action or association in
thought•••• in the sense that everyone listen~ to and
understands the speaker, but there is no collaboration because each child speaks only of
himself, and of his own action, or his own
thoughts.2
--lifts remarks out of collective monologue into the second
stage of conversation and marks the first step toward
socialization of thought and language, we have therefore
given to such remarks our own title of 'monologue type',
indicating their _s imilarity to collective .monologue.
Oolleot1ve monologue takes place wherever the

child talks about himself, except in those
oases where he does so during collaboration
with his hearer ••• and except in cases of dialogue. Dialogue, in our view, occurs when
the child who has been spoken to in a proposition, answers by talking about something
which was treated of in this propoett~on •••
and does not start off on some cock-and-bull
etory as so often happens in collective monologue.3

1 E. Clap~ede, Preface to t~:T· . · XV
. 2t}:;:r~ 54
·3 - · .

1:/; 'l". 21
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Our distinction will become clear as

e~amples.

are given.

These remarks, to our mind after a thorough study of Piaget,
are still of ego-centric type though listened to, for each
child seems to listen only to pick up some idea or schema
about which to weave his own remarks regarding himself,
his action, or his

e~erience.

E~amples of Repetit1on: 1
In home play there is just one

e~ample

of repetition.

B. Here's the kind I want.

D. Here 1 e the kind I want.
J. Here's the kind I want.

In school play there are seven instances, or

1%

of

their total conversation.
l) No.
No.
a) No.
No.
Why
No.

10. Now we can make the longest ones, if we can.

1.

If we can.

10. Why don 1 t you paste your mouth togetherJ

6. Paste your mouth shut and you can • t talk.,
don't you past your mouth shut?
2. Paste your mouth shut.

In free conversation there are three instances, or one-half
of

1%.
l) No. 10. What's that?
No. 15. Got a cake. ,
No. a. (laughs) Got a cake.
a) No. 7. I'm going to wear my wrist watch the last
day of school and a new shirt and a new tie.
No. a. A wrist watch, a shirt, and a tie.

D., at family meal,

1%.

(Picks up a remark of his father's about a dog) Did
you ever see a dog-dog-dog?
D., at bed-time,
1

1%.

In all remarks of children quoted in this study, parentheses are used to indica-t e-· remarks of older persons or
explanation of circumstances.
I

..

f
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l) (Pretending his stuffed animals are talking)

Ma-ma. Da-da.
2) Look at that (a strip of paste-board balanced;
I look). Touch it, touch it, touch it (Repeats
this as he touches it and 'see-saws' it.)

.Repetition being a remnant of baby habits, it is
natural that there should be only these rare instances.
E~ampl~S ·~- df

Monologue Type:

In these examples the fact is to be kept in mind that
they are merely akin to those types as Piaget defines them.
The fact that our subjects are always in pairs or in groups
and playing with the same things differentiates their remarks from the real collective monologue by their association
in a common activity, but otherwise they are the same sort
of remarks, therefore ego-centric in origin.

Since these

children never separate themselves from any group in these
observation periods, and since monologue and collective
monologue are two varieties of the same category we have
not separated them.
In

ho~e-play

these examples simply consist of instances

where these children announce to each other what they are
doing.
1) (They are coloring pictures in magazines) A. I'm
going to get brown to color this hair. There's
orange and black, but the black is broken. I'm
going to take orange today. Are you using scarlet? .
(Her remarks of monologue type turn into questions ,
which finally draw out a reply.) Why don't you
take another color, What color have you now?
D. Blue. These are blue-birds...
,
2) (The two tehildl:en are playing with an electric
train.) ·
J. (Playing with the switch) I turn this and
1·
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it turns this; and turn this and it turns this. They
jump off the trains and get a hold of this and turn
it back. This makes it go straight. (No reply from
D.)

1

3) (Building with Lincoln logs. ) B. My house· almost
fell down,
D. There now.
B. Oh, boyJ Here's something I want.
In school-play.
1) (They are playing in the play-house, a corner of the
. hall with low partitions and doll furniture in it.)
No. 16. Here's another chair; isn't it cuteT
No. 20. (Of a dish.) Oh, who broke that? (lieither
answers the other.)
.
A few instances in this group occur when each child is
working individually, as painting a picture, although others
are doing theirs .at the sanle wide easel J and illustrate more
nearly eollective monologue but they do not talk just about
themselves.
2) No. 15. My mother's sick in bed. (No one answers.)
No. 1 This (his picture) is a car on a hill.
No. 15. He's making a car on a hill. (To no. 1)
you're going to get your shirt painted pretty soon.
You put long sky down there. (No attention paid
to any of these remarks.)
:·
No. lS. Now what did I put that up there for.?
No. 15. When you get through you can wash th~
(the brushes) in there. (No answer.)
No. 18. Stir it up. Stir it up. There isn't
much black in here.
No. 15. Two big eyes.
No. 18. (About no. 1's painting) He's making a car
up on a hill. (About his own) Here's. another weed
growing up beside this one. Heyl Look at the nose.
Let's see what I need.
Here each. one is interested merely in the

e~ression

of

1 Building blocks imitating the logs of Lincoln's pioneer
home.

.

21
his own thoughts and pays no attention to wha.t the others
say.
The following is of a different circumstance. · The little
girls have been playing with clay and carrying on a conversation together, but No. 5, having finished her clay doll,
begins to talk to herself, though at the table with the others.
3) No. 5. Why don't you stay on, Mr. Leg? See, ·here's
his tail. How's he going to sit down1 ,Oh, gosh
sakes! I can't make anything. It makes me mad,
too. I ~ess I won't make no legs. (This tends toward monologue. The others hear but go on with
their play.)
·
Some of the clearest types of collective monologue have
been given, but included in the percentages later under monologue tYPe will be those remarks also where the child simply
announces to the group with which he is playing just what
he is about to do.

Where an adult would think this out by

himself and offer the socialized result, the child in these
instances takes everyone into his confidence and thinks aloud. 1
Half of the monologue type remarks in this group, school-play,
are of this nature and half are of the clearer
as have been given.

e~amples,

such

The following is of the announcing

variety, but with the whole conversation to consider one can
readily see their cooperation in the whole enterprise.
4) (Playing in the sand.) No. 8. Now we need a lot
. of wet dirt. I'm going to get some water and
make a lot of wet dirt and build a palace. This is
both wet and dry sand.

No. a. I'm going to wet the sand all around here.
No. a. I'm going to build a house.
No. 2. We 1 ~e going to put some dry sand on. ·
No. 1. That's my place, cause that's where I put
the water in.
No. a. (To No. a.) That's my pail, but you can have it.
Letts side it up here so the water won't run out.
This conversation continues in this vein but soon develops
into more socialized conversation as they become thoroughly
interested in a cooperative idea.

R.) No. a. No more dirt. It's enough.
Ans.l No. 2. We need some more.
A.I. No. a. No, we don 1 t. I'll make a door here.
A.I. No. 2. I'll make a window here.
A.I. No. 1. I'll make a cliff here by the side of
the house.
A.I.l No. B. This is a king's palace.
A.I. No. 1. This is the king's garage.
A.I. No. 8. No, let's have it a house near the king's
alaoe. This is the king.
Q.) No. 1. What? The acorn?
Ans.) No. s. Tn~ acorn is ~he people. This is me.
I'm the king. · · .
A.I.l No. 1. I'm the queen.
A.I. No. 2. Here comes me.
!;I. No. a. Here's the thing that walks around the
house. (The guard.) Here comes the road. They're
makin~ it.
·
(A.I.) No. 2. Here comes the man up on top of the
house. There's the bell. Let 1 s wash our hands.

I
!

i
~

This example (4) monologue type and socialized, shows
how easily announcement runs into adapted information in group
activity and so is a . ~lgher . s.:tep in·· socialization than true
collective monologue, hence, our classification, monologue
type.
In free conversation there are practically no

e~amples

of collective monologue, since for the most part they are
interested in what each one is saying to the e ~tent of listening a.nd at least adap.:t.ing. . th.e ir own remarks to some word or

general idea in what .a nother has said.

Their individual

tales group about a general topic or outgrowth· from some other
child 1 s remarks.

Often they show keen interest and question,

criticize, or make suggestions to the one who has told of
some e;perience or shown something he has made.
e~amples

Hence, the

of monologue type are only those rema%ks in which

the child breaks away from any connection with what has been
said to tell something about himself or his experience.
(They have been showing things they have made in school
or have been talking about their play.) No. 9. One night
I had a story and my mother read in a book about a man
and he preached a sermon in a bad country and they put
him in a river and a~·. black man came and pulled him out
again.
No. 20. One day my little brother wanted to go right
out and they wouldn't let him and I put on his raincoat and he went right out.
No

commen~

is made on either remark and the children go on

talking about their play.
With the child .at the family meal the examples occur
when he separates himself in thought
from .the rest of the
.
group and talks about his food or thinks aloud without looking for a reply.

All such remarks number 27 out of 613

total remarks at the table, or

4%.

1) If I haven't the biggest (dish of custard), I 1 ve
got next to the biggest. If I haven't got ne~t to
the biggest, I've got the next to the ne~t to the ·
biggest. (And so on.)
2) I took three bites of this and three of that ••• and
then I'll take four bites of this and four of that ••
(,and so on. )

or when he makes such remarks as
3 ) My glasses are stretched, mother.
4 ) All I've been eating is olives.

5) I'd like to know who had to speak to me to make _me
eat to-night, I'd like to know.
At bed-time remarks of this type occur when he talks to
an imaginary playmate or to his stuffed animala.
l) (Making a string-doll nod) How do you do, today?
(Winding it again) I do think this is going to oe a
better 11 How do you do, today."
2) (Playing with stuffed animals) You guys are guys
_ with shoe-button eyes. Do you know itl
or he announces what he is doing,
3) I 1m going to take the whole shoe-string out and make
it perfectly straight. Now I am going to take these
little pajamas and scramble in. I'm going to show
you folks, show you folks.
or he thinks aloud (the following conversation leads up to
the ne?Ct e_~ample),
.
Have you got a pin I could stick in my apple? (What
for?) Like you said about the world; it was a .round
ball and you go and go and go and come back to the
same place. (He is given a pin.)
·
4) (Sticks the pin in and eats around the apple to it.)
I came right back to it. Now I am going around again.
I coasted half-way. You know what coasted is with a
~ar.
I turned my engine off, that 1 s the noise I make
with my eating. I'm not half through with my apple
yet. This makes two apples I've had today.
Even this is adapted in a way to the remarks which preceded.

There are 34 remarks of the announcing variety, 40 of the
thinking aloud variety, and 7 when talking to his stuffed
animals.
These examples illustrate what Piaget means by egocentric language where the urge is to e;prees the child's own
thoughts but not for any interchange of thought with the one
who hears the remarks.
si~-year-old

Piaget finds the proportion in his two

subjects of ego-centric speech to other forms

of spontaneous language to be 47% for one and 43% for the
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other, or 39% and 37% respectively of their total remarks. 1

Our findings exhibit a much lower percentage; 12% of ego•
centric to other forms of spontaneous remarks, or 11% of
the total remarks of these children's

groups~·

and for the

individual child in the same three groups 11% to the other
forms of spontaneous speech or

10%

of total remarks.

These

findings, as has been said, are undoubtedly influenced by
the conditions of our observations, but because of the other
findings which will be set forth in later chapters, we know
that ego-centrism is decidedly on the wane with the individual child and special group studied.

.

Then too no restraint

was laid on these children.to . prevent their separating themselves to a greater extent in thought and indulging in more
ego-centric speech.

They did it enough to evidence their

familiarity with it and ind'-ll.g ed in it the least in their
I 'I\

conversation period, which it would have been least appropriate.

"
A sense of fitness
is evidently growing in their

minds.
Piaget, to ascertain the decline in ego-centrism in
one of hie subjects,

ha~

him observed similarly a few months

after he was seven years old and found the coefficient of
ego-centrism to have been reduced from 0.47 to 0.27. 2
We have offered no coefficient of ego-centrism for
this child or group because the conditione under which Piaget
1

2

Cf. L·. T ~ ;a.· 35 f.
Cf. L!.T:;., 42.
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observed could not be exactly reproduced and it would not be
a true comparison unless they were.
Examples of socialized type of language, with categories
named but not considered separately:
In home play these examples are taken from the conversation of two children who constantly play together and are
on the same level of mentality (the little girl though just
five ranks over seven mentally, and the little boy a year
older in each case).

73% of home play conversation is by

these t wo.

l) (This is a continuation of a conversation while they

are building with Lincoln logs.)
(A.I.) D. Then you won't have any garage. (R.) I'll
tell you. Take this down and put them all in here.
Wait. Now fix it.
(R.) s. Take everything out. (A.I.) I can fix it.
I'm going to make the garage.
·
(A.I.} D. I'm making it eo your car will go right under
the wall.
(A.I.) s. No, I don't want it to. I'm going to make
a house or something. ( R.) Pla.y like I left my car
over there. I've got a good idea.; play like we build
it and one goes right up.
(A.I.) D. I know; you mean put two boards up like
this and the oar oan go up. That would be keen.
(Q.) s. I figured it out, didn't I, D.?
(Ans.) D. I helped.
,
.

Notice how each remark grows out of what has been said
by the other child or leads up to another remark. by the other

one.

This is typical of their conversation at play.
2) (This takes place as they are preparing to play. They
have been talking about snow on the mountains.}
·
(A.Io) B. I can eat snow. It's cold and smooth. I
like it.
A.I.) D. It is cold.
A•.I. B. I eat it anyhow. So does an old lady I know.
A.I.) D. I eat pink cotton. (Candy).
A. I~) B. Oh, I know. They' :re· in cones. If you ask

l
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for a double one they put a layer of snow on top.
Once I got a whole bunch of it, a whole kettle-full
of it and ate it. I know how to make it. If it's
snowing take a cone and put snow in it.
This is of special interest as an example of the talk
of these five-and

si~-year-old

children on a subject . other

than the activity of the moment.

There is no wandering off

into soliloquy with these two children when playing together.
They collaborate both in action and in thought.

And remarks

which· we have classed as ego-centric in their play-talk have
'been when they announce to each other what they are doing
or about to do, but always in collaboration of action.

Any

such remarks are extremely rare in their play and are to be
found in the play in which other children participate, as a
rule.
One example of socialized language from school-play has
already been given in outgrowth frorn and contrast to monologue type.

The ex&aples so far given include adapted in-

formation, requests, questions, and answers.

The following

includes criticism.
(R.) (In the play-house.) No. 20. Father, will you sweep
. the floor.T (c.) You make me ·mad.
(Q.) No. 7. (Obeys her request by sweeping.) Do you want
me to sweep those, too?
(Ana.) No. 3. Those are pla4es. (She picks them up; they
.
are paper bon-bon cases.)
(0.) No. 7. I hope it's clean. There are three ladies
around this joint and they can't sweep a floor.
Adapted information, together with most of
the questions and answers •••• constitute the only
categories of child language whose function, in
contrast to the divers functions of the ego-centric
categories, is to communicate intellectual
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processes. 1
Questions will be treated in a separate chapter and contrast will be made of those questions asked by children of
each other and those asked of adults.

But attention is called

here to the fact that
intellectual intercourse between childr.en is still
factual or descriptive, i.e., little concerned with
causality which remains the subject of conversation
between children and adults or of the child's own
solitary reflection.2
Their conversation centers most about their activities or
description of

e~eriences

or of possessions.

Answers, while counted in the total number of remarks,
are not considered by Piaget as part of the child's spontaneous language, since the child's social

lan&~age

could be

raised considerably by another talkative child or by an
adult. 3

Thus in the tables which we will give the percen-

tages will be given both with and without answers (either
to each other or to adults).

Answers include those made to

direct requests and to direct questions; when made to other
statements they are adapted information.~
In free conversation (school) these examples will show
how the children become interested in each other's drawings
or toys to the extent of suggestions or criticisms.

1 ......:..

L '~·T.

, 25.

at·.·-···
r.,- 31.
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35.

l) (A.I.) No. 20. (Showing her drawing) ~ere's the moon
the sky 1 and here's the grass, and here's the
house, and here's a door. I'm going to put some
flowers here and put in the sky.
(C.) No. 1. A house can't be up in the air~
2) (A.I.) No. 24. (Showing her drawing) A house and two
tr.e es and a sky.
·
(A.l.) No. 27. I told her to put on a door and it
would look better.
(0.) No. 10. She should put the chimney straight.
Since we have mentioned the factual nature of children's
conversation it is of interest here to contrast the descriptions just quoted, from a child of average mentality and from
one near the low level of I.Q. (92) in the larger group with
that of another at the top 1 who describes his as follows:
(A.I.) No.1. (Showing a series of brownie pictures he
has drawn) This brownie's got his shovel down. He's
been digging, but he's tired. This one is going to
put dirt ~ in the truck. (Next picture) They're going.
This is the dust from their wheels • . These are the
wheels but the spokes are going around so fast they
look as if they were plain.
Piaget says of his two six-year-old subjects
All the observed cases of information which
might be thought to resemble explanation are
statements of fact or descriptions and are

free from any desire to explain the causes of
phenomena.l
·
Is not this child desiring spontaneously to give the reason
for particular effect in his drawing?

There are other in-

'

stances among the children of high I.Q. in the group where
an attempt is made to explain perspective in a drawing or
where several of these superior children by drawing on the
blackboard try to demonstrate a problem under discussion

I·

-
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(whether a horse can run faster than a freig~t-train). 1
The children who always stay on the mere factual plane
are those mentally neer six years of age.

These who are

interested in the 'why! of things are in the upper third of
the group, or occasionally an older one who is mentally
between seven and eight will follow the lead of these others
and offer a suggestion.
No comparison of the percentage of remarks will be made
in the tables which will be given at the close of this discussion except in the case of the child who is being studied
individually as he appears in the three children's groups
and the groups themselves.

Merely as a matter of interest,

however, examples will be cited of this child's socialized
conversation when with older people.
At the family meal his

eg~centrio

remarks numbered only

32 out of the 540 spontaneous remarks, but in his socialized
remar ks he entered the general conversation 89 times and
adapted 144 remarks to remarks _growing out of this entrance.
The remainder of his 540 spontaneous remarks were either when
a subject was introduced by himself or when adapted to the
conversation which followed.

Of these 508 spontaneous

socialized remarks, 205 were in question form, and 68 were
requests.

1

Of course no account was kept of the adult

This conversation will be given in Chapter IV.
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language in which he did not have a part.
It will be seen in the following chapters that as a member of a social group made up of those older than himself
(adults and older brothers) he evidences the greatest signs
of socialized thought, interest in logical justification
and synthesis of language, etc.
E~amples

of socialized language at the meal:

1) (A.I.) (Hie brother has been speaking about twins)

Twins are two brothereor two sisters born into the
same family at the same time. (Brother: can't they
be a brother and a sister? What about E. and W• ?)
Ane. ) I didn 1 t know they .could.
',
R.) Guess what we saw down-town, daddy. Guess.
He guesses.)
Q.) You give up? (Yes.)
A.I.) An Indian •. (Mother: Part Indian.)
Q.) What else was he besides Indianl (Mexican or
Spanish.)
.
Q.) What are we besides Stocktonians? (Americans.)
tells a story about an absent-minded man.)
{.Dadd¥
A.I.) ~Sympathetically) The clock might have struck
again while he was away.
(A.I.) Bread and milk go together. I don't mean
they sound alike, but they go together; bread and
milk• (Aunt: Like land and water.)
(Q.) What others go together, daddy? (Brothers and
sisters.)
· .
(A.I.) And big and little, and wife and husband.
(A.I.) You know, last night Aunt M• .was studying
brownie talk. (Mother: I guess she was studying
French.)
(A.I.) You know that other night when she was study- ing and you came out and said 1 boo-doo' she was
studying brownie talk. (No, it was French.)
(Q.) Do brownies talk French?
1

2)

3)
4)

5)

~~plea

from bed-time talk:

1) (R.) Make me_ a 4, mother. (I make a written one.)
(C.) That isn't the way a boy in my class made it
at school. (I m~e a printed one.)
(A.I.) Yes, that's the kind he made. One is open
at the top; the other isn't.
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2)(Q.) Do you want me to sing the Teddy-bear song?
(Yes.)
(Sings) Teddy-bear has his lair
Under Johnnie's rocking-chair,
Don 1 t go there;
You will get an awful scare. Boo!
(A.I.) You want to do that 11 Boo 11 good and hard.
(Laughs) All the kids laugh at school when the teacher
does it good and hard. (Sings it again.)
·
You sing it now. (I do).
C. Sing it right. (Sings it over, laughing.)
c. You are supposed to laugh, too, mother.
3) Mother says she can't see an¥thing to a little
movie book he is showing her.) (A.I.) I'll show
you. (Turns the pages rapidly.) Now watch this space
right here and pretty soon you'll see a car turning.
Here she comesJ
.
(R.) Watch! Watch the man fall out.
·
(A. I.) He backs up. (His explanation as to why he
does.) When you hit, it bounces you back sometimes.
Q.) When a ball hits it bounces back, doesn 1 t it.?
Yes.)
,
A.I.) He's down; he's lying down. He doesn't put on
his brakes at the end of the racing track.
4)lQ.) See this thimble on my finger1 (I nod.)
A.I.) It looks like a snail-shell.
Q.) Do you know what a snail does 'when it sees a
bear or anything like that? (I expect it crawls into its house. It carries its house right along on
ite back, doesn't it?)
(Ans.) Yes.
.
(A.I.) And when it w:1nts to go camping it takes .:.its
house right with it.
(Q.) That's a good idea, isn't it? (Yes.)
5)This example is interesting from the standpoint of his
explanation of his drawing of a gyrotop.)
(A.I.) This is the wheel. That's the thing the wheel
spins in. Here it is going: the thick part is the
·
wheel going. You see when it isn't going the wheel
looks thin; when it 1 s . goin~ it looks thick. (By 11 thick 11
he means blurred; by 11 thin 11 he means distinct lines.)
6) Q.) Did you ever see gold in the sky? (Yes.)
A.I.) I have. I've dreamed about it •.
Q.) Have you ever seen gold in the sky all sparkles?
Yes.)
·
A.I.) It isn't sparkles, though. (No, it's thereflection from the sun. Sometimes there are gold
edges on the clouds.)
A.I.) That's to show they are clouds.

R.l

!

!
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(A.I.) You're going to feel so proudly when you see
our Christmas present that I'm going to get for you.
R.) Guess what it is. (I don't want to.)
·
A.I.) I 1 m not going to tell, because it•s .a secret.
I don't know, it's going to be hard to keep it.
(Q.) You don't want to know~ do you? •oause you like
surprises, don't you? (Yes.)
,
(A.I.) We're going tQ get millions of surprises.
(And so on.)

r

Examples could be multiplied many times but these have
been given to show not only the different types of socialized
conversation but to show the varied interests of the
old.

si~-ye~

This will be shown further through the study of his

questions.

His interest turns from toys, games, puzzles,

e;planations, questions about animals, to life, our persomalities, death, and the universe; in fact, every variety of
topic.

Although they cannot all be studied here technically

from the standpoint of logic, they are filled with a wealth
of psychological interest to a student of children's minds.
Also they evidence the difference in subject matter about
which a child talks when with an adult and .when with his
playmates.

Perhaps it should be mentioned here that this

child always insists on answers to his questions.
Before giving the tables of remarks let us emphasize
again the difference in our circumstances of observation for
studying ego-centrism in any mathematical way.
found, however, that Piaget's
remark ~"made

classific~tion

We have

covers every

by any child; it is workable and opens an in-

teresting field of investigation.

But it is evidenced here

as in the following chapters that our subjects, at least
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those most studied, are emerging definitely

f~om

the ego-

centric period while Piaget still finds his two subjects
equally divided between ego-centrism and socialization.

In-

vestigation should be carried out with younger American
children and great care chosen to study subjects where mental and chronological ages correspond.

These subjects

were chosen first and the findings brought out the difference between our subjects and Piaget 1 s of the same age.
Because Piaget enters so thoroughly into every detail and
because such a procedure is impossible in a study of the
present scope, we refer the reader to his book for further
points of comparison. 1

~.T.

Chapter I.
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Smmnary of Functions of Language

I. Children's groups, with answers.
Home Play

School Play Free
Total
Conversation
7 1%
1 0%
3
11
<>%
0%
39
85 11% 109 16%
233 11%
5%

Repetition
Monologue Type

Adapted Information 369 50%

336

48%

512

70%

1217

56%

Criticism

30

4%

13

2%

26

~

69

3~
I

Request

84 11%

92

13%

9

1%

185

9%

122 1'1%

94

14%

47

elfo

263

12'%

6%· 108

~5%

203~

~

Questions
Answers

52

Ego-centric Totals

86 11% 116 17%

7dfo· · 43

Socialized Totals

657 89%

578

Total Remarks

743

694

..

83%

42

6%

244 11%

702

94% 193,7 89%

744

2181

II. Children's groups, without answers (i.e.,spontaneous).
Home Play

~

School Play rree
Total
Conversation
7 1%
3 !%
11
1~

1

O%

85

12%

Adapted Information 369

54%

336

5z1, 512

30

4%

13

! % 26

84

12%

92

122

18%

Repetition
Yoril)logue TYPe
· Criticism
Request
Questions
Ego-centric Totals

86

Socialized Totals -· 605
Total Remarks
(Spontaneous)

39

233

11%

81~ 1217

62%

4%

69

3#

9

1%

185

9i%

94. 14% 47

7%
7%

263

13%~

109 17%

-

14~
I

12% 116 18%

-42

6%

··a44

-12%

88% .. 535 .,82% 594 ... 9:3% 1:73:4 . 88% -.

- 691 - -651

636

1978

•.

....----
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III. D1 s Own Remarks, in Children's Groups (With answers).

Repetition
Kon.Ologue Type

Home Play School Play Free
Total
Conversation
2 #
0
5
7. 1%
3%
0%

42 10% 19

12~

0

0%

61

9~

Adapted Information 207 50%

70

46%

60

6~

33'7

Sa%

5%

3

2%

4

5%

26

4%

1~

1

1%

sa

10%

Or1t1c1sm

19

Request

48 11~ 19

Questions

74

18% 27 18%

Answers

21

6%

Ego-centric Totals

44

10% 24

Socialized Totals
Total Remarks

10% 110 1'7%

6%

-

369, 90% 1_28, 84% ,.87 100%

152

-413

__

.13 15% .,_ 43
0
16%
0% 68

9 .'

-

9

~-

87

584
652

... ?d/a_

l~

90%

-

D's Own Remarks, in Children's Groups (~ithout answers).
Total
Home Play School Play Free
Conversation
0
Repetition
5
7 1%
2 ~
4%
0%
0
Monologue TYPe
42 loi7: 19 13%
0% 61 10%
IV~

Adapted Information 207 53%

70

49%

60

~1%

337

56%

'

Criticism

19

5%

3

2%

4

5¢%

26

4%

Request

48

121~

19

13%

1

3/4,

68

11%

Questions

74 19%

27.

_ 1~

Ego-centric Totals

-- -44 0
11% 24 17%
0%

Socialized Totals _· 348 89% 119. .. 83%
Total Remarks
(Spontaneous)

9_ 12% 110 18%

392

- 143
·'

68

-11%

8.7, 100%. ·_:,541, . 89%.

87

609
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v.

D's Remarks, with Adults (with answers).
At Meal

At Bed-Time

5

9

1%

27

84

8%

217

412

40%

Criticism

18

20

2%

Request

68

11~

125

12%

215

34~

332

3~

- 73

1~

49

5%_-

Ego-centric Totals

32

5%

93

9%

Socialized Totals

581

95% -938

91%

Total Remarks

613

Repetition
Mono1 ogue Type
Adapted Information

Questions
Answers

1031

VI. D's Remarks, with Adults (without answers).
At Meal

At Bed-time

5

1%

9

1%

27

5%

84

8%

217

40%

412

42%

Cr1t1c1sm

l8

3%

20

2'%

Request

68

13% 125

13%

332

34%

Repetition
:Monologue Type
Adapted Information

Questions

215

Ego:...oentric Totals

32

Socialized Totals

508

Total Remarks
(Spontaneous)

540

38%

- 6% - 93

9%

94% .- 889 . 91%.

-

-982

Ohapter IV
Types and Stages in Conversation
Where in the preceding chapter single remarks, with
the accompanying circumstances formed the unit of this
study we now turn to conversations of three remarks or more
as the unit in question,

This study considers only conver-

sations between children and is therefore based on the observation of play at home and at school, and in the free conversation period at school.

Let us first establish what we

designate here as a conversation.
Whenever---to fix an arbitrary minimum--three consecutive remarks about the same subject are made by
at least two interlocutors. Here are two of the
simpler possible schemes of conversation:!

I

II (1) Remark by A.
Remark by A.
(2) Remark b¥ B adapted
Remark by B adapted
to (1}.
to ( 1).
(3) Remark by C adapted
Remark by A adapted
to (l} or (2}.
to ( 2).

Piaget proceeds to establish three sta.ges of conversation showing the process of evolution by which a child
passes from ego-centric language proper to the higher types
of conversation.

Stage I represents the ego-centric lan-

guage in monologue and collective monologue,

Therefore I

give his table beginning from this point, 2
Conversations:
Stage IIA
(first type)
The hearer is associ---?
ated with the speaker's
action and thought . t-(without collaboration)

~~:~~·; ,sa. ~ j
L,T_,__,53.

Stage IIIA
Stage·~n .
(second type)
Collaboration
Collaboration
in action or non- --7 in abstract
abstract thought
thought,

.J,

I
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~1'

.J,

Stage IIB
(first type)
Quarrel
(Clash of contrary factions.)

t

J.t

Stage niB
Stage IIB
(Second type)
Genuine ArguPrimitive argument
--7 . ment ·
(Clash of un(Clash of motimotivated asservated assertions.)
tions.)

In the first type of Stage IIA
there is association in the sense that everyone )
listens to and understands the speaker, but there
is no collaboration because each child speaks only
of himself, of hie own actions, or of his own
thoughts.
In the second type there is collaboration in
action or in thought connected with action (nonabstract thought) in the sense that the conversation bears upon an activity which is shared by the
talkers. The subject of the conversation is thus
some definite action, and not the explanation of a
past or future action...
,
By abstract we wish (in Stage IIIA) to designate those mental processes in a child which are
no longer connected with the activity of the moment, but are concerned with finding an explanation,
reconstructing a story or a memory, discussing the
order of events or the truth of a tale,l
Not to quote

e~actly

further but to sum up Piaget's remar.ts,

there is a gradual socialization of thought as the child
passes from one stage to another, though he still retains
remnants of past stages.

It will be noted that the point of

difference between A and ·B of each stage is that A is based
on agreement and B on disagreement.

It is only when stage

IIIB is reached that any attempt at proof is made; before
that there is simply a clash of aseert16n•~
l

. -·-

L';·T', , 54 f.
2ror detailed discussion, see

L.Ti,

Chapter II.
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Undoubtedly the best way to detect the difference between
the stages as well as to study each stage is to cite

e~les.

$tage IIA (first type) is only found in the free con. versation group at school, and is to my mind at one with a
column of

1

That Reminds Me.•

1) No. ~0. Once my daddy went fishing. My mother did't
catch anything but my daddy did.
No. 16. My daddy oatch~d · one.
No. ~4. I caught a great big fish once.
No. 2. My daddy went fishing. My dog fell in but he
got out and my daddy caught four fishes.
No. 10. My dog could. My dog swims. It's a fox
terrier. Every time we go swimming he jumps in the
water. Once my father went in swimming and my dog
jumped on his back.
No. 15. I got a dog too. Another girl has a dog and
he's that high (motions). He's a hunting dog and he
can find things. They keep him in the cellar.
No. 7. I got a dog and every time I'd throw a ball
he'd catch it.
No. 19. Once my sister had a dog and it used to jump
over me. A machine ran over it.
No. 4. My grandmother has two dogs and every time at
night a machine goes by they bark, and my grandma
can't sleep, but they never get runned over.
~) (The teacher has read a story about children at the
beach.)
..
No. 1. I've dug holes in the sand and the waves wash
up in the hole and p~l the sand back with 1t.
No. 2. I went down to the beach.
No. 1. Once my aunt and I were down at a pretty place
on the beach and my aunt and I picked up lots of
pretty stones and shells.
No. 9. Once I went to the beach and I had my shoes
and stockings off and I got my feet wet and I had
my bathing-suit on.
No. 20. I went down to the beach last Sunday and we
saw the sea-gulls. I had my swimming-suit and my
swimming-shoes and my swimming-hat and when I todt
my swim!"!ling-shoee off they were washed away. (And
so it continues for some time.)
These two

e~amples

illustrate fully the conversation desig-

nated by Stage IIA (first type) and follow exactly the

description

g~ ven

by Piaget.·

It is quite plain that this stage is an outgrowth of
ego-cent~ic

language and likewise only a step in the direc-

tion of socialized language.

For while each child is in-

terested in what the others say and indicates by his own
remarks that he is listening, yet he makes no comment on
the remarks of the other child but merely uses them as an
excuse to tell of something along the same line from his own
e?CI>erienoe.
In Stage IIA (second type) there is a definite progress
for they are interested in a common activity and their interest becomes more objective and less subjective.
In free conversation period:
1) No. 2. I'm making a cave and we are making some
ditches all around so people can't get in.
No. 27. We're making a great big one.
No. a. I hope you don't bump into the wall.
No. 2. We might bump right into Mr. J's basement.
2) No. 3. (E~lains her picture.) We're playing hide
and seek. - (She points it all out.) A boy found a
board and made a bridge across. And this little
boy can't find this one and this little girl is
hiding from that little boy.
No. a. I think you'd just have her head sticking up.
No. 1. (Goes up and points.) Is she hiding from this
little boY,? I should think you'd have him here. I
should thi~k the board would be straight. fHer
bridge is curved. The teacher e~lains that bridges
may be either straight or curved~)
3) No. 27. (Showing a toy tractor.) You can't wind it;
it winds back. (The group watch interestedly.)
No. s. My brother has a train that does that, .and he
holds it till it starts. ·
No. 7. Hold the wheel and it won't go back. I've got
an airplane that does that.
No. 2. Put the brakes on and then start it and then
take the brakes off.
No. 27. It won't do it; its broken~
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From school play:
1) No. 10. (Making paste-board reindeer'which he has
promised one of the girls he would make for her.)
Here's one of your reindeer. (To No. 15, who has
been an interested onlooker.)
No. 1. Where 1 s his horns?
No. 10. He can't have any,. They'd bend back.
No. 1. He must be a baby reindeer. He must be a
fawn.
No. 15. (To teacher) Here's one of my reindeer, but
he hasn't any horns. They'd bend back. He's a baby
reindeer.
2) No. 3. The teacher told me how to make this; you ask
her.No. 5. I know how.
No. 3. There fs just a certain way to do it. There,
my book is done. I'm going to make a fancy cover.
(To No. 5) She gold me how to do it. That's not the
way. There's just a certain way.
No. 5. You do it, then.
No. 3. Get your cover. (She does.) You do it like
this and like this. (Punches the holes for her.)
From home play:
1) A. How do you steer this thing?
D. ! 1 11 show you. You turn the, wheel till it's like
this. As long as it's that way it goes straight.
A. I 1 ve got it now.
2) (Building and playing with Lincoln logs.)
B. Let's make the house big like this and put these
things in it. This is a desk, isn 1 t it?
D. No, it's a t able.
B. Wha t's this?

D. That 1 s a da-v;enport. This goes like this and there's
a davenport for you. We 1 11 have to put a davenport
right here. Move that over.
B. Here, D.
D. Move back the table. (Conversation continues.)
From these

ex~nples

the sharing of a common activity or

interest or thought stands out clearly as a step further
towards socialization.
Of IIIA Piaget says,
Conversations at this stage are the only ones
in which there is any real exchange of thought ••••
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The conversations which we shall class
under the present type are those which bear
(1) - on the explanation of things and the motives of actions, (2) on the reality of events
("Is it true that ••• ?• Why? •••• etc.) •••••
From the twenty .ohil~en under observation
we obtained only one conversation of this type,
and not a very clear one at that. This shows
once more how ego-centric are the intellectual
processes of the child. It also enables us to
place the beginnings of the socialization of
thought somewhere between 7 and B. It is at
about this age, in our opinion, that co~versations
of this type first make their appearance.l
From home play:

D. I love doggies.
A. You love them. Why don't you kiss them_?
D. I love 1 ern but I don't kiss them. I ki~s oats, but
I don't kiss dogs.
s. I kiss my cat.
This case is concerned with the "Why" of a oonjectural action.
From school conversation:

1)

(This conversation · continues from one previously
as an example of Stage IIA (second type) on
the subject of cave-digging.)
No. 1. If you got in it and somebody walked over
it and tramped it, it would fall in and you'd be
buried~
·
No. 2. If it caved 1n we could go over into Mr.
J's basement and it wouldn't cave in 1 cause there
is a house over it.
No. 1. Are you digging it in the basement?
No. 2. We're going to go deep and make it .go flat,
and then go into the basement. (Conversation continues.)
oit~d

This e?tample,·also involves a possible procedure.
2) (·this is the most interesting of all but is too
lengthy to quote in full. It 0¢9urred on the very
last day of observation and lookd toward demonstration and proof.)

1.

L;T., 63 f.

. ~ "; ; ~No~;·: S• :- ( -.O~t1.~u1ng a conversation· o~ peny-riding.) .

When my mother was a little girl, there was a horse
one., 1;1me :and .sh_e . got o~_- the horse .and .had. a. r_aoe with
· ' ., 1·a . ~rain.
·
. ; ..:, ri· t~ <?·~· S. •. :Wh~.~~ J~ind ; of. ~ i.t r~.in , a frei gh ~ . ~:r_ain .o r. a " -..
passenger train! A. passenger train could go ·taster
, -'.t:> .. t~an a ..hors~.
(JI~ goes to the 'bl~okboard and draws.)
'Tb:i:'S' would be 'the' hor·sa- ahd th1s would ·be the freight
train (behind.) The t;rain would be so. slow. If it was
al':passeriger 'trai'h here would be the horae and here the
. .h.~ ... ~~a~ '(r\tr~ ~~ain way ahead.) (Nos. 1 and a go. to the.
•.h'--''boai'd and·· point to No. a•s drawirig as ·t hey talk.)
lo. 2. Without .the cars on the engine and coal oar
. ::,. t'6ou!d' ·go as fa.s·t •
· ·
.· lo. a. I'm _not talking about that. I'm talking about a
rH ; ~u!rr-efgh'e train~
·
·
No. 1. An electric train could go as fast.
·. l'U.: . ·•o~;·t·21·; · '!.ike ·:~M&- •freiglit train was ali el·e phant; the
horse would run faster than the elephant.
•f'., «t :::. :xo -..~~· 2'.; . But· you · see the -train is longtl!r than the ·horse
.
but the horse could run faster than the train.
'·'!;r;, t Se.v.ei"al,: · O~uld a horse run as fastt ·
.' ·
No. 2. I used to live in a big plaqe and th-e :freight
thi$] 'C:rains·. used to .go by all the tim·e . · .Sometimes the -J .rain
. would be a long line and the engine couldn't go very .
r. r.:r.f... t. ·, (Yore remarks.)
..
·· No.1. If it wanted to, (Notice the attributing of a
:\~}··:5:p.ey.cholog1oal intention to the train, an evidence of
animism) the train could go faster than the horse •
. ~:lt·1:, I~-.should.-, think the train would beat the horse. (Draws.)
The · horse might slow down. It might get tired.
~~~,m}:B a~· &.t. I-t J might. ·- get soared of the train.
. ·.
No .. 27. Interesting ideas!
'~"?1 --r-n. .B~.. ~2:~· ~~~, .,th~i horse stopped the train could bea t him.
No. a. I'll tell you a good thing to do. If you're
r:r.;::~- ~·~:- by.~ ~· fr~1ght train get a horse and see wh o beats •
. No. 27. If I go to San Francisco I'll try it and tell
·'

-·,>lj<,

-

.-.u

:~-··

~

' ' "r"

...

·~~

•••

...

•

Oontrae,
:iritli ,,this~.
quoted at the beginning
... · ......... ·. ,,.
,, .th~ conversations
.
of thi~~-o~'t(~- .~~:_e~ies ·from the same group under the
:

lo ... ' , '

I 1'f If.

.i,-

~·-

•

;,.~

"f..

•

~{ ~ ~
¥

same condftioria·
~t:r·-::1~

~ c!·'J·,f.\ tr-~

.,

j

lP-~

.'

.....

•

'

ot Stage
•1,

•

t

•

C.

tiA (first type).

Such conversations ·

v· ~

still are common but the process of socialization among them\.}

(;

~: l

~;~""~.+--;t

~.}~a,,:- · ~i.!

•r

.

..

•>

eel ves, of· !adapting: :their thoughts to each other's and
..

•t

1,. fr

.... J

\ ........

~"
~

..-

. .,

demon st~rattng. ftde_as .,~

..

i'Srrworlting out beyond .the field . of
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their own immediate activities.

There is,

ot course1 a

development within each stage and there are examples of
conve~sation

the

ne~t,

starting out in one stage and developing into

but space does not permit the giving of more.

So far we have considered

e~amples

conversation based on the agreement of

of the types of
~pinion.

Therefore

the following examples will show their parallels based on
disagreement.

There happens not to be a single example in

all these observations of Stage IIB (first type).

In

common usage we would designate it as fight, a quarrel
that reaches blows, or at least threats of blows.

Probably

this is due to the circumstances under which they were taken,
in school or in a home.

Such conversations would be most

likely to occur when children were entirely by themselves
with no evidence of supervision.
e~amples

Therefore, let us turn to

of Stage IIB (second type), clash of assertions

with no attempt at proof.

From free conversation at school:
No. 1. (Describing a drawing of hie own.) Here's the
rain. Here's the clouds. This is a rainbow. This
is supposed to be red, scarlet, and pink.
No. 10. Isn't that snow?
No. ~ It's rain.
No. ]Q, Rain is white.
rrom school play:
1) (In
No.
No.
2) No.

the play-house.) No. 16. Here's the pillow.
5. That's its bed.
16. 1 Tie not. It's the pillow.
10. (Showing c~lortd paper to No. 2.) This

is pretty.
No. 2. No, it isn't.
No. 10. 'Tis too.
rrom home play:
1) (They have just asked for an apple.) s. That's a big
red one.
D. That·• s a pink one.
s. Nice red apple, makes you hungry. Let . your mother
out it.
D. No, I'll out it. Which side do'1you want?
S. This one; it's the biggest one. You kno~, company
the biggest.
D. There isn't going to be any biggest. Let's go
outside to eat them.
2) A. Here comes s.
D. Look who's here,s. Don't you know who she is?
Who is it? A.?
s. No.
.
D. 'Tis too.
These

e~amples

are self-evident.

Primitive argument is thus, on the mental
plane, the equivalent of quarreling on the plane
of action--a simple clash of contrary opinions
and desires.l
Piaget finds again, as in the case of Stage IIIA, only
one example of IIIB.
This result shows very Clearly that genuine
argument and collaboration in abstract thought
const1tu•e a stage of development which only
intervenes after the age of seven.2
This fact is of the greatest importance, he claims.
For it is between the ages of seven: .and eight
that we can date the appearance of a logical
stage in which the phenomenon of reflection becomes general; if we agree with P. Janet in
calling reflection the tendency to unify ones

l.

..

~.
2 -. ·.

70.

L··•.lfe·, 73.

47
beliefs and opinions, to systematize them with the
object of avoiding contradiction.l
·

\

Reflection is defined as "the outcome of an internal debate
in which a conclusion is reached."2
element of clear

e~amples

Piaget designated as an

of this stage of

e;pl1c1t use of the conjunction 1 because 1 •

argumen~the

I have no· ex-

ample of arguments in which 'because' is used, although its
use in other types of conversation will be considered in the
chapter on conjunctions.

There are, however,

e~amples

of . .

arguments where attempts are made to justify or prove statements and these mark the beginnings of Stage IIIB.
From school play:
l) No. 1. The workers is the fastest group of aJ.l.
No. 2. No,,It's not.
No. 1. Yes, it is; I guess I know. Teacher told me.
This would be purely primitive·argument

e~cept

that in the

end the child seeks to justify his own statement, first by
his own authority and then

by

the

authori~y

of an elder.

Another similar example takes place between the same two
children:
2) No.
No.
No.
No.

2.
1.
2.
1.

Look at J.I. 1 s design.
That's not J.I.
.
Yes, it is.
! 1 11 ask him. {He doe~.) I guess you're right.

In this case the child appeals directly to another person
for proof and finding himself in the wrong admits his error.
Here is another direct appeal for proof:
1.--- t ·. ·T·. , 74.

·•., 75 ..
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3) No. 3. (Talking about the pictures t~ey are pasting
in their scrap-books.) Here's another front room. ·
Oan I have one?
No. 6. No, it's a dining-room.
No. 3. No, it's a front room.
·
No. 6. I'll ask. (She comes and asks me and finds
she is wrong.) All right; you can have this one.
Though Piaget does not class this as genuine argument, they
are a... step~· in: advance of the cases where no attempt is made
to justify one's statements, and this is evidently the way
in which primitive argument developes into genuine argument,
by recognizing the need for proof.
The summary of the findings in this study is as follows
(taking from all children's conversations):
Stage IIA (first type) ••••• 21
Stage IIB (first type). •..•

Stage IIA (second type) •••• l24
Stage IIB (second type) ••••

6

Stage IIIA • .•............••

4

Sta.ge I I IB • ..•..........•••

0

In addition there are ••...
other conversations which
merge from one stage or
type to another.

l 21

0 )

~

130

~4

12

Total number of conversations 167
It is very evident from this that these children, at
least among themselves, are more interested in activity than
in causal or logical e;planation.

This will be brought out

again in the study of their questions and in their use of
conjunctions.

However, these further studies will bring

out the difference 1n individual development, in the same
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individual when in contact with a more socialized group.
It is evident from examples given that a beginning is being
made in collaboration in abstract thought, which beginning
Piaget places somewhere between seven and eight.

It is also

evident that a feelin g of a need of justification or proof
in argument is awakening, though naturally lagging somewhat
behind the other, since it demands a more explicit use of
words.
Hence our findings bear out Piaget's thesis of developing stages of conversation marking their progress in socialization.

It is likewise true that the examples of more

socialized conversation c ome from the third of the group
having the hi ghest I.Q., which confirms our own statement in
that re gard, concerning their correspondin g development of
thought.

Chapter

v

Understanding and Verbal E;planation Between
Children

In the matter of dealing with the understanding between
children we feel most at a loss since the material is so
elusive.

Therefore we have made no attempt to put our re-

results into mathematical form and merely offer general conclusions borne out by the examples we give.

To quote from

Piaget,
When, moreover, the language becomes socialized,
the process at first only touches the factual
products of thought, i.e., in talking to each
other children avoid the use of causal and logical relations (because, etc.), such as are used
in all •genuine argument• or in "collaboration
in abstract thought." Before the age of 7 or
8 these \two kinds of relations are therefore
still un~xpressed, or rather, still strictly
individua~.
Observation shows that up till the
age of ab?~t 7 or 8, the child, even when he can
thi nk o£

th~m

himself, does not spontaneously

give explanB;tions or demonstrations to his equals
becaua·e his l ,anguage is still saturated with
ego-centrism.a.
Piaget allude

many times to this fact that children

do not exert theme lves with their equals to use causal
relationships or 1 gical synthesis, to be interested in
causal

1

tf~ T'~',

e~lanation

100 f.

or to go beyond factual or descriptive
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conversation and hints that this may not be true of the
I

child when with adults.

He emphasizes the conditions be-

tween children but does not balance these with similar
situations of the child among adults, except in his study
of questions .and in the present e.xperiment to be studied.
In the former study (of questions) the child is not the
same in both situations and the situations are not parallel.
Our parallel studies of the same child among his equals and
among adults offer a splendid opportunity to bring out the
points of difference.
throughout the thesis.

The contrast will be emphasized
We will observe in later chapters

the rarity of 'because', for instance, when children talk
among themselves, about their play or experiences.

We will

also point out how the same child increases his spontaneous
use of 'because' and other conjunctions when in an

ad~t

group, showing that children still retain more ego-centric
habits of speech among themselves and therefore use fewer

socialized forms then than they are capa.ble of and use
under other circumstances.
If children fail to understand one another, it is
because they think they do understand one another. 1
To study the evidences of this characteristic in our
subjects we performed two experiments, one considering
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1 acted 1

conversation and one story-telling.

The Children

were taken in pairs to alternate with each other in the
hearing and the retelling of the explanation or the story
to each other.

One child witnessed the explanation of

paper-folding or cutting with the information beforehand
that he was to show the other child each step of the process he had gone through and repeat as exactly as he could
the

e~lanation

which had been given him.

Then the second

child was called in to listen to and to repeat the demonstration and explanation as correctly as he knew how, to
the child who had told him.

,,

Experimenter: (Folding a paper) This is cut to
.look like a cross. (Cutting off corners.) Now
watch. I'm going to make it into a box. I fold
this clear back to the line. I · fold the point
back -even with the line. (Repeats for other
three sides.) Then I put it up to make the sides
stand up. Now see if you can do exactly what I
did and be sure to tell exactly what you do.
No. 3. (explainer): We 1 re going to make a bo~.
Fold that- right even with that. Fold the point back
even with that. We take this and fold it even with
that line. Then we fold this point back. Then we
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take this and fold it back even like that. Fold this
point back here. (Repeats for the fourth. side.)
Straighten up the sides.
No. 7. (Reproducer): Fold it back like that. Fold it
back like that. Fold it back like that. Fold this back.
It's wrong; I didn't fold it clear ba.ck. (Sees hie
own mistake and corrects it; repeats his first formula
for other sidest however.)
No. 3 (suggests~; He hasn't folded the points clear
back.
·
1
No. 7. I m going to get that yet. I fold this down
farther. (Gets it right.)
This experiment is much simpler than the one used by
1

Piaget (the explanation of the mechanical device by diagram) ;
yet simple as it is, the child who listened to the adult
repeated more essential points to the other child than that
reproducer gave back to her.

The first child is very pains-

taking by nature and has given an excellent

e~lanation

but

the second child fails to tell what he is going to make and
leaves out essential points in the explanation.

Only his

quick wit and the visible results of the gaps in his

e~lan

ation help him in this case to check his own explanation.
Instead of reproducing an explanation in the essential
points, he uses the sketchiest terms.

This pair has been

used to show that it is not only understanding of adults
by children that is more exact than understanding between
children but to show the individual difference in children.
The children exchange their roles of explainer and reproducer.

1

Notice the sketchy way in which No. 7 explains

t~T., Chapter III. (Piaget's experiments are explained in
----full.)
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what the adult has told him.
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Experimenter: I am going to make a circle with a
s~uare in each quarter.
I fold it over once e~enly;
· then I fold it once again evenly. I am very careful
to take hold of the point where the folded sides come
together. I out the open sides rounding from this
point to this. I fold it double again and cut a threecornered hole in the middle of this fold. Now I unfold it and see, what have I? ·
No. 7: Get a piece of paper &nd fold it like that.
You fe~d it again and try to cut a round circle. Now
I'm stuck; I think it goes like this. I cut a hole.
He does it right but says nothing about what he is going to
make, about folding it evenly each time,
to hold it.

or

about how he is

No. 3, who watches closely, follows his actions

as well as his sketchy explanation and gets it right, but
notice the difference in the type of explanation she gives
now and the one given by her after an adult

e~lanation.

She is reproducing his.
No. 3. Fold that like that. Then fold it like this.
Make a round circle. Fold it like that and cut out
this little hole.
There are varieties of explanation and degrees of
accuracy in these six pairs of children.

One child, No. 19
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takes the same adult

e~lanation

for folding .a paper

bo~

that No. 3 had and gives her partner this explanation:
No. 19. Go like that and go like that (repeats three
times.).
Of course she fails in her finished product and her little
partner, who has only her pattern and explanation to go by,
has the same results.
It would be tiresome to multiply these examples.
children with the strongest bent for accuracy and

The

e~actness

give the best explanations and also give back most accurately
what their partners tell them.

The value of this simple

experiment lies in the fact that it shows how much some

o~

these children rely on action and reality to fill out the
gaps in their explanations.
This is the only experiment in which we deviated from
Piaget 1 s

e~act

pattern, as he uses the mechanical

e~lan

ation, a much more difficult one to handle .. However, the
story-telling is carried out as a parallel to his suggestion.

The same plan is followed with the two children as

with the explainer and reproducer. in the other experiment
given.

Here again we found all varieties of and degrees

in accuracy of explanation •
. Experimenter: Once upon a time, there was a lady who
was called Niobe (name not essential) who had 12 sons
and 12 daughters (any number provided it is larger than
the number the fairy had). She met a fairy who had
only one son and no daughter (or any inferior m.nnber).
Then the lady laughed ·. at :,the fairy because the fairy
only had one boy. Then the fairy was very angry and
fastened the lady to a rock (or tree, etc.). The lady
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or1ed for 10 yearso In the end, she turned into a rock
and her tears made a stream which still runs today.1
No. 1 (explainer): Once there was a lady. She had 11
sons and 11 daughters. She met a fairy with only one.
She laughed at the fairy 'cause she had one. The fairy
tied her to a rock. She cried and cried for 10 years.
She turned into a rock. The tears ran till it made a
stream. The stream still runs.
No. B. (reproducer): Once a lady had 11 sons and 11
daughters. She laughed at the fairy 'cause she had
only 1 son. The fairy tied her to a tree. She cried
for 10 years.
The first is ap almost accurate reproduction, the only point
left out being that the fairy was angry at the lady.

The

reproducer .fails ·. to mention the meeting of the fairy and
the lady or to finish up the story.

It is to be remembered

that the adult or explainer tells or retells the story until the child told says he is ready to reproduce it.

These

two children do not reverse the order of events or neglect
the causal relation.

Here is the same story reproduced by

two other children:
No. 2. (explainer): There was a lady had 12 sons and
12 daughters. Another lady only had one son and. one
daughter. She laughed at this other lady. The other
lady tied her to a rock. She cried for 10 years and
made a stream and it .1 s there now.
He tells it very well but neglects the causal relation.
No. 5. (reproducer): There was a wife had 12 daughters
and 12 sons. There was a lady had 1 daughter and 1
son. The other lady laughed at her. She tied her to
a rock. She cried for 10 years.
Notice the

mi~ture

of pronouns and the neglect to finish

the story as told her.
1

Of.

~~

82 and 87.
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Pronouns, personal and demonstrative adjuectives,
etc., 1 he, she,• or 'that, the, him,' etc., are
used right and left, without any indication of
what they refer to ••• The pronouns distributed at
random are therefore a characteristic of the style,
and not a proof of lack of understanding,l
This is just as true of No. 5 as of the case referred to by
Piaget,
The first two children change parts and the following
story is told to one of them (They are told not to bother
about the names):
Experimenter: A child went up to a lark and said, •Good
lark, have you any young ones?" "Yes, child, I have,"
said the lark, 1 and they are v.ery pretty ones, indeed."
Then she pointed to them and said, "This is Fair Wing,
that is Tiny Bill, and that other is Bright Eyes." The
child said, "Yes, at home we are three, myself and my
two sisters, Janet and Alice. And mother says we are
pretty little children and she cares. a great deal for
us.• To this the little lark answered, "Oh yes, mother
cares a great deal for us, too.• Then ~ the child said,
"Good lark, will you send one of your little ones to
play with me?" Before the mother bird could answer ,
little Bright Eyes said, "Yes, if you will send your
sister to play with us in our nest." The child said ,
1 0h Alice will be so sorry to leave home and come away
from mother.• The little bird said, "Tiny Bill (or our
little brother) will be so sorry to leave our nest and
go away from mother.• The little child didn't know
what to think and went home saying, 8 Ah, everyone lLkes
his home.•
No. 8 {explainer): A little boy went to see a bird. The
child said, "Have you any young ones?" The lark said,
•Yes, I have." The child said, "Can .Tiny Bill come over
to my house?" Before the lark had a chance to answer,
the other baby bird said, "The other bird would be sorry
to leave his nest." The child said "My sister would be
sorry to leave the bouse.•
He bas left out details but carries the thread of the story

1·---··

t ·, T',, 102.
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thfough without a mixture of order of events ·or of pronouns.
No. l repeats .almost exactly the story as told him.
No. l (reproducer): Once a boy went to a lark. fhe
child said, "Have you any baby birds?" The lark said,
"Yes, I have.• The boy said, "Can Tiny Bill come over
to play with me?" Before the bird .c ould say, the
little bird said, "The other bird wouldn't want to
leave the nest.• "The sister wouldn't want to leave
the house, either," the child said.
These

e~amples

are given from the first pair of children

because No. l gave the fullest explanations and most accurate reproductions.

Two other stories were given them but

in every instance they reproduced the causal relationship
mentioned in the original, whether as explainers or as
reproducers.
ing it as

In the story of Eparninondas, No. 8, in tell-

e~lainer,

said,

11

When he got home it (the butter)

was all melted because the sun was shining hard."

The

original had said, "The sun was shining hard and when he
got

home ·~; the

butter had aJ.l mel ted. n

causal relationship, though it was not

He understood the
exp~essed

in the

original and put it in his own.
The next two children are quoted because in the first
reproduction a causal relationship inferred in the original
is caught by this child and put into her story when retold.
These instances are unusual, for causal explanations are
apt to be left out, according to Piaget.
Other factors are at work which help to render
the explainer's exposition rather unintelligible
to the reproducer~ These are an absence of order
in the account given, and the fact that causal
relations are rarely expressed, but are generally
indicated by simple juXtaposition of the related
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terms. The explainer, therefore, seems not to
concern himself with the 1 how 1 of the events
which he presents: at any rate, he gives only
insufficient reasons for those events. In a ·
word, the child lays stress on the events themselves rather than on the relations of time
(order) or cause which unite them. These factors,
moreover, are probably all connected in various
degrees with the central fact of ego-centrism.l
No. 15. (explainer): Once upon a time there was
a lady and she had 12 daughters and 12 sons~ And
a fairy come (No. 10 interrupts her: •Not 'come',
'oam$•.•). She had 1 son. The fairy tied her to
a rock because she said to the fairy, "Ha ha.•
She had tears in her eyes. She turned into a
rook.
No. 10 (reproducer): Once Upon a time there was
an old lady. She had 12 sons and 12 girls. A
fairy came. She had 1 son. The fairy tied her
to a rock. She had tears in her eyes.
She turned
into a rock.
Exchange of parts.
No. 10 (explainer): A little girl went up to a
bird. The little girl said, •Have you any birdsf"
The bird said, "Here's one and here's one and he~e's
one." The little girl ·. said, "Will you send one to
my home?" The little bird said, 1 Yes, if you send
your li'14tle brother up in our nest we will let you
have one." The little girl didn't knQw what to do.
She went home thinking.
· ·
No. 15. (reproducer): A little girl sai'd, "I want
a little bird." The bird said, "Come over to my nest
if you want to have a Qird. Send your little brother
over to our nest to get it.• She said, "All right."
She went home. She was mad.
This reproduction is an example of what Piaget means by the
habits of child thought which result in lack of understanding.
No. 15 did very well with the story which an adult had told
her, but though No. 10 told her the story of the bifd and
the child quite clearly, except for the point of
1

L.T., 107.

e~change
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of child for bird she changes the latter part of .the story
to fit her own schema and puts a new interpretation on it.
The

ne~t

examples show how much some of the children

condense the story and put various interpretations on it.
No. 20 (explainer): There was a lark and 2 children.
They said, "Nice lark, will you send Billy over to
play with us? 11 They said, "Send Mary to play with us."
So Barbara said, "Mary would be so sorry to come from
home." It was up in a nest.
·
No. 6 (reproducer): Once there was a lark. There were
2 children. The lark said, "Will you send some children
to play with us," Barbara said, "She was so sorry to
come from home." (Who is 'she'?)
Such a brief study of these experiments is very inadequate.

One wishes for time to pair the children off diff-

erently and study different results obtained.

This pairing

was done without any consideration of equal abili tie's , the

experiment of story-telling being done early in the course
of the observations, so the same pairing was continued in
the demonstrations to make a fair comparison.
The results of our story-telling experiment are above

..

those quoted by Piaget in the story-telling by six-year-olds.
We would emphasize the general placing of the ideas in order
by the children (exceptions here and there) and the repeating of causal relationships where they occur in the story
and as they are understood and put in, in the two instances
quoted.

These are in contrast to lack of understanding and

seeing of relationships which Piaget
year-olds.

e~phasizes

in his

si~

·o ur stories compare favorably with those quoted

by Piaget from the seven-and-a-half-year-olds and stand out
above those quoted from the six-year-olds. This bears out
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our conclusion about this group approaching more nearly the
criteria for the seven to eight-year-old or
plicit reasoning.

t~e

age of im-

This sense of relationship already dev-

eloping in them will be brought out in another chapter.

There

is, on the whole, a very little romancing or filling in of
gaps not remembered.

The children try to reproduce the stories

they hear and do not twist and turn them to any . extreme, though
such tendencies in some of them are still evident as shown,
There is no equivalent to "She cried for 50 months" as Piaget
alludes to in one example,
20 months."

2

1

and "For 20 rnonths,,.and then

Our points for criticism are very mild beside

this romancing and lack of order Piaget refers to.

He goes

on to show from his experiments
••• that the objectivity of thought is closely
bound uo with its communicability, It is in
ego-centric thought that we give rein to our
imagination. When we think socially, we ar3
more obedient to the "imperative of truth".
On the one hand, it is only from the age of

7 or 8 that there can be any taLk of genuine
understandins between children. Till · then the
ego-centric factors of verbal expression (elliptical style, indeterminate pronouns, etc,) and
of understanding itself, as well as the derivative factors {such as lack of order, in the
accounts given, juxtaposition, etc.) are all
too important to allow of any genuine understanding between children. Between the ages of
7 and 8 these factors become less active and
some of them (lack of order) even disappear.
On the other hand, there exists between children
of 6 and 7 and those of 7 and 8 a fundamental
1

L.T., 106,

2L,T,,

3

111

L.T,, 124.

difference as regards their efforts to be
objective. This convergence of two inde-·
pendent phenomena is certainly not fortui~
taus, and it has enabled us to place the
beginnings of verbal understanding between
childre~ approximately between the ages of
7 and a.I
·
After the age of ? :to .. 8, these consequences
of ego-centrism do not disappear immediately
but remain crystallized in the most abstract
and inaccessible part of the mind, we mean the
realm of purely verbal thought,2
To prove this point, Piaget carries out experiments

wit~

older children who are able to read, for these experiments
are on written material and therefore beyond· our group.

Here

he brings out the syncretism of understanding or perception
•by means of general schemas" which supplant the perception

of detail. 3

He goes on to distinguish between the syncretism

of ·understanding and the syncretism of
how they are dependent on one another. 4

1

~, 125
t:; Tl 128.
3·
.
of. t.T,,
132.
4 Of. L, T,,
. . chapter IV.
2

J

reason~ng

and shows

Ohapter VI
Ohildren's Questions
The reason for studying this phase of a child's
language is best given by P1aget.
There is no better introduction to child logic
than the study of spontaneous questions,l
He treats it as a Wtransition subject between the functiamal
study of verbal intelligence in the child and the analysts
of the peculiarities of child logic.• 1
lfhat are the intellectual interests or, if one
prefers, the logical fuhotionA to which the
questions of a given child testify, and how are
those interests to be classified?l
I

He then proceeds to classify them according to the : eort
of answer which the child

e~ects

fication will be given shortly.

to receive, which classiAll the questions of which

he has made a study2 are those asked by a single child of
..
one adult. In another connection, however, he deals with
a briefer study of the questions of two six-year-olds,3
In our present study it is of interest to

e~amine

the

questions asked by children in their own groups in comparison with those asked by one of these same children when
with adults,
There is also a difference in connection with the conditions under which the subject matter was obtained.
lz;··, T·, , 162,
2
L.T., Ohapter V.
3~
~~

28-34.

The
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questions asked by the child from whom Piaget took his
findings were asked always during a lesson-hour and. this
he speaks of as having an inevitable influence on the questions, in ppite of the natural atmosphere under which they
were asked.

This would account, certainly, for the large

number of questions of causal explanation involving precausality from which he draws his conclusions in this conne ction about preoausality in the child.

However, our study

only strengthens his judgment that children of their own
initiative are not especially interested in the cause of
things.

If one were to guide a child's thoughts toward

natural phenomena, the child would inevitably ask questions
about them, but just as Piaget 1 s

e~erimenter

refrained

•as carefully from provoking questions as from picking and
choosing among those that were asked,"

l

so in this present

study all effort to guide the conversation was conscientiously avoided.

At the family meal, for the sake of these

observations, the child was allowed to enter the general
conversation at will, as his interest directed, or to ask
any questions or to introduce any subject he desired.

Even

in the groups at school no observ§tions were taken during
lesson time, but when children chose their activity and
their · own topic of conversation.

In r .egard to their quest-

ions, as to all their language under consideration, every
. 1 L.-. T/ , 163,
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one has been included and counted, no differentiation
whatever being made.
The following are the tables for analysis which Piaget
uses.

Further explanation of his terms will be given in

connection with the examples
chosen from this study.
..
'

For

more explicit details the reader is referred to his chapter
on "A Child's Questions.• 1
I.
E;planation
(causal)
Jlotivation

Analysis of "Whys"2

Form of the question
Cause •••••••.•••••••

{ End •••••••••••••••••
Motive ...•.•........

Justification [Justification proper
Logical reason ••.•••

of the question
Physical objects
J Matter
Psychological actions
Customs and rules
Classification ana
connection of ideaa

Piaget explains the difference between psychological
motivation which has to do with the immediate motive and
psychological

e~lanation

which has to do more with the

reason or cause underlying the motive and which closely
connects with or grows into logical or causal explanation,
but he classes them all under motivation.
II. Questions Not Expressed Under
the Form of "Why" 3
Of causal explanation
Natural phenomena
l

~~ Chapter V.
2
L; T., 171.
3
cf e L .. T'"'
i .. 218
_ ·1

I

•
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Physics
Plants
Animals
Human body
Manufacture

'
'

Of reality and history
Facts and events
Place
Time
Modality
Invented history
'

On actions and intentions
On rules
Social rules
School rules
Of classifica.tion
Nomenclature
Logical reason
Classification and evaluationl
Of calculation
With this material before us, let us cite examples
from the children's groups, first considering the 'Whys.•
In the free conversation period at school 47 questions
are asked by the children,

?%

Of these 47 questions, 7 are

of their
1

Whys.

1

spo~~aneous

remarks.

6 of these 'Whys' are

whys of motivation (5 of simple motive and l of psychological
explanation).
1) (No. 15 has shown her paper dolls.) No. 27. Why
can't you play with them?
2) No. 10. Why didn't you u~e sticks (for candles in
the clay cake)?
.
'
The difference in degree
between these and the next question

of psychological explanation is apparent.

This seeks a
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different cause.
3) No. 27. Why would you hunt tin-foil? No. 20.
(has been ta~king about it) I would ,get money
for it.
The one why of causal explanation in the group is a question
about the pasteboard reindeer one of them was showing to
the group.
No. 11 Why don't they have horns? No. 7. They're motherreindeer; they don't have horns • .
In the school play period questions form 14% of the
children's total spontaneous conversation and out of 94
questions asked 10 are 'Whys,f all of motivation.

They are

all of the same tYPe, having to do with the activity in which
children are engaged.
1) No. 10. Wby don't you work faster? No. a. I am
working as fast as I can.
2) (Playing house) No. 20. Why don't you put some water
in it (the pitcher)? No. 3. It spills.
In the home play group, 18% of their spontaneous conversation consists of questions, 122 in number; of which 7 are
'Whys' (6 of motivation and 1 of logical reason, this latter
being the only such question among all the 'Whys' of children
in their own groups).

According to Piaget, the words or

meaning •Why is it called? etc." classes a question as one
of logical reasoning, •relating to judgments and not to things.nl
In logical justification, thought becomes conscious of its own independence, of its possible
mistakes, and of its conventions, it no longer

1

w_•• 194

f.
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seeks to justify the things in themselves,
but its own personal judgments about them, 1
.... ,.t

D. Thfs boy's name is •sock' (a stocking-doll.). Do
you know why? I want you to tell why,
8, Because it was made from a stocking, ·
The questions of motivation again all ha.ve to do with their
activity,

This is a typical one:

A, Why don't you take another colorl What color have
you got now?
.
D. Blue, These ,are blue-birds. I know they are, by their
wings,
Summing up the 'Whys' of children in their own groups, .
there are 22 of motivation, of which 1 takes on the character
of a more lasting cause of the action; 1 of causal
ation; and 1 of logical justification.

e~lan-

This bears out Piaget's

conclusion that
there is very little attempt on the part of children
(i.e., among themselves) to socialize their search
for the causal explanation of external phenomena,
This does not mea.n that they do not feel the need
for explanation (i.e., when with adults),2
As to the other questions under these same conditions,
they group themselves mostly about 'actions and intent,•
'reality and history,' and

1

classification,

1

In other words,

they are concerned with matters of fact and not of abstract
reasoning, which is what Piaget contends.
Examples from free conversation,
Action and intent.
No. 15. (Showing a bell and a little sleigh she has
1

L. T., 194.

2

-··

Of. ·L,·T, ,33f,;

~·

13.

If
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made.) I wanted to put the bell on the sleigh but I
don't know how to put it on. Maybe someone will help
me.
No. 8. Couldn't you hang it on? (He tries but doesn't
succeed in making 1 t stay.)
.
.
Fact.
(No. 2 has told about an experience with a lizard.)
No. a. Did he bite you?
No. 2. He didn't do anything. There was a pile of cans
there and he dug down in there.

~

Place.
No. 18. I am going out in the hills to take my lunch.
fio. 27. Where? Boston1 Cleveland? Twin Peaksl San Francisco?

'=

Classification.
(No. 10 shows a drawing.) ·No. a. What's that blue on the
side?
No. 10. A curtain; I haven't finished it yet.
E~amples

from school play.
'=

Action and intent.
1) No.1. (making designs with colored sticks.) Were you
working with these with me last time?
No. 2. No, it was M.
,
2) (Playing with clay.) No.3. He can't get a whole big
piece like that soft, can het
No. 5. No.
.
No.3. He ·has to take a little piece.
3) (Making paper chains.) No. 1. You can take the blue
out, can't you?
No. 10. Yes.
.
No. 1. Take it out.
0

0

Place.
(In the play-house.) No. 5. You go to work.
No. 2. Where shall I go?
No. 5. Your work is doWQ there (pointing).
Time.

(While they are painting.) No. 15. Some kids had a fight
today, didn't they?
No.1. What do you~ean, at recess this afternoon?
No. 1~5.. Yes.

Classification and evaluation.
1) No. 10. Is it all right now?
No. 1. Yes.

~----------------~~~--~~~d. _
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2) No. 15. (Pointing to a key on a ribbon) Isn 1 t that
cute? What is it?
No. 3.. A key to my, bike.
3) no. 20. (About No. 1 1 s drawing.) What are those spots?
No. 1. The dirt on the hills.
4) (Playing with clay.) No. 5. What is it, a chair or a
stool r '
·No. 6 •. She changes it a~l the time.

School rules. (There is only one.)
(They are making 'phonics• books.) No. 6. How do you
make an F?
No. 3. I Qan show you on the board.
Logical reason. (There are only two.)
1) No. 1. How could anything be pigger than big?
No. 2. Giants are bigger.
,
2) (Involves demonstration but does not have to do with
set rules) No. 20. How do you make a house?
(No. 1 shows her.) I made mine square.
This last example is not as clear as the other, and is closely
allied to action and to rules, but the child who is shown
criticizes her own and sees her error, hers being more like a
box than a house.
E~a.n1ples

from home play.

Action and intent.
1) s. Did you color all these yoursel~?
A. Yes.
.
2) D. How are you going to get into your house?
B. (Has no door.) Climb up, I guess.
D. Climb up here?
B. Guess I 111 bu.j,ld up some steps. Guess I'll tear it
down and build a door.
3) (This illustrates the intent which corresponds to
psychological motivation.) D. Do you want to color
with my colored pencils?
A. Yes.
D. I'm going to get a magazine for you.
Fact.

s. I have my camping-suit on. You know where the
oamp-fire girls got Well, there's the cutest puppy
there. He'll spea~ and stand up like that (shows).
D. Does he speak our language?
2) s. I wish I was up at the cabin now. I'd slide
down hill. I bet there's snow there now, don't you,

1)

7!

D.? It said in the paper that the bus had a hard time
ge~ting over the grade.
D. Is it hot up there now?
s. No, it's cold.
Place.
(Playing with train.) D. Put the switch right here
end of the bridge.
J. Where is it?
D. Right here. ,
Time.

011!1

the

D. Did you have to go home at a certain time?

B. No, we'll just start home when it's kind of dark.
Classification.
1) B. What are these for? The roofs?
D. Yes, but we're not .ready. I'm ,not and you're not
either.
2) B. What's this thing?
D. It's going to be a, chair when I get it done.
3) B. This is a desk. isn't it?
D. No, It's a table.
The one question about social rules is an appeal to an adult.
D. (To S.) That isn't fair for you to have all the short
sticks. Is it, mother?
,

There is one example of logical reason which, however, borders
closely on intent.

A. I told you you didn't have red.
did for?
D. •cau~e I thought I did.

What did you say you

It has the criterion, "Why do you assert that?• which we
have referred to before.

One of the examples of logical reason

through demonstration was given in connection with types of
conversation.
A. How do you steer this thing?
D. I'll show you. You turn the .wheel like this. As long
as it is that way, it goes straight.
This is allied to human action but the demonstration involves

I

reason,

It shows how one forms a basis out pf which the

other gradually emerges; the intellectual realist through
.

transitional stages becomes able to separate intellectual

~

processes from himself.

In a similar manner Piaget shows

how questions of logical reason grow out of questions about
the actions of people through questions about· the rules
which govern these actions.
child's mind of causal

This very confusion in the

e~lanation

and logical justification

with psychological motivation is what Piaget designates as
1

precausali ty. •

1

Now what we propose to show is that in the
child before the age of 7 or 8, these types of
explanation are, if not completely undifferentiated, at any rate far mDre similar to each
other than they are with us. Causal explanation
and logical justification in particular are still
identified with motivation; because causation in
the child's mind takes on the character of finalism and psychological motivation far rather than
that of spatial contact, and because, moreover,
logical justification hardly ever exists in an unadulterated form but always tends to reduce itself
to psychological motivation, We shall designate by
the name of precausality_ this primitive relation in
which causation still bears the marks of a quasipsychological motivation. One of the forms taken by
this precausality is the anthropomorphic explanation
of nature. In this case, the causes of phenomena
are always confused with the intention of the Creator
or with those of men, who are the makers of mountains
and rivers. · But even if no 1 intention 1 can be detected
in this anthropomorphic form, the 'reason• which the
child tries to give for phenomena is far more in the
nature of a utilitarian reason or of a motive than of
spatial contact.! ·
1

u~ ·T~,, 196

2

!/~ '!''. :, 181
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If all the questions noted down were examined, one
would see that the children among themselves ask only what
r.

!:
..J

might be designated . as surface questions.

'

matter of the examples given has been tYPical of all. But

·r

when the child is in conversation with one or more adults,

1

The subject-

his questions, though falling under the same heads, are in
many instances of a deeper natuxe.

Piaget says that .the

child regards the adult as omniscient, thinks all his own
questions can be answered and this leads to his notion of
,_

final ism, of leaving nothing to chance.

And it is only with

the realization of death and of necessity that his reasoning
begins to assume a logical character, for the idea of necessity underlies all logic.
seem never

1

At any rate, children of this age

to ask each other questions far removed from

simple activity, motive, and fact.
We turn now to D.'s questions asked of adults.

The first

fact to notice is the proportion of questions asked. Whereas the percentages of questions to totals of spontaneous
language of all the children in their groups is 7% in free
conversation, 14% in school play, and 18% in home play, and
of D. in these same groups respectively is 12%, 19%,and 19%,
the percentage of his questions when with one adult is 34%
and at the family meal is 38%.
1 This is a general summary of this phase of Piaget's hyPothesis as it appears throughout his books.

'.
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In the tables of summaries the 'Whys' will be separated
from the other questions, but in considering examples they
will not be treated entirely apart from the others.

Since

the catagories of questions are now clearly in mind, they
will, though named in each instance, not be listed as
separately as heretofore.
Unless so designated, the examples will not be kept
separate as to time of ·occurrence since they are all asked
of adults (or of older brothers,

~2

and 16.)

In the family group 'talk has centered around plays and
this group of questions from D. involves several of classification and one of fact, as well as a why of logical reason,
due to the fact that it implies a "Why do you say ••• ?"
Classification
Were the thxee men in the play I was in the Three Musketeers?
,

Why of logical reasoning.
Why not? (i.e., why do you say they were not?)
Classification.
Weren't the three musketeers soldiers? (Yes.)
Classification.
Then what makes musketeers? (Soldiers who carry muskets.
They didn't have muskets in Trojan days.)
Classification.
What are muskets?
Fact.

(Explanation.)

They have muskets now, don't they?

(Explanation.)

Other classification questions.
ll When a girl loves a boy it's her beau, isn't it?
2 What are sheaves?
3 What are jokes? ,
4 What's an adul~?
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5 What 1 s a lamp?
6 What's a crescent?
7 Are nails steel? ,
8 Is a young cow ~ calf?
9 What does parched me~?
10 What does quenched mean?
Where among themselves the 'children's classification
questions only sought to designate an object, these seek
for a definition of a term, and through definition and rule
the child begins abst.ract reasoning.

Still other classi-

fication questions are of the following order:
(~he family
n~ighbor.)

at table are talking about the death of a

l) ..What kind of dreams do you have when you are dead?
(Nobody knows.) I mean, if you wake up? (Nobody ever,
does.)
·.
2) Is a funeral where they take you when you~re dead?
(E?CPlanation.)
Action and intent.
ll Are you going over to pray, mother?
2 What do. they do when they fire a ma.n?
3 Do they bury you when you get older? .
,

This leads to a why of logical justification on social rules.
Why do they bury dead people? (Explanation of danger
to the health of those living, so . they either bury or
burn the dead body.) I'd rather be burned, so I wouldn't
get dirt in my eyes.
Two points of interest in this example are (1) that the question comes very near to the why of causal explanation showing how closely allied these two types are to one another
and (2) that the child thinks he will still care after death
whether or not he has dirt in his eyes.
Other very different examples of social rules are:
1) (The child at the table is asked not to repeat
something.) I won't tell till I get married and tell
my wife. That'll be all right, won't it?

76
2) Do ladies that own stores have to pay,for their
little boys' clothes? (!xplanation of wholesale and
retail.)
The

ne~t

example, while it deals with social rules, shows

how rules and definitions are hard to separate from classific a tion arid how they grow out of human action, also why
Piaget puts question of logical reason under classification.
Did you hear Mrs. X. say she forgot to tell me when :it
was time to oome ho~e? That was an excuse, wasn't it?
The following conversation at bed-time is filled with
questions of different types.
Place.
Where is Jesus? (Answer.)
Is He down-town, too? (Answer.)
Is He all over town? (lnswer.)
Causal explanation.
How can He beT

(Because He is a Spirit.)

Psychological motivation.
Why doesn't He come again, like He did? (He came once
to show man what God is like.)
.
Why did they call Him Jesus? (Just as we·~ called you D.)
Psychological explanation.
Why did they hang Him? (Because the¥ were so selfish
they didn't recognize .Him to be God.)
Fact.

Are the crosses they hung Him on chopped down? (Yes,
a long time ago.) Was it two pieces of wood nailed together? (putting hie hands together cross-fashion.)
(Yes.),
·

This conversation shows the great difference between the
subject-matter of questions asked by a child of an adult or
of another child.

They fall into the same categories of

f act, etc., but deal with far different subject-matter, as
for e?tample:

Fact.
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We know God, don't we, mother?
A question of psychological explanation which involves

causal

e~lanation

of sound waves, etc., is

Why do deaf men put their hands behind their ears?
,

of Causal explanation.
·
1) ('Why' of physics.) (As shadow falls across the
table.) Why do we always have to have a shadow?
2) (Body.) Do all black-haired people get white ,hair
over their ears like you do, daddy? {No, because ••• )
3) When you die, you forget how to read, don't you?
Everything is just the opposite to what it is in life,
isn't it? (Yes, because ••• )
4) (Animals.) Ants can crawl up trees easier. than anything else, can't they?
5 Do eggs grow?
.
6 What are his .(elephant's) tusks for?
7 {Physical phenomena.) How was eartn made?
8 Wi~l lead go to steel?
9 Is the moon on fire? .
10 (Manufacture.) How,do they make olive oil?

Ex~~ples

Two other questions of causal explanation have been classed
under

1

body 1 but they are of deeper significance.

They are

asked on separate occasions, so indicate that .the child is
puzzling about them.

1) Mother, am I always the same person?

(Yes, there can

never be another D.F.) But there has qeen another D.F.

(An uncle.) (I try to explain about individuality and
that no two persons are ever exactly the same.)
2) Mother, is it always the same 1 I 1 when I wake up in
the morning? (What do you think?) I didn't know. - It
must be, though, 'cause it has the same feelings and
the same life.
The following example of logical reasoning is too interesting to be left out.
(At table. The remark has been made that his brother
had three rides across the Bay in an aeroplane when he
was .in San Francisco.) How could he have three rides?
How 1 d he get back to the place he started f1•om?

•
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(Explanation: Because he crossed the Bay pnce in the
ferry-boat.)
It is hoped that this more natural way of handling the
individual child's questions of adults has not ·been confusing.
The summaries following will place all the material by classes.
Before giving those tables a few examples gathering up those
types not indicated thus far are offered.
First are examples of invention, which strangely have
occurred nowhere in the children's conversation.
1) If I were a mechanic, do you know what I'd do_t
2) But if I did see a ghost in the closet, what ~ould
you do? (But you couldn't, there aren't any such things.)
But if,I did, what would you do? (I'd look at it and
see what it was like, etc.) What are they? (People have
used their imagination, etc.)
3) What would happen if you broke a leg?

.

Piaget speaks of such physical assumptions as •mental experiments. n
Childish assumptions point to a confusion between the logical and the real order of things,
just as precausality confuses logical implication
-and causal explanation. In other words, the child,
thanks to the notion of preoausality, conceives the
world as more logical than it really is. This makes
it possible for him to connect everything and to
foresee everything, and the assumptions which he
makes are endowed in his eyes with a richness in
possible deductions which our adult logic could never
allow them to possess.
Examples of historical fact.
·
·
(Naming books of the Old Testament.)
1) The Chronicles that are put around at peoples'
houses? (He means newspapers, such as the San Francisco
Chronfqle, so explanation of meaning of chronicles.)
a) Did they (the Jews) have Chronicles1 (I'll read you
some of them, so rou can see what they ,are like. I read
about King David.)

1
t.T{, 211 f.
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3) He's dead, isn't he? (Yes, a long ti~e ago.) I
wonder if I'll be a king when I get big. (The names
being the same.)
Examples of school rules.
- 1) (Pronounces 'pretty' as though it were 1 purty'. (I
say, "No, it's 'pretty'") Who said so?
2~ It begins with aT, doesn't it?,(Ye&.)
3 'Because' is better than # 1 0ause~, isn't it, mother?
Yes.)
4) It 1 s wrong to stole. You shouldn't stole. (Explain
'steal, stole, stolen.•) Wouldn't it be this way, "I
have not stolen"? (Yes.) "I have stoled," that wouldn't
be right1 What do. I hitch on to that 'stolen'? He has,
or they ~ave? (It makes no difference.) Is 'tqey have'
two words? (Yest) 'They' is one word? And 'stolen' is
one word? .(Yes. J
It is not inJcended at all to convey the idea that when
with an adult the child asks only such questions as have been
given as examples, but it is true that neither this particular
child nor any other in the children's groups ever ask questions
of this nature of each other during the observation periods.
Probably these questions are typical of any child of similar
age and I.Q. when with adults whom he feels free to question.
Side by side with these questions are many in the home observations of the same character as the examples given from the
chidren's groups, dealing with the games, stories, or i mmediate activity or interest.

But most of the questions are

seeking for adult information by which to check his own
opinions and these questions certainly form a more intensive
mode of the socialization of the intellectual processes with
its consequent gains in logical reason, if the adults asked
are interested in giving the child a thoughtful answer, based
on their best knowledge.

Summary of Children's Questions in Their Own Groups (D.'s
included.)
Home Play

School School
Play·- Conversat ion

Totals

42

10

111

15

67

15

59

Not in the form of 'W'.ayt.
Action and Intent

59

Reality and History
J'act
Place
Time

20
14
0

Classification
Nomenclature
Classification
Evaluation
Reason

8
9
1

34

2
15
1
•3

1
17
3
2

21

Rules
Social
School

8
7
0

18

0

15
0
0

23

0
•1

1
0

1

115

0

o·

1

0

84

~

2

239

In the form of 'Why'.
Psych. Motivation

6

10

6

22

Causal

0

0

1

1

0

1

E~lanation

Logical Reason

1

0

7

1~

Percentages of questions
to total spontaneous remarks

10

"'"94
14%

18%

Same for both play groups

16%

Same for three groups

13%

-7
47
7%

24
283

80

81

Summary of D.'s Questions in Children's Groups.
Home Play

School Sohool Tota1.s
Play Conversat ion
'

I

Not in the form of 'Whyl.
Action and Intent

37

11

5

53

2

34

Reality and History
Fact
Place
Time

12

4

12
0

3
1
24

~assification

Nomenclature
Classification
Evaluation
· Logical Reason

6
2
0 ·

Social

8

0
2
0

1
3

1

Rules

0
2
0

1
1

9

o·
6
0

1
71

.

In the form of 'Why'.

25

,.

2

17

0

1

-9

Motivation

1

2

0

Causal Explanation

0

0

0

Logical Justification
or
Logical Reason

2

0

0

2

3
--rr4

Percentages of questions to
total spontaneous remarks

19%

~7

19%

0

---s

'

105

5

-no

12%

Same for all children's groups 1'7%

-
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Summary of D. ' s Questions with Adults
Meal

Bedti1ne

Totals

Not in the form of 'Why'.
Action and Intent

33

123

156

80

174

Reality and History
Fact
Place
Time
Invention

79
7

4·
4

94

Causal Explanation
General
Human Body
Animals
Plants
Physics
Natural Phenomena
Spiritual Phenomena
Manufacture
Classification
Nomenclature
Classification
Evaluation
Logical Reason

1
2
3
2
1

5
31
7

Rules
School
Social

5
3

-

0
12
2
0
9
23
3
6

--

9
0
3

~2

2

45
23
3
9

45

60

105

16

3

8

Whys

Causal Explanation

44

3
40
13
4

19

192

Motivation

32

314

14

11

1

1

27
506

Justification
Justification
Reason

0
2

2

- 2 17

---zos

0

. · a'·

, ...

,

)

-.J - -

... _

14

~28

3!1.

537
Percentages of questions to
Total Spontaneous Remarks
38%
33%
3~
Total, number of questions asked by D.of children and adults 647
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General Summary of All Children's Questions in Groups
Not in the Form of Why
Action and Intent ••••••••••••.•••••..••••••...••••• 111
Reality and History (Fact 36) (Place 30)(Time 1) •••

67

Causal E~lana tion • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . • •

«D

Classification (Nomenclature 3)(Classification 47)
(Evaluation 4)(Logical Reason 5)....

59

Rules (Social 1) (School 1)........................

2

· Whys (Psychological Motivation 22] (Causal Explanation 1 )(Logical Explanation~ . l~ ••••.••. : .•.••••• ,

24

Total ntimber of questions asked by children in groups

263

General Summary of D.'s Questions
with Adul te and Other .C hildren
Not in the Form of Why
Action and Intent ••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••

209

Reality and History (Fact 140)(Place 47)(Time 8)
(Invention 13) ••••••..••.•.•••

208

Causal Explanation (General l~(Body 14)(Animale 5)
·
(Plante 2) Physics lO)(Manufacture 9 (Spiritual Phenomena 3) ••..•.. .•.••• :· ••.....••

44

Classification (Name 10) Classification 82)
(Evaluation 23)(Logical Reason 7) ••

122

Rules (School 21) (Social 7) ••..•.•.••.•••.•••••••

28

Whys (Motivation 28) (Causal Explanation 2)
(Logical · Justification 6) •••............•...••••

.

.

Total number of Questions asked by D••••••••••.••••••

647

Total of above figures •••••••.•••.••..... .•............

910

From which should be subtracted D. 1 s questions in groups

110

Total number of questions asked by children..........

800
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From these summaries and our examples it is evident
that child thought centers about action, psychological motivation, and matters of fact.

It is also evident from our

typical examples that questions asked by children between
themselves are simple in character and have to do with the
activity of the moment, but that a great change takes place
in the character of the

que~cn~

when the child (whom we

have observed) is with friendly adults.
Another outstanding fact is the small proportion of
'whys'.

This harmonizes with our assertion that the major-

ity of these children and the one most thoroughly studied,
are in their mental age passing out of the ego-centric period and beginning the period that extends from 7-8 to 11-12,
Our findings in the case of the child with adults bear
out the truth of the following statement (with the exception
that he does not frame his questions of causal explanation
in the form of 'why'.)
Thus, on the one hand, the relative freq*ency of 1 whys 1 diminishes; on the other hand,
there is an increase of questions of reality and
history in comparison to those of explanation;
finally, the sense of the 'whys' becomes increasingly causal. These movements seem to us to be
closely connected with one another. It is true
that statistics can be made to prove anything, but
in this case statistical induction corresponds
with the results of qualitative analysis and
clinical examination.
For one thing, if the f .r equency of the 'whys 1
diminishes in proportion to the bulk of the questions, this 18 because between the ages of 3 and
7 'Why' is - rea.lly.a question which is used for every
purpose, which demands a reason for everything indiscriminately, even when there is no reason for
present except through a confusion of the
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psychological and the physical order of things.
It is therefore quite natural that when these
two orders come to be differentiated, and when
the idea of chance or of 1 the given' first makes
its appearance, a lar ge number of questions
should break away from the why form. They will
then take the form of 1 how 1 or of simple questions without any interrogative words in them,
and will concern themselves as much with the consequences and inner mechanism of phenomena as with ·
their 'reason.• The decrease of 'whys' would thus
be an index of a weakening of precausality. This
weakening, it seems to us, can also be seen in
the increase of simole quest i. ons insofar as these
show signs, a s compared to •why~', of a desire for
supplementary information.l
Thus we find in the case of D. his questions of causai
explanation with but one exception are stated in other forms
than

1

why 1 •

In other words, he is more interested in infor-

mation about than in the 'why' of things in general. This
searching for correct information is tYPical of his questions
of adults, although at times strong evidences of the remains
of precausality make their appearance, but very infrequently,
however.

This infrequency of the

1

why 1 form in his ques-

tions as well as the less precausal character of his causal
questions stand out in startling contrast to the questions
of the six-to-seven-year-old quoted by Piaget.
If questions about facts and circumstances are
multiplied, it is because the child gives up the
attemp t to account for phenomena which are simply
given, and tries to gain a more detailed knowledge
of t he historical circumstances in which they
appear, of their condition and of their consequences. 2
From this point of view we are also enabled
to understand why questions of reality and history
increase in comparison to questions of explanation,
1

L.T., 220 f.
.
61..... 222.

2

as
always assuming that this increase is no~ due
to the arbitrary character of the classification~
Only 31 out of D.'s 537 questions to adults are 'why' questions, while 185 of 750 questions cited of Piaget'a
seven-year-old subjects are in the form of 'why'.
does ask

1

si~-to

When D.

why 1 questions they are chiefly, as with the other

children, 'whys df motivation.•
Though there are very few questions explicitly logical
in form, many of his questions of action, or reality and
history, and of classification and rules are implicitly
logical.

If this is evidence of remaining precausality it

is also evidence of the germs of reas·oning growing in his
mind.
There is indeed subject-matter for a whole book in the
study of children's questions and one is baffled very often
by the delicacy of the task of separating them into arbitrary classes.

But Piaget's analysis certainly is appli-

cable as well as interesting and if proof of his tireless
effort in his study of the "Psychology of the logic of
childhood."

He spared no pains to verify every assertion

and back up his conclusions.
e_~eriment

He carried this particular

over a period of ten months with a child between

six and seven and then seven months later put fifty of the
same questions to the same child and found a decided decline
of precausality.

Through socialization of his thought, then,

the child adapts the information given him and gradually
1 ··

.

L.T.; 222.
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drops his precausal ideas.

A similar though

~premeditated

experience indicates that the same thing is true in D.'s
case.
His question, "Is the moon on fire?" was the most
strongly precausal question he asked during the observations.
Its precausality is indicated by his own remarks following.
That's what I think. I think Jesus has a soft thing
up in the sky, that He l .i ghts every night and morning
(the sun) and puts it up in the sky, but He 1 s carefuii.
not to turn i t upside down because the fire might fall
on folks and burn them up. There might be sticks
flying around in the air and they might catch fire.
He always has daylight though, because He always has
the sun.
This is perfect evidence that he still retains strong precausal J'lotions.

But contrast to that these remarks.

He

himself brings up the subject, three months later, after the
observations are closed; and

a~ter

he has made his own the

explanation given him at the previous time.
A boy said the light from the moon was stronger than

the li ght from the sun because it gave .light in the

'

night.

~-

But that isn't so, is it?

Because the moon

gets the light that it gives us from the sun, and anyway it's dark at night because the sun isn't shining
on our side of the earth.

t.

r;

Let us keep in mind Piaget 1 s conclusion that

11

precau-

sality tends to disappear at the same age as ego-centrism,
viz., between 7 and a. 1 and let us dr~w a few general conelusions.

1

L.!T., 237.
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We have seen from our studies so far that ego-centrism
is bound up with these various aspects of child thought and
that they are affected by it either directly or indirectly.
As we go on to study more particularly child reasoning we
shall see how ego-centrism, in whatever degree it remains,
affects the processes of reasoning.

It should be kept in

mind always that Piaget emphasizes formal reasoning and
draws very nice distinctions in view of that.

We have found

that to be true in his analysis of chiJ.d's questions and it
will be evident throughout, since in the ability to separate
oneself from one's own viewpoint and reason from hY-potheses
is the greatest evidence of divorce from ego-centric thought.
It is also evident and will be increasingly so, that
a child in passing into another stage of thought and reasoning does not drop entirely the habits of the former stage.
With others of h.is own age he is far more ego-centric than
with adults and in tests and experiments evidences far greater
advance than in conversation with other children.

CHAPTER VII
Use of Conjunctions of Causal, Logical and Discordant Relations

in taking up the effect of ego-centrism on the reasoning processes in a child, Piaget shows that since the child
is unconscious of the need of proof he does not synthesize
hie thoughts, does not consider relations, and therefore
omits logical relations and juxtaposes propositions instead
of connecting them.

Because the child fails to analyze he

brings thoughts to gether in confused wholes connecting everything with everything else, and so ind.Ullges in an excess of
relating to which Piaget gives the term 'syncretism' which
is the opposite of juxtaposition, that being a lack of
plicit logical relation. 1

e~-

He compares it (as he says M.

Luquet has done) to children's drawings: "The thing is not
there a's a whole, the details only are given,· and then, for
lack of synthetic relation, they are simply

j~taposed."

2

The method followed by Piaget in studying this angl e
of child reasoning is to study the spontaneous use of the
child's conjunctibns, especially 'because,' 'although,'
and 'therefore', and to give experimental tests which involve the completion of sentences by the children from the

1
2

Of. J ,R:, ; 4
-

J,R, -, 3,
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point where the conjunction is used.

Of the results of these

tests, he says:
The data show that up to the age of 7-8 the
word 'because' is occasionally an equivocal
term which is used for all purposes, and covers
a number of heterogeneous types of relation-causal, consecutive, and even finalistic, the
child being apparently undisturbed by this heterogeneity,l
Bumming up his findings rather than going into every
detail, they are as follows:

(1) The child confuses different

possible relations, such as causality, consequence, etc.:
(2) He is unable to handle the explicit relations of discordance, and

1

although, 1

1

even if,' etc. unambiguously be-

fore 11-12, using the conjunction

1

but 1 , which fails to in-

dicate exact relations; (3) He does not use the

1

but 1 of

implicit discordance till 7-8 (that in which the word
II

~ Qccurs,

1

but 1

not at the beginning, but in the middle of a sen-

tence, and of a sentence containing a causal relation whether
2

'

lo gical or psycholo g ical." ): (4) The word 'therefore' does

not e ~ist in childish language until formal logical thought
makes it first appearance after 11-12; (5) The d1fferent
meanings that a child gives to the word 'the r efore' turn out
to correspond exactly to the different meanings of
as 'and', and 'and then', 'because', etc.:

1

because 1

(6) A child's

talk is full of 'thens', but only a few of them are logical
'thens' corresponding to
1-...
2

lJL..,
i·,a~ ,

16.
52.

1

therefores 1 ; (7) There is a rarity
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of the 'because• of logical explanation. corresponding to the
rarity of the

1

whys 1 of logical justification: (8) The child

does not understand logical necessity, so reasons from particular to particular, or by transduction, and easily forgets what he has just said, and so contradicts himself.
Piaget distinguishes three types of

1

because 1 ---'causal 1 ,

'psychological', and 'logical'---calling to mind the three
classes of 'whys' studied in Chapter VI.

The distinguishing

marks of them will be brought out 1n the study of the examples.
In the present study his method of experiment1 has
been closely followed but the findings will necessarily have
to be condensed as much as possible.

The most interesting

aspect of the experiments has been the study of the indiv.iduality of the child in his approach to the experiment and
of his characteristic answers, arid the detailed material
gathered with each one, but as heretofore only sufficient
~~amples

can be mentioned which will bring out the general

results.
After talking with each child in a friendly fashion and
creating the atmosphere of playing a game together, we ast
if he can give us a sentence all his own containing the word
~ecause'.

All but one of the twelve do so 9

This one, No.

5, although she afterward finishes the sentences we give,
declares she cannot think of any of her own.

1

For fuller details, see J.R., Chapter I.

It is of
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interest to note that in her 82 remarks in school observation
periods she never once uses the word 'because•.

She uses

'because' in a causal sense, however, in every completion
sentence except the one about teasing the dog.
tence she uses -because' in the sense of

1

In that sen-

and then•.

We

find in the other experimental tests that she ·uses 'because'
correctly twelve times, of her own accord.

These are the

sentences (Used by Piaget) given to each child but as completed by No. 5 (the child's words being all those following
the conjunction):
1) I shan't go to school tomorrow because I it's raining. (This has the criterion of a causal 'because',
i ~ e., "The mark of a relation of cause and effect
between two phenomena or two events."l)
2) That man fell off his bicycle because I a car bumoed
into him to make him fall. (Causal).
·
3) I lost my pen because I it was hanging. (Causal).
4) I teased that dog because I he's bad. (She means
he 1 s bad as a consequence of her teasing. Her 'because'
equals 'and then' or 'therefore•).
5) A man fell down in the street because / he was playing ball in the street. (Causal).
,.
These sentences are so worded that a child could very
easily finished a causal 'because' involving a psychological
relation, which Piaget calls "the relation of motive for
action", 2 which children of this age are prone to use, he
states, especially in place of logical relations.
however, does not do so.

1 .. . .

.-J.R.t.;, 6.

2.

J,R., 7,

She,
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Her attempt to finish

the

sentences involving a logi-

cal relation (i.e., denoting "a relation, not of cause and
effect, but of 'implication,' of reason and consequent; what
the 'because' connects here is no longer two observed facts,
but two ideas or judgments. 111 ) is a good illustration of
'justification at any price' and lack of reasoning.

1) Paul says he saw a little cat eating a big dog. His
friend says that is impossible because f the qog was
mean.
2) 2 is not half of 5 because I 5 is .a little bit
straight and 2 is a little bit straight.

In her case the sense of necessity of logical relations is
still entirely dormant.
Neither does she understand the use of 'although.' The
sen tences given each one were as follows, up to and including the conjunction of explicit discordance.

These are as

she finished them:
1) Ernest is playing in the street even though I he
would get run over. · (This is the only , correct use
she makes of such a conjunction.)

·

2) I have some big friends even though I they come down
to see me. (Confuses with 1 and 1 . )
3) He slapped my face even though : I I slapped him.
(Confuses 'though' with 1 because. 1 )
4) I have given John my bicycle though I I . might get
hurt on it. ( ! Though' equals 'because•.)
5) I ate another roll although I I want to die. (Rather
an exaggerated idea of the immediate effect of overeating, but the 'although' is equivalent to 'because').
6) It is hot today although I I gu ~ ss I'll take a
shower. (Here 'although' equals either 'and' or
'therefore•.)
7) He bathed yesterday although I he was hot. (Equals

1.

JtR', , 6.
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'because'.)
8) He didn't get wet yesterday, although j there was
no water i n the tank. (Equals 'because'.)
9) That man fell off his horse, although I the horse
was running fast. (Equals 'because•.)
This brings before the reader the sentences used and
illustrates the same results as Piaget found, especially
in the use of conjunctions other than 'because'; namely, a
confusion of discordance, causality, consecutive relations,
and consequence.
Her utter lack of understanding of 'therefore' emphasizes Piaget 1 s conclusion that 'therefore' is not a part of
a child's vocabulary before 11-12.

For her it does not

exist in the sentence, for she adds a 'because' to each
'therefore' before completing the sentence.
1) John has lost his pen, therefore I because it was
barely hanging.
2) I can't ride my bicycle, therefore I because the
bicycle was broken.
3) Tomorrow I shall have a holiday, therefore I because
it is Sunday.
4) It will be fine tomorrow, therefore ../ because he can
:Qlay.
5) The sun is shinin ~ , therefore /because it was a
pretty day.
Not understanding 'therefore' at all, she naively for ge s
its existence, adds the 'because' with which she is familiar and finishes the sentence, although in the last two
cases she confuses her ideas with the correct use of
'therefore'.
This same disregard of what is.not within their
understanding i s tr.ue in the case of several others.

No.2
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adds •because' to every 'therefore' given.

No. 7 adds it

t o three of them, but uses 'therefore' correctly in the
fifth sentence:
nice day.

The sun is shining, therefore

I it is a

In the fourth sentence, however, he repeats the

same idea which preceded the 'therefore'; it will be fine
tomorrow, therefore

I it will be a nice cool day.

No. 6

adds 'because' to the 'therefore' in ever·y sentence except
one, and repeats the original idea in other words after
the 'therefore' in that sentence.

No. 8 uses 'therefore'

in the first sentence as meaning 'because', and thereafter
adds 'because' to the 'therefore'.
cause' in three sentences.

No.1 uses it as 'be-

Enough have been mentioned to

show how readily they attribute the meandng of 'because'
to ·•therefore', or disregard it entirely in the sentence,
adding 'because' to it.
Other instances show it to be confused with 'and 1 •
No. 15. Tomorrow I shall have a holiday, therefore
I .like holidays.
No. 15. The sun is shining, therefore / I like the
sun.
No. 19 finishes two of her

~entences

I

in this fashion:

John has lost his pen, therefore I what shall we do
about it?
I can't ~ide my bicycle, therefore I why can't I?
I

We can thoroughly agree with Piaget 1 s statement that
children of this age show no unambiguous use of 'therefore',
the conjunction of logical consequence.

It is only fair to

t hem, however, to mention a few instances in their
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spontaneous conversation where they make correct use of
'so' as equivalent to 'therefore' although they never once
use 'therefore' of their own accord.

'So' is, however, much

more common with adults in social communication, 'therefore'
being reserved more for demonstration or scholastic discuss ion.
1) No. 1. It isn't big enough, so they come down to get
into a bigger one.
2) No. 1. There wasn't any brown, so I used red.
3) No. 7. We thought it was too little, so we busted it
u~ and we're making another.
4) No. 7. His brother has a steam-roller, and it won't
go, so he pushes it.
5) No. 19. I made abook and I never made no pictures, so
I put numbers on it.
These examples, though few, show the beginning of the use
of a conjunction of consequence, equivalent to 'therefore'
though less formal.
As to the use of 'although' four of them add the word
'because' before they finish their

sentence~

the explanation

of this, as with the 'therefore', being that since it stands
out as a 'because' in their minds they unconsciously add the
word, thereby

·~· ustifying

it at any price".

It is confused

with 'because' in some instance by each one of them, and
continuaillly by a few of them.

Sometimes· 1 although' is used

for 'but•, sometimes for 'therefore', sometimes for 'and'.
Thus again we find the confused heterogeneity of which
Piaget speaks.
1) No. 3. He slapped my face, although/ I told my
mother. (Equals 'and 1 or 1 therefor~'.)

·. •
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2) no. 4. That man fell off his horse, al.though I he
gets up again, (Equals 1 and 1 or 1 but 1 . )
3) No. 20. It's hot today, although I I drink water.
(Equals 1 and 1 or 'therefore•.)
Undoubtedly the reason why 'although' and 'therefore'
are most frequently confused with 'because' is that it is
the one of the three
and this they use
use of

1

con~unctions

e~ceedingly

of which they make use,

well.

Every one makes correct

because 1 in every instance in the completion of the

five sentences, with the exception of No. 15, who in one
sentence uses it as equivalent to 'and then' (I teased that
dog because

I he bit me), and No. 4, who confuses it four

out of the five "times with 'and' or 'but•. She, however,
uses 'because• correctly in all her explanations in the
other experiments.
No. 8 adds to his example,
morrow because

11

I shan't go to school to-

I I'm sick," this remark, "I 1 m sick in the

hospital;' is another reason':

h~

Of course,

means a fur-

ther or stronger reason, but he understands of his own
initiative that in using 'because' he is giving reasons.
His

e~lanation

of the following sentence is a fine illus-

tration of the beginnings of logical reason.
the sentence, "I teased that dog because

I

He has given

~e · cried."

Thinking this is a case of reversing cause and effect, or
meaning 'and then' instead of 'because', I ask, "How's
that? Don't you mean that he cried because you teased him?"

.

"No," he replies, "it's this way.

If you laugh when they
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tease you, they go away; if you cry, the more. they tease
you.

I teased the dog because he cried."
A point to notice about many of their completion causal

sentences is that they are stated impersonally.

This, it

would seem, is a step away from the personal element in
reasoning.

The sentences of No. 10 bring out the impersonal

stating of the cause.
1) I shan't go to school today because I it's rainy
day.
2) That man fell off his bicycle because I his bicycle
wouldn 1 t go.
3) I lost my pen because I it fell off.
4) A man fell down in the street because I a car ran
over him. It knocked him down and made him fall.
Also No. 15.
1) I shan't go to school tomorrow because I there is
no school.
5) A man fell down in the street because / it was
slippery.
In the 11 original sentences containing 'because' 5 are
of psychological explanation and 6 are causal.
No. 6. I
fishery
No. 1. I
because

go down to Oakland because I want to see the
my cousin has. (Psychological)
asked my father if I could play in the sand
I wanted him to :know where I was. (Psycholo gical)

This same child in his first sentence containing 'although'
uses an original logical 'because' ('should' and

1might 1

show that rbecause" connects two judgments).
Ernest is playing in the street, even though I he
should go out of it because he might get run over.
E~amples

using a causal

1

because 1 :

No. 10. Because the man bumped into somebody, he fell
down. (Causal)
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No. 2. I play with my own self because there's no kids
to play with. (Causal).
There are many points of interest in a detailed discussion of their examples, but the completion of the sentences
calling for a logical 'because'

rema~

for study.

1) Paul says he saw a little cat swallow a bi~ dog.
His friend says that is impossible, because 1 •••
Here are a few examples of the completions of this sentence:
No. 1 I it couldn't. The cat it too little. (This is
is correct, but he might have explained more fully.
Three others give t i1is sa.rne reason, or that the cat' s
mouth or throat is too little.).
No. 2. (goes into full detail and is most painstaking
in giving reason) I the cat has too small a mouth and
he couldn't swallow it anyway unless the dog was all
chopped up and he took little pieces.
No. s. (Also goes into complete deta.il) I a little cat
couldn't swallow a big dog. It's mouth isn't big
enough and the little cat couldn't hold a big dog;
it's stomach isn't big enough.
No. 19. I His friend· fooled him. The dog is too big
for his throat.
Nine out of the twelve, or 751; give the correct logical
reason.

One w.1biguously states her logical reason, one

gives a psycholOgical reason ( 11

I he didn't '1mow how a

little cat could eat a big dog"), and one, a meaningless
statement.

Not all, however, have a general proposition

in mind, such as, "Little cats do not swallow big dogs,"
but are reasoning from a particular case.

This is not

true of No. 8, nevertheless, and all these examples are
better stated than the ones Piaget gives from children 7:11
and 8.

This failure to state the general proposition is

due to the child's inability to be conscious of his own
reasoning; he is accustomed to take the essential points

'

lOO
for granted and so reasons from particular cases. 1
Piaget's test sentences, "Half 6 is 3 because

~

i

I "

and

'

"Half 5 is not 2 because/," do not seem fair to ask of

,I

children who have had no number work whatever in school,
' but they were given out of curiosity to know how these
childxen would handle it.

Two of them handle both sentences

correctly.

·

No. 1. I 3 and 3 are 6. I there is 1 in the middle.
(He might have said, "It is 1 more than 2 plus 2,
but he has given a logical reason.")
No• 8. I 3 a.nd 3 make 6. / it is more than 2. (It could
have been stated more clearly by an adult but this
is a logical reason).
Five others finished one sentence correctly; four of them,
the easier problem.
No. 2. / they are both half; 3 is half.
No. 3. I if you cut 6 right in two in the middle, you
would have two 3 1 s.
No. 4. I if you take away 3 from 6 . thetl!t_ll be 3 left.
No. 7. I if you took an apple and cut it in half and
each half in 3 pieces, there'd be 6 pieces. (A roundabout way, but correct.)
No. 10. I you 1 d have to take 1 out to make 2 half~
These children give a correct logical explanation in har-

mony with the arithmetical rules.

It will be recalled that

the first one quoted, No. 5, gave a meaningless
''

e~lanation.

No. 3 probably has the correct idea, since she finishes one
correctly, but she takes it for granted that one understands
her meaming and so is not explicit,

I·'- ,

come that near to 5."

'I

because it doesn't

The other children of the 12, Nos.

6, 15, 19, and 20, simply shake their heads and refuse to

I~;:

~Of.

,

J. R. , 29 •
J' '

' 1
i
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f ! dish the sentence.

They do not, however, f1nish the

sentence as Piaget gives an instance of a nine-year-old
d oing, "Half 9 is not 4 because

Another

1

1
I he can't count."

because 1 of logical justification is completed

correctly by seven of the twelve children.

The following

are typical.
Paul s~ys that the road from his house goes down all
the way to the school and goes down all the way back
from school. Jean says tha t's impossible because I
No. 1. I it has to go up to go down. (Idea of necessity
in relationships.)
No. 4. I he goes down-hill to school and up the hill
to the house. (Correct, but does not justify her
statement.)
No. 6. I you couldn't go down all the way there and
all the way back. He'd have to turn around and go
up the hill. (Mixture of pronouns but correct lo gic.)
No. a. I it would be uphill back. He'd have to go up
too.
Such phrases as

11

it has to," "he'd have to,"

11

it would be,"

indicate the presence of the idea of necessity and an attempt
at justification.

Contrast Piaget's statement, "Even when

the child has reasoned correctly ••• he cannot justify his
reasoning, because he is accustomed to take the essential
points for granted."

2

None of these children exhibit a heterogeneous use of
the word 'because' itself, but handle it intelligently,
in the majority of cases, to meet the need.

In only 5 sen-

tences out of the 108 separate 'because' sentences given to
the whole group to complete, is the word 'because' confused
with any other conjunction.
1

.

J.R., 26.

z
J .R.

I

29.

Neither is it tn any of their

'

'

I

r

~~
•

,
I

t
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!
'

I
I

i
'

original sentences.

Piaget 1 s

e~amples,

taken

~rom

children

6-7:6 j : in these same tests, show confusion of 1 because' with
1 and' and 'in f:such a manner that. 11
Enough e~amples from
this group have been given to show that they tally closely
to the criteria given by Piaget (which have been alluded to)
which mark the beginnings of the third stage of socialization
of language and thought.

It is true, nevertheless, that

I

~
I

among themselves they take the easy way and do not exert

;

themselves to use the more explicit speech, but continue
the ego-centric habits.
··They evidence a healthy development toward abstract
reasoning, as for instance in the correct though . simple
completions of the logical 'because• sentences by eleven

~f

"

them in at least one instance, by several of them in two

I

,.

or three instances, and by two of them in all (one of these
two being one of the two youngest members of the group).

:

75% correctly complete the first sentence, requiring a logical

1

because•, 65% correctly finish one of the arithmetical

sentences, and 65% the sentence about the road.

The average

percentage for the correct completion of the three logical
'because' sentences is 72%.

These are higher than Piaget 1 s

results with eight-year-old children, but he worked with a
group of 180 children, probably a more heterogeneous group.
It is to be expected that this group of twelve with an

1

Cf. J.R,, 17.

'

I

'

...

~; .

,,
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average chronological age of 6:6 at the time of this experiment, and an average mental age of 7:8 would show evidences
of advancement

beyo~d

children of just average intelligence.

It is to be remembered, also, that the chronological age
of these children then ranged from 5:11 to 7:6, and two
of the youngest ones did as well as, and, in some instances,
better than the oldest member.

This indicates that not

only mental age, but I.Q. is a determining factor.

Since

explicit understanding and use of abstract reasoning do not
appear before the age of 11-12, we are not looking for it,
but there seems to be evidence through their use of 'because•
!

I;
I!,
I

in these experiments that they are already entering upon the
age of implicit logical reasoning.
If this phenomenon (juxtaposition) really lasts
up till the age of 7-8 ·, we must expect to find,
even at this age, that when the chil dr en are
asked to complete a sentence which implies a
definite relation, there is a certain runount of
confusion between the various possible,. relations.
Only this element of confusion will prove that the
relation was not implicit in the child's mind,
and that the child was really incapable of establishing the correct relation.l
Since our genercd conversation in school play group
study is only from the standpoint of the group, there is
not enough individual material to warrant any individual
study in the spontaneous use of

because 1 •

1

points of general comparison may be made.

1

However, some
Later, the study

J,R,, 15 f.

-

)~:"'.;...

-
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f

104

of our single child in other groups will point. out how very
general this is.
In the play period the children talk in short, simPle
sentences, illustrating juxtaposition by lack of conjunctions,
while in the free conversation period they indulge in the
habit of stringing statements to ge ther with 'and' and 'and
then,' offering many illustrations of juxtaposition and
syncretism.
That there is no pains taken to synthesize their statements when interested in activity, is plain, since there are
only two instances of 'because' and one of
in their 694 remarks in school play.

a logical

'so'

These are all made by

No. 1 and in both uses of 'because' it is causal, the first
being a rare, pure causal (dealing with external phenomena).
1) I can make myself some blue because there is green

and yel low there.

2) That's my place 'cause that's where I put the water

in.
3) There wasn't any brown, so I used red.
There are many instances where a 'because' is implied but
the meaning is as clear as in adult ellipsis'.

Instances

from story-telling show how No. 8 and No. 15 put in a 'because'
correctly which was certainly inferred in the original but
not stated; these children catch the causal relationship,
however, and put in a 'because' in the retelling of the story.
Nevertheless, this does not keep them from stringing many
statements together in their own conversation.
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No. 20. (practically average) likes to

e~ress

herseaf

in this way:
A man came past one night and he said, "Hello," and

I said, 11 Hello, 11 and he said, "Do you want a ride?"
and I said, "No."
The following illustrates a common style of language in
play:

No. 2. I almost got my chair made. I just got two
more legs to make. I put sticks inside to make the
legs.
Notice the short, terse sentences.

However, in school play

there are 10 ins t ances of 'if', 3 of 'then', 4 of the •so'
of purpose, and 5 of 'but 1 of vague discordance, although
these indicate nothing of interest particularly in logical
arran gement.
It is in the free conversation period that we find
everything strung together in long sentences.

While all

t he children fall into this form occasionally, it is of
interest to notice that the one boy most prone to its use
is the one with the lowest I.Q. in the larger group under
consideration, No. 27.
only 7:7 M.A.

He is the child of 8:8 C.A., but

He shows very little evidence of an eight-

year-old in his conversation, for the most part he talks
as a child very much younger.

Here are typical

e~amples:

1) First time I went I saw someone and I said "Hello"
and I went on the scenic railway and I lost my breath
and it kept on and it goes in the dark and you don't
see where you're going and you keep going and you
· land in the water and the water splashes on the window.
2) One time I went up-town and I saw two fire-engines
and one fire-engine bumped into a street-car and they
brought a little tow-car for the fire-engine and a big

,.
{
i
~
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tow-car for the street-car and the fire-engine began
to tip off the tow-car. It tipped up on bne end. It
went 'boom' and the street-car went 'boom' and the
glass went to pieces and we all got dizzy and the
tractor bumped into the street-car and the street-car
carried the building right away.

~··

These are "dyed-in-the-wool" examples of syncretism, or

j

thinking in confused wholes, and of juxtaposition, or the

'

lack of synthesis.
Even the ones who handle 'because' so well in experimental tests, when with other children frequently

"

ju~ta

pose their ideas.
Here are extreme examples:
No. 2. Last Sunday I went down-town and we went around
town and we saw a great big water-wagon and we saw a
great big hose under the water-wagon and they were
putting the hose down in a great big hole in the middle
of the street to wash it out. They took the great big
hose from the water-wagon and put it on a faucet of
the fire-hydrant and filled it up.
No. a. Once a little boy ate lunch and went out in the
garage and got into the oil and the little boy had to
go to bed and I had to sit in a " chair. Let me think,
there was something else. We had a gun and we pointed
the gun at the dog and he'd run and then we ate waffles
and then I went home. We had lots of fun.
No. 1. (Just after the long tale of the wreck told by
No. 27, cited above) Somebody ought to take up a house
and put it on wheels and take an engine off the track
and have a little thing to hook the house to the car
and have the front .of the house in back and that would
be the observation car.
While these examples are typical of most of No. 27's remarks,
the other three children many times talk very differently,
as our various illustrations show in other chapters.

Examples

were taken from them to illustrate how in the same child
at t his stage the beginnings of implicit logic and the signs
of ego-centrism exist side by side.

'

.

'
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It is when the child is relating an
he falls most noticeably into this habito
readily with

1

expe~ience

that

They respond

because 1 to the teacher's questions, but

since it is the rule to leave them to their own devices and
merely listen, _.she seldom asks questions during these periods.
(In the use of conjunctions, all remarks, answers included,
are considered.)
Examples of 1 because 1 from free conversation:

..

-~

'.

1) (No. 20 has shown and described autumn leaves she
brought to the teacher. The teacher asks of the
group, ~Where could she find autumn leaves like that?")
No. 8. Out-doors. ( What makes rou think so?) No. 1 • . .
Because we hear them. (Logical)
.
2) (The teacher has finished reading them a story and
asks ., "How old was Beth?") No. 19. Five. (Why?)
Because there were five .candles on the cake. (.Lo gical)
3) (A child is showing something she has made from
the school clay and the children discuss whether each
one can take home what he has made. The teacher asks,
"Who can tell us why we don't take it horne?") No. 19
We don't take it home because there is not .enough for
all of us. (This would be causal were it not tha t
she is giving the reason for her opinion.)
The following a re from their own descriptions or experience:
4) No. 1. (describing a picture) They're digging the
hill down 'cause the country doesn't want it here.
{Psycholoo-ical)
5) No. 2. fTelling about his baby-brother) Hy mother
turns the water off. My brother likes it, 'cause he 1 s
scared of the water. (Psychological)
6) (They are talking about making dolls.) No. 1. I can
make one out of a stocking 'cause the teacher showed
us how in kindergarten. (Causal, relationship of two
facts)
7) No. 16. (talking about riding horse-back) We just
rode the big one, 'cause the little one gets scared.
(Psychological)
8) No.4. (They have been talking about the deep-water
way. No. 27 has said they are making an ocean. This
child calls it, digging a well.) We went out to Dad's
Point but we couldn't get there because they are
digging a well. (Causal)
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Notice how she contradicts herself.
n't get there."

11

V/e went ••• but we could-

She knows so well herself that they started

for that place that she thinks everyone will understand.
This, besides the example of

1

because 1 contained, illustrates

how little pains children take to make their meaning clear to
each other.
Conversation between children is therefore not
sufficient at first to take the speakers out of
their ego-centrism, because each child, whether
he is trying to explain his own thought or to
understand those of others, is shut up in his
own point of view. This phenomenon occurs, it
is true, ~ong adults. But these have had at
least some practice in arg~1ent or conversation,
and they know their faults ••• because experience
has shown them the appalling density of the human
mind. Children have no suspicion of all this.
They think that they both understand and are
understood,l
We must not forget, however, the illustrations we have given
from this group which show effort to explain points to each
other and to compare opinions.
E~amples

of logical

1

if 1 :

1) No. 1. (to a ·~ remitrk of No. 20 that her baby brother

is 9 years old) He wouldn't be a baby if he was 9
:years old.
2) (Talking about phonic rhymes) No. 1. It would go
up there {Pointing) if it was.
3) No. 10. (talking about the paper chain on the
Christmas tree) If it was long enough it mi ght come
down again.
There are frequent uses of

1

but 1 which fulfil their

vague sense of discordance and ·some might be considered
implicit.
l ·

..

L.T,, 99.

There is also the use of 'only' as 'but•.

,.
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No. 15. ·We've got something else, only we didn't write
it down.
No. 8. (endeavoring on his own initiative to explain perspeotive in his drawing) This (pointing to a tree)
·
really is as big as this (pointing), only this is far
away •

.
l·

There is another instance of a •so 1 equivalent to •therefore' which should be mentioned in addition to the five used
by the three children of the experimental group.
.,

No. 12. (about his picture) I started the house and 1
made it crooked, so I started it over again.
Examples of juxtaposition and syncretism might be
multiplied but it is enough to say that vague and implicit
relationships are more common throughout the -general group.

.
i

The child, unconscious in most instances of the need of
proof, does not naturally use expl i cit relationships at this
age to his

equals~

Again, nearly all exruapl es of any a ttempt

at logical relationships come from the half and usually the
third having the highest I.Q.

One point stands out cl early:

When these children do make use of 'because' they do not
use it in a heterogeneous manner which Piaget states is
1:

natural up to 7 and 8.

Also the few who us e

1

so' as equi-

11

valent to 'therefore' do it correctly, but there is no t a
single instance in their spontaneous conversation in these
groups of 'although' or 'even if'.

A few

e~amples

will be

brought out in the case of the one child studied with adults.
One would think from these examples of their spontaneous conversation that most of them had never>heard of
'because•.

However, the experiments and their answers to

"
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the teacher disprove this.
with its use.

They have become

~amiliar

Observations carried out all day, under all

conditions, would undoubtedly tell when.

Merely as a matter

of interest, the word 'because' was .used spontaneously 215
times by the group of twelve in their answers or conversation during the experimental period, outside of the experiments on the use of conjunctions and outside of story-telling
and explanation.

These were distributed throughout the group

and were almost entirely causal or logical.
Summing up the material from home play we give these
few examples, the first two of which are most interesting
because they come from a little girl of just 5 who is over
7 mentally.
1) S. Maybe you can't use it.
D. Maybe I can't use it?
s. Yes, because it 1 s my' ,car. (Causal)
2) D. This dol~'s name is Sock. Do you know whyl I
.
want you to tell why.
s. Because it was made from a stocking. (logical;
gives reason for a name.)
··
3) D. Let's play p ar tner tag.

No, we can 1 t, because

you have to have two partners to chase and two to
run. There aren't enough of us. (Logical justification ~Y rule.)

All the instances of 'because' in this group, though few,
were used by these two children, so there is no need to
give further examples.

Compare with these examples the

statement:
Note the correct use made of 'because' at the
age of
In the three lists of complete vocabularies given by Mlle Descoeudres 'because' is
used by the 7-year-old but not by the 5-year-·o ld

st.

1~--··· ~--------------'~--------------------------------------------~~----------~-~

.lll
child. 1
We have also the correct spontaneous use of 'because' by D.
·'

many times in experimental tests and in 67 examples in
spontaneous language in these short periods of observation
between 5:10 and 6:2.
Let us turn now to examples of the child among adults.
Before giving these it is
considers the

1 because 1

imp~rtant

to point out that Piaget

of psychological relation as inter-

mediate between the 'because' of causal

e~lanation

and the

'because' of logical explanation or justification.
The relation_here is empirical in a sense, since
it is & question of two facts and of a causal
explanation. In another sense, however, it is
logical, since it introduces a reason, an intelligent motive as cause. We have here as much a justification as an exnlanation.
We have distinguished this third type because
children have a tendency to replace logical by
psychological relations. We gave an example of
this just now. "Half 9 is not 4, because he can't
count.•2
At no time can this be said to be true of t 'h is child.
·'

His

use of 'because' is as clear and correct as an adult's.
The examples themselves prove this.

Therefore, all of his

psychological explanations are as much logical as psychological and in his case, at least, no differentiation need
have been made for the reason Piaget has given, namely,
proneness to use his psychologioal reason whether it fits
or not.

The examples given are without · exception typical

of all.
1
L.T., 25.
2 .. :

J ·. R;' 7 f.

1~--~~.~--------------------------------------------~~--~~--------------------~--J

E_?Camples of the 'because 1 of psycholo gic,a l relation-
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ship (motive for a desire, command, or act):
From bed-time conversation.
1) We want a big circle -because we're going to play
games.
2) I ~eel as if I wanted to give them all my clothes,
because you wouldn't want to be poor like that, would
:you?
3) You don't want to know, do you? ' Cause you like
surprises, don't you?
,
4) You do that, because I can't do it~
5) I say that every day, because I love you more and
more.
6) (Has been telling how to play Charley-Over-the-Water)
Does Charley hurt the birds? I hope not, because they
are pretty. (Involves an evaluating judgment) (The
rest of his comment is so interesting, it is included)
They just fly around and look pretty. Just like some
people. I've heard people say, "I've nothing to do,"
and someone s~y, "Just stand around and look pretty."
At the family meal.
1) Put this where I can't reach it, because I want some
of it saved.
2) I didn't mean to tease, mother. When I do things
with the tops of things, don't be scared, because I
really woUldn't do what you didn't want me to.
3) You remind him not to forget, mother, 'cause I don't
want him to forget •
. 4) I want you to sit and keep me company tonight because
i t .1 s kind of hard to have a mustard plaster.
Examples of causal explanation (relationships between
two facts or events or phenomena):
From bed-time conversation.
1) The teacher had to help me first, because I didn't
fit the right-colored balloon into the right hole. A
funny little dotted man holds them up in his hand. It
tells by the place for the balloons what color to put
in and you put the right colored paper balloon in
the place, red, green or yellow, or whatever it says.
2) Remember that last night of Christmas vacation when
I lay in bed learning those things (books of the Old
Testament). I didn't get sleepy because I was talking.
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3) (In a bed-time story, the stare have been called
'sparkling lights.•) But they aren't sparkling lights;
they are other worlds. Maybe our world is a star to
another world under it. 'Cause that's the way they are,
one world above another.
4) (Why did the pebbles put in the water raise the level
o! the water?) Because they took up eo much space. (This
was nothing that had been rehearsed; an entirely spontaneous answer.)
·
5) (He has asked, "Is it always the same I that wakes
up in the morning" and to find out wh¥ he asked the
question, I ask, "What do you think?") I didn't know.
It must be, though, 'cause it always looks the same and
has the same feelings and the same life.
This last examples belongs equally, if not more, to those of
logical 'because' but since it involves his explanation of
the phenomenon of individuality, it is placed in this group.
The same is equally true of the next example.
6) Oh, mother, are nails steel, (What do you think?)
Yes, because they stick to this magnet.

These examples show that this child is interested in using
the genuinely causal 'because' (causal explanation of external phenomena), rare with children of this age, according
to Piaget.

1

At the family meal.

1) Mother, he can't have his pie, because he hasn't

finished his lettuce yet.
2) K. can't go to orchestra, because he's got a broken
strap. (On his saxophone?) Yes.
3) Well, they could just .walk in there 'cause there
wouldn't be any door. They wouldn't have to open any
door.
4) I don't know why you feel it when your foot goes ~o
sleep, because the house doesn't feel it when you go to
sleep on the bed. (Why is it that the house doesn't
feel it?)

1

.J .R, :, 13.

ll4
5) Because it's made of wood, it isn't al:ive.
E.?a.mples of 'because 1 of logical justification or

e~lan

ation (involves proof or be ginnings of proof, or connects two
ideas, or gives a reason for a judgment or opinion):
Bed-time conversation.
1) That's easy, because I know where Michigan is.
(Reason for~ judgment.)
2) (Proving location of elephant's mouth.) Yes, 'cause
I've seen him curl up his trunk like this (motions).
3) I wonder if s. knows how to work B.'s (movie-book)
yet. I think she does, because they're awfully easy
to work. (Reason for opinion.)
l .

Fam ily meal.

I~

~) I heard them talking about giving you those pencils,
· but · I couldn 1 t tell you, because if you tell anyone,
then you can't give it to them. (Justification by
social rules.)
2) I think ~eople with black or brown eyes are safest
at ni ght. {His brother asks, 11 Why 11 ?) Because they
don't show. (He criticizes his own reasoning.)
3) I forgot, because their eyes are shut ••• If their
eyes are shut, robbers don't know who they are.
(Whose eyes?) Anybody 1 s. (Why?) A eat's eyes show
in the dark ,when they'l:'e open, .so (logical 1 so' equals
'therefore') I don't see why anyone's wouldn't.
4) (He has given his idea of attitude as the tone of
voice one uses. His brother asks him why.) Because
when X. talks too loud sometimes, mother says she
doesn't like hie attitude. (He is justifying a definition.)
5) (He has bewailed the fact that a brother is using
somethi ng of his that he considers valuable. The
brother asks, "Vfhat do you mean, valuable? 11 ) Because
it cost a lot of money. (Justifying a de~inition.)
6) (He and· his father are talking about letters of the
alphabet which can't ever look as if they were upside-down or side-ways. His father suggested the
letter 0 as one of them.) It could be sideways,
because it has to have the long part on the side.
7) It could be turned sideways, because it's taller
than it is wide.
·
8) Maybe Daddy can (something others have tried to do
and failed), 'cause he's a man. He's the oldest one
in the family. If he can't do it, nobody can.

-

' . >T.

n·
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Summary of 'because' for bed-time and meal-time:
Psychological
Motivation
Bed-time
Meal-time

Causal
Logical
Explanation Justification

Total

9

10

6

25

8

9
19

17

34
59

17

23

From these examples it is evident that this particular
· child, when with adults at least, is strongly interested in
studying out the logical reason for things.

Piaget finds

it otherwise with children of this age, but as he himself
maintains about the questions of the subject he observed,
the only way to test these hypotheses is to carry the study
out with as many individual subjects as possible, since,as
in the case of the boy who asked so many causal questions,
it may have been due to the special interests of the child. 1
At least these examples under consideration seem to the
observer to tally with Piaget 1 s requirements {referred to
before) and examples of the use of the logical

1

because 1 •

It would be interesting to study other examples as
those illustrating the use of the logical 'then' or 'so'
which are equivalent to 'therefore'.
stances of both.

But at least we will note one of the use

of a 'but' of implicit discordance.
use of

There are many inPiaget says of this

·'cut':

In short, the only cases in .which the term 'but'
really denotes an implicit discordance, are those
1

cf •

L T
--!....-!.1

34 • .

.-'.

:
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in which the word occurs not at the beginning ·
but in the middle of a sentence, and of a sentence containing a causal relation whether logical or psychological. Now such sentences were
not to be found before the a.ge of 6 1 and the
two examples we have between thf ages of 6 and
7 are anything but unequivocal.
He then gives e~amples (age
have no eyes and mouth."
right."

st):

I

':
'

'·

"Suns are round, but they

:

"It is more than that, but that's

Compare with these,

11

:

I heard them talking about

'

those pencils with your name on, but I couldn't tell you,
'

because if youmll anyone then you can't give it to them."
There are many others as clear as Piaget 1 s examples, but
this shows the use of it in our subject at 5:11 in a very
clear form.

use 'although!
,
1

'

It seems strange that this child should not
1

though 1 , or

1

even 1f 1 correctly in more than

2 of the 9 sentences for completion, and the word 'therefore'
in only 2 of the 5, since he uses their equivalent correctly
at home ( 1 then 1 and 'so' equal to 'therefore') and at school.
Examples of 'though'.

I~

1) ! 'didn't lmow. It must .be, though, 'cause it always
looks the same. • •
2) I think Jesus has a soft thing up in the sky t hat He
lights every night and morning and puts up high in
the sky. He always has daylight, though, because He
always has the sun.
Examples of 'even if 1 •
1) (Talking about peanuts at the meal) Even if it took
a long time, you'd .roast them till they were done,
wouldn't you, daddy?
2) (Playing school at bed-time) Sometimes she (his real
teacher) says, "Pencils down," even if we aren't through.

-

ll7
It is of interest to note an increasingly

frequ~nt

use of

this conjunction outside of observation time, as "I will,
even though I don 1 t want to," etc.
The

e~amples

given of his use of conjunctions, especially

at the family table, show a definite progress into the realm
of synthesis.

Here he uses the greatest nmnber of conjunctions

(and correctly) and gives definite proof, therefore, that
for him the feeling that he is a member on equal terms of
this adult group arouses in him a growing need for direction
of thought and checking of statements by reasons and beginnings
of proof.

These findings seem of special interest since Pia-

get makes the statement,
There is still a great deal of work to be done
ori the intercourse between children of different
ages, between brothers and sisters, and above all
between parents and children.l
It is because of such findings, also, that we have

~aid

stress on mental rather than chronological age as the criterion for various stages of socialization of thought and
language.
of

It is interesting to note that the only instances

~u~taposition

at meal-time are when he falls into the

monologue type of conversation or thinking aloud and not
being interested for the moment except in his own activity
or thought.
E~amples:

1) (Talking to himself at the table)
1

J,R,, 208.

You should take
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a little bite of something else, then a

~ittle bite
of something else; a lit t le bite of olive, then something else; and bread, then something else; and milk,
and that will be all; potatoes, then peas • • •
2) (He has been talking to the rest of us about a playhouse and children's clubs, but launches now into an
ego-centric type of speech, thinking aloud with an
audience.) I am going to be a carpenter when I am big
and I'm going to work alone and I 111 get up early in
the morning and go to work on a room and I'll have
another man working on a room way off there and then
we'll work on a room together in between and that way
we'll get t he house done.

These instances show the distinct difference between the
effort at synthesis in his socialized language and in the
remarks he makes simply thinking aloud, with no idea of adaptation · to another's thoughts, thereby indicating the close
connection which, as Piaget has pointed out, exists between
socialization and synthesis of language and thought.

There

are examples of much interesting material which show a quick
selecting of an essential point in another's conversation,
a checking notanly his own thought by another's, but another's
by his own, as when his brothers talk of a ·ball-game score
~

being 7 to 7, immediately the child e?.Cclaims, "The.n it was
a tie,•

Or when it was mentioned that George Washington

married a widow, he quickly says, "Then she wasn't a widow
any more."

Again, his father has made a general remark re-

lating to the conversation, "What if we couldn't think?"
'
D's immediate remark is "We wouldn't know anything unless

we saw it, then if we couldn't see anything we wouldn't
know anything."
There are many other examples of logical

e~lanation.

i•

-
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using 'if ••• then ••• • but enough have been
with other

e~a.mples

giv~n

in connection

to show that their use is frequent.

A wealth of material in four almost equal sets of re-

I
I~

marks shows the extreme difference between· this child's type

'

of conversation when with a group of adults and when with
children of his

own age, although he is noticeable in his

school group for more socialized expression.
Taking the one child studied at home as well as at

l

·}

1

I· '

~

school, we find the following percentages of 'because' to
his total remarks:
In school play~ • • • • • • • • •
In school conversation • • • • •
In home play • • • • • • • • • •
Average for s.chool groups • • • •
Average for 3 children's groups •
In conversation with 1 adult. • •
At the family table • • • • • • •
Average with adults • • • • • • •
The variations between the groups

• .1.3~
•
•

.3.5*

.1.0%

• .2.0%
• .1.9%

• .2.5%

• .5.3%
• .3.9%

is evident.

Thus,

as in the case of the proportion of the child's ego-centric
to socialized language, it is not feasible,

bec~use

of the

~

circumstances under which the observations were taken, to

.

make strict comparisons with Piaget's figures.

His sub-

jects were studied for hours at a time a.t school, while
our observations were necessarily limited to daily halfhour periods with each group.

ro.:

CHAPTER VIII
.The Ohild's Ability to Handle Relationships .
.,

In studying the development of childish reasoning,
Piaget lays emphasis on the child's inability to handle
relational situations.

Syncretism, or failure to analyze,

and juxtaposition, or failure to synthesize, show lack of
necessity in child logic, and in his inability to handle
i

relational situations and ideas of relativity the child

I'

reveals his failure to grasp "reciprocity existing between
different points of view ••• Necessity and reciprocity constitute an essential character of logical thought---its
reversibility.ul
In testing these relational judgments, he uses the

f~ve

absurd sentences of the Binet-Simon test for ten-year-olds.
1• A poor cyclist had his head smashed and died
on the spot; he was taken to the hospital and it
is feared he will not recover.
··
2. I have three brothers: Paul, Ernest, and myself
(I changed this to 'sisters' and to girls' names,
since I am a woman).
3. The body of a poor young girl was found yesterday,
cut into eighteen pieces. It is thought she must
have killed herself.
4. There was a railway accident yesterday, but it
was not very serious. The number of deaths was only
forty-eight.
5. Someone said: "If I ever kill myself from despair,
I won't choose a Friday, because Friday is a bad
day and would bring me ill luck."~
In his results, the order of difficulty was as follows:
1 ... , -•··w--

J ;.R·; ·, 134.
2 ._. , -· ·--~.

63.

~.

,,

..

'
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The questions of the three brothers and of
Friday were the most difficult. The ques·tions of accident by far the easiest •••• It
is because they (the latter) appeal directly
to the sense of reality without any presuppositions about the data ••• In order to discover
this absurdity (that of Friday and the brothers)
the child has therefore to place himself at the
point of view of the person who lays down the
premises. The reasoning takes place relatively
to a given point of view, which is a psychological operation of far greater difficulty.l

I'

He goes on to show how the children do not accept the premises as such but stick to their own point of view,so do not
I

~ ~~

· ..;~

reason from these premises in a purely deductive style.
Thus the difficulty of reasoning formally
(i.e., of admitting a datum as such and deducing what follows from it) is the real
difficulty of the test. That is why this
test is, in our opinion, better suited to
the age of 11 or 12 than to that of 10. Indeed, there was an interval of at least a year
between the success of this test and that of
the accident tests.
We are now in a position to understand
what formal reasoning really consists in, and
how its structure may be influenced by soci~l
factors such as ego-centrism and the socialization of thought.2
·-

•

<

..r
'

i~

He goes on to show how at the age of 7-8 the child begins
to •distinguish hypothesis from reality 11 and that this stage
corresponds with the "development of the logical

because 1
and the beginnings of correct deductive reasoning.n 3
1

Our results from the tests go to prove conclusively

1 '

'

J.R., 64.

2 --· '.
J , R-,, 66.

3For detaile~ discussion of these absurd sentences see ~~
Chapter II.

-

."
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why some of our children do not correspond to his s:tage
chronologically.
No. 1 is the only one to pick out the absurdity in
all 5 sentences.
1) The doctor couldn't help his head because he died.
2) No, ~ou haven't, because your self isn't one of your
sisters. (How many sisters have I, then?) Two.
3) She couldn't cut herself up in 18 pi~ces. She would
be dead.
~ 4) It was serious, because they were killed.
5) Because he couldn't work on Saturday and there wcUldn!t be anyone to work on the lawn and pull weeds.
(Corrects himself without any suggestion) Oh, it wouldn't make any difference after he killed himself, if
it brought him bad luck, because he'd be dead already.
It wouldn't make any difference what day he killed himself; it would be just the same.
No. 2 passes the first three successfully: No. 3 answers
correctly concerning one: No. 4, two: No. 5, none:

No. 6,

three: Mo. 7, two: No. 8, three: No. 10, one, and decides the
accident in test four was serious but doesn't say why: Nos.
15, 19, and 20 do nothing with any of the sentences, but No.
20 exclaims over test 4, "Whew, tha.t 1 e a lot.

They shouldn't

have been killed; they should have been careful."

It is

striking that every one who sees the absurdity in any one
sentence sees it in the one about the sisters.

None other

than No. 1 get the Friday test, and even he was on the
wrong track until he caught himself.

The rest make all

. sorts of answers from "I don't know", "Friday is a good day;
I don't lmow," to such as "'Cause it was on Friday and she
didn't want to kill herself; she wants to forget about it."
But the point we wish to emphasize is that eight of the
twelve children do the sister test correctly, as follows:
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No. 2. It wouldn't be right, because you counted yourself. I 1 d just count my brothers. (He explains
thoroughly about his own 2 brothers.)
·
No. 3. You counted yourself; you had 2 sisters.
No. 4. no, it wouldnJt be right; you could skip yourself out. You're not yourself's sister.
No. 6. You said you had 3 sisters. This way you'd only
have 2.
No. 7. No, it's not right, because there's only 2.
There's only 3 sisters in the family. You've only got
G. and M.
No. 8. You don't count. You're not a sister to yourself.
No. io. You only have 2, ·because you're not your sister • .
The tests passed were all clearly stated.

All of the children's

remarks on sentence 2 have been given to show how clear they
were in their ideas about it.

There is no confusion in the

minds of these children about myself as a sister to the others
but not to myself, or between the phrases, "I have sisters"
and "We are sisters."

These are common errors of Piaget's

subjects. Our further experiments on the reciprocal relationship of brother and sister carry out and prove these findings.
Such results prove adequately that these children are
developing away from ego-centrism and that our low percentage of ego-centric remarks is significant.

Some of these

children are able to handle these tests involving a development in the . beginnings of formal logic.

At least this test

confirms our opinion that mental age is a truer guide than
chronological, but that I.Q. is the most determining factor
and that mental tests which allow a child to answer if
possible some tests noticeably beyond his years are more
indicative of individual ability.

It is to be regretted

l
\

l

I

.\
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that no one was available to give each of these twelve children an individual (Stanford-Binet) test.

The group test

given, while a general guide, does not differentiate far
·

..J."

enough the individual ability, and possibly the individual
tests would change the relative position of certain ones
in

~his

group.

The one child in this group who had been

tested i ndividually ·ranked noticeably higher than in this
group test.
To test further the ability to handle relationships,
we asked the following questions, which Piaget used in his
tests. 1
1. The brother and sister test.
1. How many brothers have yout And how many sisters,
How many brothers has each one of .them (in turn)? And
sisters?
.
2. How many brothers are there in the family? How
many sisters? How many brothers and sisters altQgether?
3. There ,are three sisters in a family. How many
sisters has A? ••• B? ••• C?
4. Are yo~ a b~othe~ (or a sister)? What is a
brother (or a sister, according to the ,sex of the child)?
5. Ernest has three brothers, Paul, Henry, and
Charles.

How many brothers has Paul,? ••• Henry? •••

Charles?
,
6. How many brothers are there in this family? ·

II. The right and left test.
7. Show me your tight hand~. Your left. Show me
your right leg. Now your left.
a. Show me my right hand. Now my left. Show me
my right leg. Now my left. (During the questions the
,experimenter must sit opposite the child.)
-. 9. (A coin is placed on the table to the left of
a pencil in relation to the child.) Is the pencil to
the right or to the left? And the penny.?
10. (The child is oppQsite the experimenter, who
has a coin in his right hand and a bracelet on his
left arm.) You see this penny? Have I got it in my
right hand or my left? And the br.acelet?
11. (The child is Qpposite three objeqts in a row,
L · ...
.J ,R,- ,98 f.
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a pencil to the left, a key in the middle, and a coin
to the right.) Is the pencil to the right or the
left of the key? And of the penny? Is the key to the
right or left of the penny? And of. the pencil? Is
the penny to the right or left of the pencil? . ,And of
the key? (Six answers altogether.)
.
12. (,The same questions as before, with three objects
in a row opposite the child, a key to the left, a piece
of paper in the middle, and a pencil to the right. But
the objects are only shown for half a minute and are
then covered over with a copy-book( and the answers
are taken down. The child is told): Now listen,
I 1m going to show you three things only for a tiny
.moment. You must look very carefully and then afterwards tell me by heart how the things are arranged.
Look out ••• (the experiment) ••• Well now, is the key
left or right of the piece of paper, And of the pencil? etc.
The results of our tests do not coincide with Piaget's,
since he finds the degree of correctness to advance steadily
with age.

We can only offer our results with this comment:

The children who think most clearly in all situations handle
these correctly: the children who are most prone to juxtaposition, and most prone to thinking in confused wholes, fail
in some respects, but even so they are considerably beyond
what Piaget finds according to their age.

<·

,
Age.Tests passed by Piaget's subjects. 1

'

5
.6

7
8
9
10
11
12

o.

Test 7.
Tests 2 and 7.
Tests 2, 7, and· 9.
Tests 2, 3, 7,8~9 and 10.
Tests 2 J 3, 4 I I 8 I 9 J and 10 •
Tests 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.
Tests 1-10 and 11.
Tests 1-12.

If Piaget intended tests 11 and 12 ·to be answered from
1

J.R., 100.
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the point of view of a person opposite the child, then we
cannot count our tests 11 and 12 in that light.

We took

the difficulty of these tests to lie in the relative notion
of right and left in handling several articles and had the
child answer them in relationship to hie own right and left.

Our findings should read with that in mind.

up to that

point, however, these children passed tests beyond their
age as indicated by Piaget 1 s results.
Results of these teste, in group of twelve by individual.

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

No. a.·.
No. 10.
No. 15.
No. 19.
No. 20.

MieGed none.
Missed none.
Missed none.
Missed one-half of
Missed one-half of
Missed none.
Missed one-half of
and test - a• .
Missed none.
Missed none.
Mi ssed one-half of
and tests 6 and 8.
Mi ssed one-half of
Missed one-half of
and tests 5,6, -a.

test 4 (definition of brother).
test 4 (definition of brother).
test 4 (definition of brother)

test 4 (definition of brother)
test 4 (definition of brother).
4 (definition of brother)

test

It will be seen that 35% of the children fail to give
an adequate definition of brother or sister while handling
the ~elationship problems correctly.

The other

25% who

fail in the definition fail in from 1 to 3 of the other tests,
test 8 included in each case.

It is evident that for these

children definition is more difficult than the handling of
reciprocal relationships.

They implicitly understand what

a brother or sister is, and given a situation they handle
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the relations accurately on the whole.

Test 4, therefore,

is the only one not passed according to Piaget's standard
(Any test in which only one or two points are passed must
be considered unsuccessful and a test is considered passed
if answered correctly by 75% of the children).
It should be kept in mind that these children's ages
range from 6:2 to 7:8 at the time the mental tests were given,
and that these experimental tests were given two or three
months earlier.

Only three children in the group were be-

low I.Q. 113 and none below 101, and that fact would necessarily influence our findings.
on 200 children.

Piaget's experiment was tried

He comparies this brother and sister test

to the Binet-Simon test ("I have 3 brothers, Paul, Ernest,
and myself") and nlaces the successful solution of such a
test at the age of 11.

Any one who has witnessed a mental

test understands that the individual child may pass certain
questions far beyond his chronological age

~ccording

to his

individual ability, and the net results of all his answers
determine his level of mentality.

Piaget everywhere fails

to consider this question of individual capaeity, or else
in dealing with larger groupe counts on his results being
those which approximate average mentality.

However, only

half of our group give an idea of relativity in their definitions of brother or sister and that would bear out
the conclusion that the sense of relationship is not fully
and clearly

u.~derstood by

mental age is 7:8.

a group of children whose average
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In the first place, it should be noted
that the first part of the question {Are you
a brother?) hardly presents any difficulties
after the .age of 4-5. The correct definition, .
on the other hand, is not found till the age
of 9, and by correct we mean that which implies
in one way or another the idea that in order
to be a brother one must have a brother or a
sister,l
Examples of correct definitions:
No. 1. A brother is a boy who is born into the same
family with another boy or girl. A sister is
a girl wbo is born into the same family with
another boy or girl.
No.2 • A brother is a boy. I'm a brother 'cause I'm
my baby's brother. Or a brother could be a
sister's brother.
No. 3, A sister is a girl, if she has sisters or
brothers. A brother is a boy if he has sisters
or brothers. (She turns around brother and boy,
but her meaning is clear.)
No. 6, A girl is a sister if she is sister to a brother
or another sister.
No. 8, A brother is a boy. Two boys to be brothers .- ·
hav~ to be in the same family.
No.lO. A brother is a boy. They are brothers if they
only have one mother; if both have the same
mother.
Some of these definitions have emphasized the idea of the
brothers having to be in the same family.

This too is a

criterion of correctness.
The correct definition is therefore that
which implies the idea that there must be at
least two in the same family for there to be
a brother or sister. The child often knows
this without being able to express it straight
away, in which case he must be helped to make
his ideas explicit. There is a good proportion of such correct definitio~s from the age
. of 7 onwards (average of 6Q%,2J,
1

2

...

J,R,, 104,

J,R., 106,
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E~a.mples

of incorrect definitions:

No . 4, (An only child) A sister is a girl that lives
with you. I have a cousin, but she lives in
Texas. You can't be a sister, because you're
a lady. (Can't ladies be sisters?) No, they
have to be girls. (E~lanation)
.
No. 7, A brother is a boy, (Are all bo?s brothers?)
Yes. (Wnat makes them brothers? Because girls
wear dresses they are sisters •. T, hasn't any
brothers. Is he a brother?) Yes, he's a brother,
,
No, 15. (This little girl has had one sister, who has
died.) (Were you Helen's sister or brother?)
Sister. (What is a sister?) I don't know. God
makes them sisters. (Are .all girls sisters?)
No • . (Why are some of them sisters?) Because,
they died.
This child's ego-centrism is evidenced in her finalistic
reply, "I don't know.

God makes them ••• ", also in her not

separating her definition of sister from her own individual
case and also in her contradiction of her own previous statement that she was a sister but "girls are sisters because
they died."

This example emphasizes the following points

of Piaget 1 s about child thought and reasoning: finalism, a
justification at any price, inability to separate thought
from one's own viewpoint, and inability to retrace steps
of reason resulting in contradiction of wha t one has just
said,
No, 19,
No, 20.

~irl. (Are all girls sisters?)
Yes. (Has M. any brothers or sisters?) No, .
(Is she a sister?) Yes,
.
A sister is a gi~l. (What makes. a girl a
sister?) Because they look alike and have
dresse~ alike,

A sister is a

This common answer, "A sister is a girl" or "A brother
is a boy," is "the most primitive definit1on."l
1 J ,R,, 104

In spite
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of their having passed the tests except in the matter of
definition, there are all types of definitions in this
small group.

This point is to be noticed; all accept the

notion of a brother being a boy and a sister being a girl,
but there is nothing in this very incomplete idea which
incapacitates them for solving their brother-sister problems when confronted with them, those brothers and sisters
being boys and girls, and their own home situations involving brothers and sisters.

The notion of relationship

is only partly developed in some of them, that is, enough
to handle actual situations presented but not enough to
put all these points into verbal definition.

There is a

definite step between these two situations which Piaget
emphasizes in other places but not in treating this problem, that is, the distinction between perceptive and verbal intelligence • .
The most difficult point in the right and left test
for these children was that of the relative notion of right
and left when considering it as opposite to one's own right
and left.
to notice.

Only 3 of the 12 failed here, but it is a point
Even though they could handle most of the

relative situations of several articles to each other,
they did it in relat1o nship of right and lef~ to them.
The · test in which the experimenter's right and left was
e~actly

opposite theirs was a step more difficult for these

three children.

Nevertheless they failed in only one test
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involving this point.
The general difficulty with reciprocal relationships
and relationships apart

fro~

oneself is evidenced in a few

of these children, showing the truth of Piaget 1 s statements relating to child thought in general.
There are two matters of interest in regard to No.
8 1 s answers which throw li ght on this individual child.
His individuality and keenness of intellect are evidenced
throughout the experiments and observations.

When asked

the first question, "How many brothers have you?" it is
revealed that he is an only child.
"Let's suppose I have some."

Immediately he says,

So he is asked to take the

family of another boy in the group and answers all questions
correctly· in relation to him.

In the matter of the defini-

tion he brings out clearly that he has no notion that living together makes boys brothers, a common idea among
children, according to Piaget.

This child's mother is a

business woman, and he lives during the week in another
family.

Here is his statement about his deflnition: "If

my mother keeps him he isn't my brother.

If my mother

has (evidently 'bears') him he's my brother.
to be brothers have to be in the same family."

Two boys
Every-

where this child likes to figure things out, as he says,
to demonstrate and to give reasons.
who, when giving s·e ntences with

He is the same child

1 because 1

in them, volun-

teered the information that he was giving reasons.
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Such data along with the experiments give the interesting side-lights on these children from the standpoint
of individuality.

No. 2 also offers many interesting com-

ments showing his superior mind.
an extremely interesting trio.

These, with No. 1, form
As a rule, the boys are more

responsive to the experimental tests than the girls, who are
more shy.

Certain points, nevertheless, stand out in regard

to the girls.

No. 3 is meticulously painstaking: Nos. 5 and

19, superficial and careless; No. 20 gives out the impression that she understands everything, but when it comes to
the testing point is often superficial and apt to confuse
her statements.
In addition to these tests Piaget used syllogisms as
dealing with ideas of relationship and obeying the laws
reason. The syllogisms used were: 1

o~

1) (Burt's ·test) Edith is fairer than Susanne; Edith
is darker than Lili. Which is the darkest of the
three, Editht Susanne, or Lili?
_
2) If this anim.c;l has long ears, :1, t is either a mule
or a donkey. If it has a thick tail, it is either
a mule or a horse. Now it has both long ears and
a thick tail. Which is it?
3) Some of the inhabitants of .the town were English.
All the English from that town were killed in the
war. Are there any inhabitants left in the town?
(Names changed, but same test.)
These tests are to bring out the t endency in childish reason not to think in terms of relationship, but in an absolute sense, and the child's inability to understand before
10-11 alternation, opposition, dis jun'c tion, that is,
1 - . ·'

J,R,, 87, 161, 233.
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handling logical multiplication of the verbal . pl~e. 1
Thus the difficulty in handling the logical
relations would seem to be a new consequence
of childish ego-centrism; ego-centrism leads to
naive realism, and this realism, which is by
definition the ignorance of all relations, leads
to logical difficulties every time there is ~
question of substituting the lo gic o~ relations
for that of membership or inclusion.
Very few of the children show any ability to deal with
these syllogisms, proving Piaget's statement for the child
under 11-12 (except in rare instances).

Some of the answers

to these tests are offered to show the great variety in this
smal l group.
No. 1 answers all of them correctly, and his will be
given in full.
1) Susie. (Why do you think Susie is the darkest?)
Lili hasn't very dark hair. Edith has a littl~
darker, Susie has a little darker than that.
2) It is a mule because it has long ears and a thi ck
tail. ·:: .AJ·horse has a thick tail, too, because I've
been swished by •em. A horse has short ears.
3) Yes, because all the inhabitants of the town weren't
English.
This child seems to have no difficulty with judgments of

relationship.

Neither has No. 2, although he has to be

questioned to give his reasons.
· 1) Edith and Susie have the darkest hair. (Which one

of them has the darkest?) Susie, because the other
is lighter than Susie. ,
2) It • e a mul~ ,because mules have thick tails and big
ears.
3) The niggers and a lot of different people. All the
rest were killed. (Who?) The English.

No. 8 is beyond his depth in test 1 and not explicit in
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test 3.

3

~l
~

Edith; ehe 1 s half dark and half light.
Mule, because he has a big furry tail and long ears.
Yes, the Chinese, Indians, and Japanese. (But he
doesn't definitely eliminate the English.)

No. 7 shows ability in this direction but fails in test 1
and doesn't go far enough to generalize.
1) Edith, because she is darker than Lili. (Is that
all?) Yes. Faile to consider the relative degrees
of fairness in the three girls.)
2) A mule, fcause he has long ears and a thick tail.
(Why ien 1 t it a donkey or a horse?) Because the .
donkey isn't like a horse. A mul~ looks just like
a horse if you wanted the horse to have lqng ears.
3) Yes, because the Italian people were left~ (He
himself is of Italian parenta~e.He fails to generalize, "Everybody but the English.•)
No. 10 answers only teet 3 correctly.
3) ·Might be any people left, American, Chinamen, anybody except the English.
These have been given to show the varying degree of development of these children in reasoning and their advance in
. this particular over the others, who gave such answers as
follows:

1) No. 3. Edith. (Why?) You said she was.
No. 4. Edith, because she has dark and light hair
and I don't see how she could change it, so I 1 11
leave it dark.
No. 5. Edith. I don 1 t know why.
No. 6. Edith, because she has darker hair.
No. 15. Lili. (Why?) 'Cause it is.
No. 19. I think Susie is. (Why?) •cause you said
Edith is darker than Susie. (Sh~ contradicts herself.)
No. 20. Edith, because she was born that way.
These children who do not correctly deal with this syllogism generally give Edith as the darkest.

They hear her

called 'darker' last, and judge from that in an absolute
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sense, with no idea of interrelationship of

~he

three.

No. 20

merely gives a finalistic answer and makes no attempt to
reason.

No. 15 gives an arbitrary answer and justifies it

at any price.
2) Nos. 3,4,5, and 15.

It's a donkey, 'cause it has
long ears •.
No. 6. A horse, 'cause it has a thick tail.
No. 19. I guess it's a mule. I don't know.
- No. 20. A horse, because horses do have a thick tail
and big ears.
3) No. 4. Yes, lots of people; girls, boys, ladies, and
men.
No. 6. Yes, soldiers and some of the other people.
No. 15. No, because they got killed.
No. 19. No, because they were killed in the war.
No. 20. Three people, I think, because they watched it.
We cannot enter into fuller details in the discussion
of these tests but offer our conclusions that Piaget is right
in his statements concerning the results of ego-centrism :in
child logic, that its

accompany~ng

juxtaposition and syn-

cretism make it unconscious of reciprocal relationships or
necessity of relations one with the other and cause it to
build no

b~archies

of thought and to be Unable to give

the reasons for its conclusions by retracing its steps.
However, we do emphasize again the difference in individual
children as brought out in this small group and.point out
that everywhere it is the same chiidren who show the greatest advancement from ego-centrism toward logical thinking
and that many elements influence that development besides
chronological age, as I.Q. plus mental

~ge,

plus environ-

ment, and particular bent of the individual child's mind.
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It is true, also, that all the evidences of ego-centrism
coincide with Piaget 1 s conclusions and seem to be tied up
together, consequently the lessening of one in a child
brings a lessening of the other.
The study of the child's idea of relationship is further
carried out by asking for definitions of words involving
the idea of relationship.
1. Family.

Piaget divides definitions of 'family

into three stages; 1) Those emphasizing the fact of living
together or defining by name; 2) those making use of the
idea of blood relationship; 3) those generalized so as to
include all blood relations.l
Examples of Stage 1.
No. 3. A family is a whole bunch of persons that have
the same name.
No. 6. A family is lots of people. It's the people
who live in your house. My family is my brother
and father and mother, the people that live at our
house.
Examples of Stage 2.
During the second stage the idea of relationship intervenes but does not yet supplant the
fact of living together.2
Many of these are stated in a general way and make no
mention of living together, so muld be a step further, in
our estimation.
No. 2. A family is a man and a woman and a lot of
children. (Arty man or woman?) A mother and daddy
and children. ·Nobody 1 s else .would be, because they
aren't theirs.

".•

137
No. 7. People are in every family. In mY family are
father, mother, R., E., and I.
No. 15. A family is people. (Who are in your family?)
My grandpa and grandma and uncle and daddy and mothe~
and me. (They live together.)
No. 19. A family is people, a mother and a father and
maybe boys and girls.
No. 20. A mother and father is a family, or a mother
and father and children. (Notice the confusion between
•husband and wife' and 'father and mother.')

'.
't

. :'

,,
t

'

t

The next two emphasize other generations.
No. 1. A family is when a man and a woman marry each
other and have a child, I mean, children. My daddy
was my grandpa's and grandma's child. In his family
were grandpa and grandma and G. and F.
No. 10. A family is a father and mother and children.
My father had a family too.

.. ·

'.:t,

Example of Stage 3.
No. a. (Explains rather than defines, but emphasizes
successive generations.) My daddy married my mother •
.People get born and they marry each other. You have
to marry someone outside your family. That's the
way I'm going to do. My daddy and mother made a new
s. family, then there are one, two S. families, and
when their boy marries there's another s. family;
that's three.
Piaget connects the development of these different
stages with the lessening of childish reali-sm and places
the age of 9 for the second and 11 for the third. 1 He relates this to the fact that on the average the correct
definition of brother does not appear until 9. 2
The writer's attention has been called to the fact
that in America there is not the close connection between
successive generations in families that there is among
1

2

J.R., 119
Cf. J.R,, 107 and 119.

-
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the French, and therefore we should attach more importance
to the division between emphasis on living together and
emphasis on blood

relationshi~

especially when that . relation-

ship is treated by the child in a general way apart from
his own family, as "when a man marries a woman", etc.

This

more impersonal statement of the case marks the third stage
of the American child when no reference is made to his
immediate family or those living with him.
II. Town and State.

We offer a few notions of the

relation of part and whole, which is the main idea of this
definition.
No. 1. A town is a great big place with lots of houses
in it. (Which is larger, Stockton or California?)
California. Stockton is in California.
,
No. 2. A town is a lot of stores and Christmas trees.
(This was early in December.) (Are there other towns
in our state, besides Stockton?) Yes, Oakley, Monterey, Oakland, etc. (Which is larger, our town or our
state?) The state is bigger than the town.
No. 3~ A town is a lot of houses and a lot of people.
{Which is bigger, Stockton or California?) California.
(Are you in Stockton and California?) Yea.
No. 4. I don't know what a town is • . ! ' know this town
is Stockton. (How do you know you are in a town?)
Because you see stores and houses. A state is like
states of California and Texas. (Which is bigger,
Stockton or California?) California is bigger than
Stockton.
,
No. 7. A town is where people go to buy things and
where they live; where they buy clothes for little
boys and girls. (What's the name of our town?)
Stockton. (What is California?) A state. (Which is
bigger, etc.?) California. (Are there other towns
in California?) Yes.
No. 8. They build a lot of houses and make a town.
A state is a whole bunch of towns. The United States
is a whole bunch of states. (Which is larger, etc.?)
California. It is a big state and Stockton is only .
a town. Stockton's in California. (Names other towns
in California.)
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No. 10. A state is like a law. It owns the town. A
state is bigger than a city.
No. 20. A town is a street and you go buy things in
town. (Is Stockton a part of anything?) Sure, it's
a part of California. (Which is bigger, eto.j)
California is a bigger town. (We call it a s4ate.
Has California more than one town in it?) Yes (she
names several).
,
No. 6. (Defines a town as) A big place and you haven't
been there before. (She answers "I don't know" to the
other questions.)

·'

The other three children make no attempt to define or
to answer questions, but 66% of these children, though they
give rather realistic definitions, show a thorough acquaintance with the fact that a town is a part of a state, the
state being the larger and containing the smaller, and so
show again a development in this

<laS-e

at-a notion of relati-

vity.
III. Half and Part.
No. 1. Cut anything right straight in two in the middle
and one side would be half and the other would be the
other half. \How many halves can anything have?)
Two. A part is piece of anything.
.
No.2. Half is if you cut it in half. ··A part is a
. piece of anything. (How many pieces would you have,
if you cut it in half?) Two. If they weren't halves
you could cut them in .five or six pieces maybe.
No. 3. A half is a part. Cut it right in the middle.
Right in two. A part is a piece of anything.
No. 4. A half---if you cut a cake in the middle · in· two
pieces. (How many halves in anything?) Two. A half
has to be cut in the middle. If you out it in three
or four pieces they would be parts.
No. 10. A half is anything cut in the middle---two
halves. A part---cut anything in the middle and it's
two parts. You can have more than two parts. A half
has to be two parts.
No. 20. A half---you cut it right in the middle and
the two pieces are halves. When anything is broken
one of the pieces is a part.
The other children make no distinction between 'half'and. •part'
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Half of the children have given co r rect defin·i tions and
distinguished the difference between

1

part and 'half'.

In

other words, half of the group have given their correct
relationship to the whole.
IV.

Friend and Enemy.

Piaget does not give this test,

but accepts the findines of Mme. Passello, a Geneva schoolmistress, "that at the age of 7 the notions of 'friend' and
'enemy' axe still devoid of relativity." 1 We have examples
of definitions involving relativity.
No. 1. An enemy is a person that hurts you and that
you have to shoot. A friend is a person you know
and that doesn't hurt you. You know him and he likes
you.
No. 3. A friend is somebody that people like and that
the friends like the other people.
No. 4. A friend is a boy, girl, lady, or man. (Wha·t
makes them friends?) 'Cause they know each other and
'cause the y like yo.u and think you're nice.
No. 7. (Repeats and emphasizes 'together') Friends are
people that stay around together, a.nd go to shows
together, and go to dances together, and go to picnics
together. (That do things together?) Yes.
No. 8. If you know somebody and he .lirkes you, that's
your friend.

No. 19. They are friends when you t alk to them and
they know your nrune and like that.
The

followin~

is an interesting example of an

involving relationship.

e~planation

This is given by the oldest member

of the group, who, aside from this instance, does not stand
out above the others.
No. 10.

\ :f.R•.,

131.

An enemy is a spy.

The Germans were enemies
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because they didn't like the Americans; the Americans were enemies of the Germans because they didn't like each other.
Some of these examples just quoted involve varying degrees
of relationship, such as knowing and liking , hurting and
shooting; others give an idea of a more reciprocal relationship in such terms as 'if you like them and they like you'
or by using the words 'together', •each other', etc., in their
remarks.

Others are one-sided,

as~

No. 2. A friend is a boy or n girl you know. You know
them and play with t i.1em.
No. 5. A friend is a neighbor that you know.
No. 6. A friend is a person that comes to stay with
you sometimes.
No. a. (See above) An enemy is not your friend; he
doesn't like you.
No. 10. (See above) A friend is a person you know.
It is of interest to note that twelve years after the
World War 75% of these children declare

that they have

never heard of an enemy and so do not know what one is.
Another point of interest and one along the line of our
study is the frequent use of 'because' by

th~se

children

when talking about these experiments, giving reasons for
their definitions or opinions, that is, using the logical
1

because'.
Through these experiments have been bfought out evi-

dences of ego-centrism which Piaget mentions, but also just
as strong evidence of a developing sense of relativity.
indicating a decline of ego-centrism in this group in varying degrees according to the individual, beyond their
chronological age and far more in accordance with their
mental age.

CHAPTER IX
How the Child Reasons
If the definitions of

1

townf given by the children

and mentioned in the last chapter are called to mind, childish realism is apparent in many of them.
11

a place where you buy thin gs,"

11

For instance,

a big place and you have-

n't been there before," "a lot of stores and Christmas trees."
These definitions are allied to definitions by usage,
though not stated in the form 'it is for, etc.,' and come
from the child's own particular viewpoint.
tions of

1

friend,

1

Their defini-

'brother,' and 'family' were more gener-

ally stated and showed the further point of their development.

Being in the

1

in-between 1 stage of ego-centrism and

socialized thought, evidences of both are apparent.
With the decline of ego-centrism the child begins to
be more conscious of his reasoning and forms his first
logical definitions, but these are not exhaustive in the
beginning, the child defining by particular rather than
by

specific features.

Not until the age of 11-12, the

age of formal reasoning do they become perfected.

This

is due to his unconsciousness of the meaning of the concepts or words which he uses and this unconsciousness involves him in incessant contradiction and makes it impossible for him to generalize.

This unconsciousness of
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his own reasoning is particularly true of such concepts
as 'alive' or

1

strong', Piaget affirms, although the child

frequently uses these concepts in

h~s

own questions and

explanations.
Naturally, there is no question to asking
the children: "What is life?" or even 11 What does
'being alive' mean?" This would be to expect
them to possess th~ power of making abstractions,
and it would be absurd to conclude from the lack
of such power to the ability to be conscious of
meanings and to give definitions. The following
method, on the contrary, raises no difficulty. You
give the child a list of familiar objects, asking
about each in turn 11 Is it alive?" and adding after
the affirmative or negative reply, 11 Why is it
(or is it not' alive?" The only thing to avoid is
suggestion by persev~ration. In view of this, it
is best to begin with objects that are obviously a
alive or obviously inanimate, and then only after
making sure whether there is or is not a definite
systematization in the child's mind, can he be
questioned about o-ojects which strike him as doubtful.
The order to be observed is therefore roughly as
follows: A dog, a fish, a fly, then a pebble, a
table, a bench, then the sun, the moon, the clouds,
the rivers, fire, wind, a marble, a bicycle, a
train, a boat, etc.l
Among our subjects, the idea of 'life' being because
o£ movement or self-movement corresponds to : that of many
of Piaget 1 s subjects.

Also we find in the same child a

heterogeneity of attributes of life, with no attempt to
synthesize these into one general concept.

But we did not

ask these children for· :;a definition; we simply gathered
their ideas about life, and only three children offered

any general statement.
1

.

J ·.R. , 150 f.

The manner in which the questions

I

\
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are answered show.sthat the same child attributes life in
some instances to one cause and in others to another.

Only

two of the children who managed some or all of the syllo-.
gisms show any signs here of logical snythesis or any generalization of ideas.
In fact, in these tests we find the most evidence of
finalism, precausality, juxtaposition and contradiction,
lack of logical multiplication, etc., all of which Piaget
points out to be the accompaniments or fruits of ego-centrism.

Here we witness the greatest evidence of the Iin-

between' stage in which these children are at present.
Some of them have shown, as the tests and observations have
proved, a noticeable advance in logical thinking, yet through
these questions the evidence of how implicit their logic
is in general comes to light.

1

Synthesis and generalization

of attributes to the degree of making abstractions is be..

yond the ken of most of them entirely.
t.ro~particular

Here they

thin~

to narticular, without connecting these

different attributes into one general concept.
· To show how commonly movement or self-movement is
thought of as a necessary attribute of life, we quote the
following examples from different children:
No. 1. (A dog, fish, fly) Yes, because it (respectively) walks, swims, flies. (A table) No,
because it doesn't move and jump unless people
move it and carry it. (A bench, marble, bic¥cle,
train) (The same idea in varied statements.)
(Fire) No, because it can't walk.
. '
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He makes no mistake about what is animate or inanimate,
and offers the statement that being alive is moving, talking, and things like that.

'

!

No. 2. (A boat) I don't know. I think so, 'cause it
goes in the water. (A fish) If they're alive they
swim over or under the water, 'cause a fish has got
to breathe the water. (But he attributes life for
one reason or another to sun, moon, fire, and rivers.)
No. 3. (Fish) Because he swims he's alive. (Fly)
Yes, because he flies. (She adds,) a paper flyins isn't
alive, because it has no hands, feet, or legs. ('!'able
and bench) No, because they can't move themselves.
(She also calls clouds, rivers, fire, wind, a marble,
bicycle 1 train, and boat alive because they move.)
No. 6. ~A dog) Yes, it runs and plays. (A pebble) No,
(cause it doesn't move unless you pick it up. (Table
and bench) No, it doesn't move b¥ itself. (Fire) No,
because it doesn't move itself. {Talk to her about the
flames dancing; she insists on her reason, which is a
true one, of course, but incomplete) (She gives as
a· reason that marbles, bicycles, trains, and boats
are not alive the fact that someone has to shoot,
pedal, or make them go. She attributes life also to
the clouds, rivers, and wind because they move.)
No. 7. (Attributes life to dogs, fish, and flies
because they walk or swim or fly, and denies life to
pebbles, tables, benches, sun, moon, marbles, bicycles,
trains and boats, because they either do not move or
move of themselves.) (Clouds) aren't alive because
they dan't walk; they haven't any feet. (A river)
because it's just water moving around. That makes it
move around. (Wind) No, because it just moves around
the air and blows. (He is groping for some hidden
factor besides mere movement, but doesn't frame it
in clear terms.)
No. a. (Gives self-movement as a reason for life in
different cases and generalizes in regard to his idea
of life and movement when he says of pebbles,) No,
they lay on the ground. If things move around, I
know the~ are alive.
No.;. 10. Lays emphasis on "If they keep moving.")
(The sun is alive if it keeps moving. (The wind) is
alive sometimes because it blows. (A marble) Yes,
if you keep throwing it around. (A bicycle) If
somebody keeps riding it all the time. (A train)
If it's always moving. (A boat) If it keeps moving;
if it stands stil, it's dead. (I asked him if he
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:
'

was alive when he stood still, and he said,) Yes,
'cause I eat good stuff. (The reader will. remember
that this is the oldest child in the group. He does
not show the furthest advance in logical thinking.)
No. 15. (Calls several things alive 11 if they wiggle.")
No. 20. (Attributes life to a boat "when it goes.")

:
:

Thus the predominance of movement and self-movement as
attributes of life is evident.

Only two children fail to

name it, and yet No. 1 : and No. 8 are the only ones to make
any sort of a general statement about it.

(No. 1: "Being

alive is moving, or talking, and things like that." No.
8: "If thin gs move around:j I know they are alive.") No.

1,7, and 8 are the only ones who answer about each object

correctly; but they give precausal explanations for some
objects.

In spite of the two attempts at general state-

mente, there is evident lack in each child of putting "two
and two together• and making a general statement which fits
all cases.

They reason from particular to particular here,

and though they emphasize movement and

self-~ovement,

they

i-

also bring in heterogeneous reasons and fail to relate
them all in any way.

No. 1 comes nearest to doing so•

The same child who emphasizes movement or self-movement may bring in other criteria of life, such as talking,
the possession of hands and feet, the fact that "things
that shine aren't alive," and "God makes" a certain thing
alive.

In some cases a child answers many of the questions

and then says, "It just is (or isn't).

I don't know why.

I just lmow."

..

-
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· No.4 offers an interesting example of heterogeneity
of reasons for anything being alive or not alive.
(Dog) Yes, because he can walk. I never saw a man kill
a dog.
(Fish) Yes, when it's in the water, because there's no
hook going down there to kill. (How do you know it's
alive?) If he swims, he's alive.
(Fly) Yes, because they don't kill it yet. If a lady
kills them they're not alive. If a lady doesn't kill
them, they're not dead.
(Pebble) No, it can't walk or see or roll, not unless
a lady makes it roll.
(Table) No, because it ha s legs out it can't walk.
It can't see.
Bench) No, because it can't walk.
Sun) Yes, because it can make the day bright.
Moon) Yes, because it makes it bright like the sun.
Not as bright as the sun, though. tHere she brings
in utility as a reason for being alive.)
(Clouds) Sometimes they are alive, sometimes they
aren't. At n.i ght they're alive. Some days they aren't. (Eviden.t ly when they are not visible she considers them not alive.)
(River) Yes, 'cause it floats around.
(Fire) Yes·, 'cause it burns. If it burns something,
paper, logs, sticks, it's alive. (Effectiveness or
power the criterion.)
.
(Wind) Yes, 'cause it blows. Because it makes the
night cool when it blows. (Utility again.)
(Bicycle) No, because it doesn't go unless a boy or
girl rides it.
·
(Marble) No., it can't roll unless a boy or girl rolls
it.
(Train) Yes, unless a man turned the engine off. It is
then, 'cause when he turned the engine on it goes like
that {motions).
·
.(Boat) Yes, if a man and lady started it it would go
on the water.

!

She shows a confusion of ideas all juxtaposed with no thought
of synthesis.

Most often movement or self-movement is the

criterion, but i n the case of the clouds, for instance, she
does not take movement into account at all.

Although these

questions were all asked in succession, she does not connect
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her ideas or attempt to generalize.
offer this general thought,

11

She does, however,

Vlhen you die, you aren't alive.

· When you don't die, you are alive."

But this has nothing

to do with what being alive involves in many of her statements.

She deals with each particular case by itself;

hence, the disregard of any relationship between the several notions and the unconsciousness of any contradiction
in her statements.
The various answers of each child offer an interesting
study of these points but enough examples from each one
and the answers of this one child in the

entire~y

bring out

sufficiently the points we a.re discussing.
The same holds true of their answers about 'strength',
though there is more consistency here than in their answers
about 'life'

1

and greater similarity between the answers

of the different children.

But there is no attempt whatever

to gather the attributes into a general idea.

We followed

Piaget's suggestion of not asking outright for a definiti on
and no child spontaneously gave one.
In general, the children considered the wind and rivers
strong because of the rapidity of self-movement or because
of their power to move or to break other things, and tables
and benches strong because they hold things and people up.
No.1. (Emphasizes 'resistance' in saying of a bench.)
Yes, it's lots stronger than a table, because people
sit in it and bear down.
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No. a. (Shows his practical nature in his comment,)
You and I wouldn't be sitting here if it (the Bench)
wasn't strong.
Some of the children attribute 'strength' to tables and
benches because of the material of which they are made,
and going back of that, "if the wood is rotten, they're
apt to break."

Some attribute 'strength' to the ocean and

river because they hold boats up, but No. 2, who was one
of these 1 does not carry t his
about tables and benches.

t ~i ought

over into his ideas

He attributes their strength to

the strength of the tree from whose wood they are made.
No. 20. (Says of the wind, as do several others.)
When it blows, it's strong; when it doesn't, it
hasn!t any strength in it.
Only two children try to carry the same idea of 'strength'
lying in power to move over to a table and bench.
No. 7. (Denied at first t hat a t able was strong.) No,
there's nothing to make it go fast. (What about those
things on the table?) The table has to be strong to
hold them.
.
No. 15. (The wind) Yes, 'cause it makes you go always.
(Table) No, it doesn't move. (Bench) No, it doesn't
move. (Quickly changipg her mind) Oh, yes, it won't
break, 'cause it's a lot of wood.
We find nevertheless, little contradiction in the srune child's
answers about any certain thing, as Piaget did.

1

If, as

in the instances we quoted, the child chan ges from motion
to resistance as a necessary attribute of the particular
thing, he corrects his own idea about it and does not

1

Of. J .R.

I

156.
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deny life for the lack of the former attribut·e.

Never

does he accept both views at once, as of course he should
be able to do in the case of the river, but always gives
either one or the other attribute as a criterion.

Again,

these children are always reasoning from a particular
viewpoint.
We can agree with Piaget in his conclusions that two
particular points stand out from t his experiment, unconsciousness of thought processes resulting in contradiction
and lack of arrangement into a logical hierarchy of the
notions or ideas about a concept.

Concerning the contrast

in this matter between children and adults, we quote:
For most' ·of our ideas, too, are determined by
several heterogeneous factors and even by factors which are the same as those used by children.
Thus we, like children, define life as selfmovement, as the fact of having blood (or sap, or
any kind of circulation), etc. We also define
force as activity and as resistance. Where we
differ from the c b~ ldren we have been .·discussing
1s that we always have the component parts of
the concept si~ultaneously in mind. Thus we say
that a river has force because it flows fast,
but we do not deny that a bench has resisting
force even though it makes no movement. The
child, on the contrary, thinks, not simultaneously,
but alternately of the two determining factors.
When he is thinking of resistance he denies force
to rivers because a pebble sinks to the bottom ·
of the : ~ater, and when he is thinking of motor
force he denies force to a bench because it moves
neither itself nor any.thing else.l

1

J ·,R,, 156 f.
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Our ·eubj ects do not exhibit the same degree of contradiction that Piaget refers to.

When they attribute strength

to motion or to driving force the y do not deny it to things
standing still, as he avers some of his cases do.

In the

two instances only when children do -this, they immediately
see their mistake an a correct it, one without any question
Asked.

In their ideas about life, we find more contradic-

tion, as we have stated, life be ing attributed to motion
in some cases and the fact of moti on being left out of
consideration entirely in other cases.
str~ngth,

Also, in regard to

in a few instances, they say a table or a bench

is strong if it has someth in g on it to hold and not if it
does. not.

They are considering the outward evidences of

strength, not the constant elements of inherent force or
resistance.

These are questions too deep for the child's

mind to grasp.

But the point we are emphasizing is that

these children again are not as contradictory in their
statements as a greater degree of ego-centrism would entail.

These facts do not nullify Piaget's statements, only

emphasize again the

simu~taneousness

of a decline in ego-

centrism and a decline in its accompaniments.
certainly true that
they (the children) think of them (the
factors or classes) alternately, without
bringing · them together, and fhat is why
they cannot define the word,

1

.

'·

J .R., 160.

It is

152

and that
the reason why adult concepts a r e in a state
of equilibrium is that they are the products
of lo gic al addition or multiplication.l
·
Piaget goes on to shov1 how this lack of synthesis
is due to an over-determination of certain ideas and to
show the connection of all the features we have discussed
in our various chapters,

ju~taposition

and syncretism,

the child 1 s inability to use the relations of discordance,
his thinking from particular to particular, or by transduction, his overdetermination of certain ideas, his lack
of recognition of reciprocal relationships, his lack of
synthesis, and his irreversibility of thought, all these
either bound up with or growing out of e go-centrism, and
declining as it declines.

He discusses contradiction by

amnesia and by condensation, and t h e part -played in childish reasoning by such factors connected with c ontradicti on
as imitation and' assimilation of

reality~

We cannot take

up all these points in detail but would refer the reader
to the two closing chapters in his second book on the logi c
of childhood. 2 In these are gathered up all the points
which we have emphasized throughout this study and to which
we called attention in our introduction in our summa.ry of
1
2

J.R,, 160.
J.R3

,

Chap~ers

IV and

v.
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his two books.
What appli e s to the child is also true of
science. So long as Physics took absolute
space and time as its demain it reached a
certain de gree of development but came short
of any fundamental solution. But from the
moment that it was realized that the measurer
was relative to what he measured, the resulting relativity enabled physics, thanks to the
conditions of invariability and co-variability,
to attain objectivity. In the same way, so
long as t he child thinks he can reason directly
about things without takin g himself into account,
he will succeed neither in handlin g relations
nor in reachin g lo gical necessity. As soon as he
brings in his own ego as an element in these
relations, the child attains to the reciprocity
of relations and to lo gical strictness ••• As soon
••• as rel a tions become completely reciprocal, the
fertility of relational multiplication knows no
bounds, and generalization becomes possible. Nay,
more, this reciprocity is what explains the reversibility of all deductions and consequently
the character of strictness and necessity that
is peculiar to the reasonin g process.l

l

J .R., 197 f.

CHAPTER X
Conclusion
Because of the nature of these observations and the
constant comparison of them to Piaget's standards, we have
necessarily drawn conclusions in regard to each phase of
the development of our thesis.

There remain, then, only

a few general conclusions.
In the first place, we cannot emphasize too strongly
the gre a t contribution made by Piaget to the study of child
reasoning.

As a thorough analysis of the trend of develop-

ment and its different stages it forms a most enli gh t ening
basis for child study.

It has been more and more evident,

however, in the course of these observations and experiments
that he fails to emphasize the

followin ~

points: 1) The

importance of mental rather than chronological age in defining these stages of development: 2) The individual aptitudes or

differ~nces

in rapidity in development: 3) Th e

effect of t he style of language used in the child's home
on his own language development: 4) the socialising influence of that home or of his environment: 5) the necessit y
of adaptin g meticulous points of lan guage to the particular
language which is native to the child's country: 6) The
natural responsiveness or adaptability of the child to the
experiments tried.

But as a working basis for successive

stages of development, it is invaluable.
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It has been evident throughout that the smaller,
superior group was not to be compared to Piaget 1 s standards
for six-year-olds, but to the stage more nearly approximating their mental age, and the.t within that small group
of twelve mental age was but one, although a very important
item, in the child's individual development in the socialization of thought.
It was emphasized in the study of the individual child
how much greater a degree of socialization of thought and
language he exhibited when checking his ideas by those of
the family group and how in a lesser degree he used more
socialized language with one adult than with one or more
children.

These facts lead us to the importance of envii·-

onment in the development of child language and thought and
consequently in his reasoning.
One little girl, during the last experiments discus s ed,
asked me, "Can D. talk at the table?"
just to ask for things.

".Yes 11 • "I

c~ 1 t,only

My daddy 1 d give me a whi pp in g i f

I talked at the table just to tell him things."

If the

table conversation among the family is the most socializing factor in one child's life in the matter of language
and thought development, the other child is missing that
influence entirely.

This illustration is offered merely

to bring out the point of the varying environmental influences in this small group entering in to determine the
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degree of socialized thought of its

membe~s.

We agree thoroughly with Piaget in his suggestion
that such studies as his and those based on hismay prove
of great value to parents and educators.

I

.:1

•

Considering

such findin gs, how essential it is to adapt our training
to the child 1 s level of reasonin g and to be sure that he
understands us.

How often his proneness to syncretism may

lead him to select some unessential point and build his
schema about that, le aving him utterly and innocently unaware of wha.t we had in mind as important.

How many child-

ren in the past have been unfairly held responsible for
aspects of situations of which in their ego-centric outl ook
they were utterly unaware?
.
.
In the educational field how essential it is to take
these findin gs into consideration as to subjects taught and
methods of teaching these subjects, recognizing tha t the
child thinks first in confused wholes, and fails to analyze or to recognize relations.

The modern unit system

of reading is in harmony with Piaget 1 s findin gs, be ginning
with whole sentences, then gradully through familiarity
recognizing word units, and late-r analyzing these into
their individual letters, the.se letters finally in new
relationships to be built into synthetic wholes.

The

project system, also, beginning with the intellectual
realism dY t h e child, arouses his interest and cooperation .

·:

157
and when he is old enough to do so, abstractions based on
these projects may be made.

With Piaget's diagnosis of the

development of child thought and reasonin g as a guide, all
subjedt-matter can consciously be fitted to the child's
stage of development.
Many times Piaget hints at the remants of ego-centrism
existing in adults, but that through social inter-action
we are made conscious of our shortcomings and are en gaged
in a perpetual struggle toward maturity.

An understanding,

made possible by his explanation, of the stages by which
our own thought has developed and the consequent self-analysis marks a further step in our own development away from
the effects of ego-centrism.
There ma.y be room for criticism of Piaget in the emphasis which he puts everywhere on the ability to reason
formally as the acme of development and in his consequent
fine distinctions drawn between implicit' and pure lo gical
reasoning.

Everywhere this nicety of distinction has be en

evident in the tests which he applied.

It should be re-

membered, however, that even though formal logic and the
syllogism are but the shell or corpse of reasoning, they
are the evidence of the ability to separate oneself from
one's own point of view and to consider matters in a
relative light, which ability even in a practical way is
indispensable to maturity of thought.
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In our observations and experiments
able to follow up clues exhaustively.

w~

have not been

Vistas of further

investigation with the individual children have ·opened :up
but time and opportunity forbade following them up.

This

thesis is offered not as a conclusive treatise, but as an
interestin g study made in the light of Piaget 1 s theories
and findings.

A:ppendix
Since the completion of this thesis the wri.ter 1 s
attention has been called to the recent book, Child Psychology, by Margaret Wooster Curti, Assistant professor
of psychology at Smith College.

She devotes considerable

space to a discussion of Piaget's theories concerning child
thought and reasoni::1 g and makes the following comr:1ents.
It is only recently that we have had systematic
investi gations of children's t ho ught which have .
succeeded, as it were, in getting beneath the
surface.
The great advance in this respect has been
made in Switzerland by Jean Piaget.l
Ego-centrism is inevitable in early childhood but in thus calling our attention to its
importance in thinking Piaget has made a fruitful contribution, especially as he shows that the
other chief features of child thought are intrinsically related to this ego-centrism.2
No one has studied so thoroughly the actual
processes of empirical thinking in children as has
Piaget, or traced in such a penetrating way, by
means of systematic investigation, 'the progress
made by the child in powers of lo gical analysis. 3
In various places, howeve·r, Mrs. Curti calls attention
to the fact that Piaget narrows the concept of reasoning
down to formal reasoning only, and she remarks that if we
thus restrict reasoning we will find it rare among adults.
1

Margaret Curti, Child Psychology, 255.

2
Ibid., 257.
3-

Ibid. , 260.
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Compare the following statements to the conclusions
of this thesis:
The word method of teaching reading, prevalent now for years, is based on the realization
that it is natural for the child to react to whole
words first, and only later to read by ~utting together of previously perceived letters.~
One reason which might well be advanced for
adhering to this (Piaget 1 s) conception (of reasoning)
is that it might have a good effect on practical
dealing with children. Perhaps too much time is
spent trying to instruct through formal reason
young children who are really incapable of profiting by such methods.2
·
But according to our conception successful
integration of the whole personality cannot begin
until the child has acquired some conception of
himself as an individual in relation to other
people and some general idea or plan of what he
wants to make himself. Such an objective conception of himself the average child does not
acquire until the age of twelve or so, if we accept Piaget's analysis. Some for lack of knowledge or of sufficient innate intelligence, never
acquire it, and hence can never have well-integrated personalities. They may as adults have
desirable personality traits and distinct individualities but their outlook in life remains
essentially childlike and naive. 3 :
Not only the rate at which children pass
through the first primitive stages of thought but
the degree to which their ~atute conceptions of
the world and human life become rational are susceptible of control by adults, a point on which
Piaget does not dwell. There are differences of
opinion on the extent to which rational thought
should ·be applied, but it would be generally agreed,
probably, that the abi l ity to see the world in
an impersonal and objective way is essential to
1

Ibid., 233.

2 Ibid., 270.
3-

Ibid., 504.
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the attainment of what we might call "inner
harmony". The child must learn sometim·e , if
he is to lead an effectively integrated life,
to look upon himself as merely one individual
among an inconceivably large number of others
of past and future as well as of the present,
living in a vast world which is not organized
with reference to their wishes. And so, by
whatever means they may, those who bring up
children will wish to help them outgrow their
first crude ways of thinking and achieve rational standards of conduct, to the end that
sometime they ma.y learn, as independent and
mature personalities, thoughtfully to direct
their own livea.l

l

Ibid., 510.
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